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Abstract 
This working paper includes a collection of case notes written by the national judges who attended the 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers (ENTraNCE Judges 2017). The 
training programme was organised by RSCAS between November 2016, and October 2017, with the 
financial contribution of the DG Competition of the European Commission. The case notes included in 
the working paper summarise judgments from different EU Member States that relate to diverse aspects 
of competition law enforcement. This working paper thus aims to increase the understanding of the 
challenges that are faced by the national judiciary in enforcing national and EU competition in the 
context of the decentralised regime of competition law enforcement that was introduced by Reg. 1/2003. 
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1. Introduction 
This working paper contains the case annotations presented at the final ENTRANCE workshop on 7-9 
September 2017. The judgments reported in this collection cover a wide range of practices across the 
fields of competition law and state aid. Below the reader will find a brief summary of each judgment, 
placing some of the more significant cases in a wider context.  
Looking at the judgments as a whole, there are two striking features in the competition law 
judgments. First, compared to when the first case notes were published in this collection in 2011, we 
find that some judges are now more exacting in requiring that national competition authorities (NCAs) 
tell a convincing theory of harm when condemning restrictive business practices. The judgment in Cartes 
Bancaires, in particular, seems to have been very influential in this respect, see for example Mladinska 
Knjiga Trgovina Ltd v Solvenia NCA (section 4.1.) and FMS Software and FMS v. Lativan NCA (section 
6.3). In addition, we also see that a number of national courts are uncomfortable with the existing rule 
that resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements in vertical relations are automatically deemed unlawful 
(e.g. Asseco Business Solutions v Polish NCA, section 6.2), and find ways of allowing such practices – 
how long will it be before the CJEU is called to task to rethink its approach to this issue?  
The second feature is in relation to procedures: a number of the judgments apply the teachings of 
Regulation 1/2003 to help the interpretation of national procedures (e.g. Cyprus Telecommunications 
Authority v Commission for the Protection of Competition, section 3.1 and Lithuanian Chamber of 
Auditors v Lithuanian NCA, section 4.3). This is a little unusual since national procedures need not 
follow those of the EU: national procedural autonomy requires that these procedures are effective in 
protecting EU rights, but it need not follow that NCAs should have procedures analogous to those of the 
Commission. It might be that national courts consider that Regulation 1/2003 sets out best practices for 
the application of competition law and are thus seen as helpful in filling gaps in national legislation. 
The state aid law judgments show the difficulty caused by an unusual procedural design. There are 
two salient features that may be identified in the cases: both are well known already. The first is that 
many claims are made by firms who are asked to pay taxes and use state aid law as one of the legal 
mechanisms to try and avoid paying the tax because, it is claimed, the tax is in some way selective (see 
e.g. Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council v. West Wood Club Limited, section 7.4). Perhaps a 
notable feature of some of the cases below is that some national judges are now happy to determine 
whether the measure constitutes state aid on their own, and feel sufficiently confident to apply the 
judgments of the ECJ on the matter. 
The second feature of the cases has to do with the existence of parallel, interdependent procedures at 
the Commission and at the national courts. In particular, the long time it takes for the Commission to 
resolve certain cases hampers the role of national courts in safeguarding the rights of plaintiffs. 
Statements made by the Commission about the state aid aspects of a particular case pending a final 
decision are seen as particularly unhelpful by national courts. A particularly useful discussion of the 
difficulty of dialogue between Commission, ECJ and national courts is found in the Lubeck Airport saga 
(section 9.2). While in competition cases private enforcement is finding is way as an effective 
complement of public enforcement, in state aid the situation remain clearly unsatisfactory. Some 
fundamental reforms are needed if private enforcement of state aid is to complement public enforcement 
in such a way as to provide an effective system of enforcement. 
Procedural issues 
Judge Haijdinova (Siemens v Slovak NCA, Section 2.1) discusses a judgment where the issue at play 
was whether a fine may be increased on appeal, or whether the general legal principle found in the 
Slovak Republic, disallowing an increase in the penalty on appeal in criminal procedures, is to be applied 
in the field of competition law. The Supreme Court held, following principles derived from the case law 
of the ECtHR and CJEU, that the scope of application of fundamental rights protection for ‘hard-core 
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criminal law offences’ does not apply to competition law cases, holding that an appellate court may raise 
the fine set by the National Competition Authority. This is aligned with the position under EU Law, 
where the General Court is able to increase a fine on appeal.1 Whatever the fundamental rights merits 
may be, there is some good practical sense in allowing appellate courts to reconsider the fine upwards 
for often cartel members raise several weak points on appeal, and a risk that a fine may go up can lead 
to parties considering the strength of their likelihood to win on appeal more closely. 
Judge Rodin and Judge Crnogorac (Croatian Society of Orthodontics v. Croatian Competition 
Agency, Section 2.2 and 5.1 respectively) both discuss a case about the relationship between competition 
law and sector-specific regulation. They note how the national court excluded the application of 
competition law in favour of the sector regulator which had the power to fix minimum prices for dental 
services. This is the kind of case where perhaps NCAs can consider applying their advocacy powers and 
ensure that the sector regulator is made aware of the benefits of competition when setting out regulatory 
standards that are probably designed to safeguard quality care. Alternatively, a more hard-line approach 
for an NCA would be to apply Article 4(3) TEU, read jointly with Article 101 TFEU and challenge the 
statutory scheme as having cartel-like effects. It would then be for the Court to assess the degree to 
which the statutory scheme provided a procedure whereby the minimum price was set in such a way 
that the public interest is safeguarded or whether it merely facilitates collusion. 
Judge Constantinou (Cyprus Telecommunications Authority v Commission for the Protetcion of 
Competition, section 3.1) discusses a long-running saga of a refusal to deal case where the NCA accused 
the dominant player of denying access to facilities essential for a rival to enter the telecommunications 
market. The dominant firm appealed against successive decisions which were vitiated by procedural 
failures (regarding the composition of the NCA) and when a properly constituted NCA imposed a fine 
the applicant appealed on the basis that the action was now out of time. At the time of writing the 
Supreme Court has held that the action was not time barred. Interestingly the national court referred to 
Article 25 of Regulation 1/2003 in an attempt to align national procedures with those of the Commission. 
The case also shows that in refusal to deal cases NCAs should be able to act more quickly and one 
wonders whether interim measures could be used more frequently to ensure market access to rivals 
especially in markets that move as quickly as those of electronic communications. 
Judge Gonçalves de Melo Marinho (Public Prosecutors’ Office v NOS Communications, section 3.2) 
discusses a challenge against a decision of the national telecommunications regulator who had found 
that some telecoms operators had to facilitate number portability when consumers wished to switch 
provider and it required that providers in breach of the Portability Regulation should make payments to 
the providers to which consumers wished to switch. The appeal was brought to the constitutional court 
in an attempt to test how far the regulator’s powers to impose such fines were legitimate under the 
Constitution. The Court draws a distinction between the procedural guarantees available for hard-core 
criminal offences and the types of administrative offences found in the regulatory framework and 
upholds the imposition of the penalties, noting how the remedies serve to ensure portability by their 
deterrent effect, thus benefiting consumers. 
Restrictive Practices 
Judge Ugarte Oterino (Envelopes Cartel, Section 2.3) discusses a judgment where the key infringement 
was an export cartel whereby all national producers of envelopes created a single company for export 
which coordinated sales outside of the European Union. It appears that much of the discussion focused 
on whether there was an agreement among the market actors, but an issue which does not appear to have 
been explored is whether EU Law applied at all since the effects of the agreement were to be felt outside 
of the European Union. As the ECJ recalled in Javico v. YSL, a distribution agreement relating to states 
                                                     
1 However it has done so rarely, see Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF and UCB v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:380, where the fine was increased from €34.97m to €35.02m. 
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outside of the EU need not necessarily impact trade between Member States.2 That the national court 
here was faced with a restriction by object should not make a difference to the assessment of the effect 
on trade. 
Judge Dekleva (Mladinska Knjiga Trgovina Ltd v Solvenia NCA, section 4.1) reports on a bid rigging 
case where supplies made joint bids. The judgment is important because the national court applied the 
reasoning of Cartes Bancaires and inquired as to whether the facts revealed harm to competition. The 
court found that the NCA had not worked hard enough to establish any restrictive effect of the 
agreement, for example it noted that there wasn’t enough evidence to show a price increase and it did 
not analyse the extent to which the use of joint bids (which is allowed by the national public procurement 
rules in specific cases) could be justified. These findings are intriguing, for they blur the line between 
object and effect cases. By introducing an analysis of effects (whether prices go up, whether collusion 
may be justified) into an object analysis one has to wonder whether the category of agreements 
restrictive by object is going to shrink so much that it no longer exists. 
Judge Oana (OMV Petrom v. Romanian NCA section 4.2) discusses a cartel in a shrinking market. 
The undertakings sold petrol designed for cars without catalytic converters. The users of these cars were 
diminishing and so was demand for the specific type of petrol these cars need. Rather than compete for 
this shrinking group of customers the suppliers colluded to reduce output. The appellants were 
unsuccessful in their claims that the decision was vitiated by flaws in the procedure and in the 
substantive assessment of the facts of the case. This is a fairly straightforward infringement but it is 
illuminating that as with the judgment discussed just above (section 4.1) the court engaged in an analysis 
of the relevant market to test how far the agreement would indeed yield harm to consumers. 
Judge Einkiene (Lithuanian Chamber of Auditors v Lithuanian NCA, section 4.3) reports on an 
anticompetitive decision of an association of undertakings that set fees for certain services provided by 
auditors members of the association. An interesting aspect of the judgment is the reference made to 
Regulation 1/2003 to justify the imposition of a fine on the association and liability for that fine on the 
members. With respect, it is not clear why reference to Regulation 1/2003 should inform the application 
of national procedural law – perhaps the provisions in Regulation 1/2003 are seen as the correct 
benchmarks for effective enforcement? 
Judges Galante and Lobo (sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively) report on the OTOC case which is about 
anticompetitive tactics by the association of chartered accountants to reserve to its members certain 
lucrative markets for training professionals. The judgment is important for clarifying the role that 
associations of undertakings can play in coordinating anticompetitive conduct, in this case by excluding 
potential competitors. Judge Lobo’s annotation also remarks how the court had evidence of the adverse 
anticompetitive effects: some professionals that had attended other training courses which were not 
authorized by OTOC withdrew from these courses when they found out that the credits they gained were 
not recognized by OTOC: here is a clear exclusionary impact that harmed competition between service 
providers. 
Judge Valkadinova (Bulgarian Construction Chamber Cartel, section 5.5) reports on the Bulgarian 
NCA’s decision against a cartel facilitated by the applicant who established recommended prices for 
building projects by its members. A significant aspect of this case is that the prices set were not 
obligatory but the NCA and the court on appeal noted that this did not mean that the price lists could 
have no anticompetitive impact, for it hampered the independent setting of prices specifically by 
reducing the uncertainty about competitors’ likely behaviors. 
                                                     
2 Case C-306/96, Javico v YSL ECLI:EU:C:1998:173. 
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Vertical Restraints 
Judge Petrova discusses an agreement between a producer of refined oil (Biser Oliva, section 6.1) and 
its distributors fixing retail prices (in antitrust jargon an RPM agreement). What is remarkable about 
this judgment is that, applying solely Bulgarian competition law on the grounds that there was no effect 
of trade, the court rules that the RPM agreement is not anticompetitive inter alia because of the modest 
market share of the producer. As is well-known, under EU competition law, RPM is restrictive by object. 
It is thus refreshing to see a national court using economic expertise to establish that a producer with a 
market share of 5% is free to engage in RPM if he wishes to do so, given that this is unlikely to harm 
consumer welfare in what is most likely a market In which it faces fierce competition. 
Juge Dominiak (Asseco Business Solutions v Polish NCA, section 6.2) also presents a case where the 
manufacturer of computer software fixed the price at which retailers may sell its products. At the time 
of writing the Court of Appeal has ruled quashing the decision of the NCA – as with the previous 
judgment, the national court is unimpressed with classifying RPM agreements as restrictive of 
competition without any analysis of the market. How long before the CJEU reconsiders its stance on 
this issue? 
Judge Amerika (FMS Software and FMS v. Lativan NCA, section 6.3) also reports on a judgment 
which has been affected by the more economics-oriented approach. The facts were that a software 
manufacturer’s agreement with its dealers provided that each dealer who begins to negotiate a contract 
with a potential client should inform the manufacturer of the negotiation. If the potential client agreed, 
then other dealers would be forbidden from contacting the client. The NCA was rightly suspicious of 
this clause for it seemed to prevent intra-brand competition. However, the national court ruled that more 
analysis is required to test whether the agreement was harmful. First, it noted that the potential client 
had to consent to negotiating only with one dealer, and this could well prevent the arrangement from 
limiting intra-brand competition. Second, it may also be that this arrangement is efficient because the 
software has to be tailor-made for each client so that a consumer may prefer dealing with only one 
supplier with whom to discuss the specifications. This shows how national courts are becoming exigent 
of the need for NCAs to have a convincing story of why an agreement should restrict competition. 
Judge Panocha (Roland Polska sp. z o.o. v Polish NCA, section 6.4) discusses another RPM 
agreement in the context of a selective distribution network managed by the applicant. The RPM 
agreement dealt specifically with on-line prices. Evidence was unearthed that Roland Polska monitored 
prices and threatened dealers with termination if they did not comply. The NCA and Court concur in 
finding an infringement – this judgment stands in contrast to the more analytical approach of some other 
judgments in this collection (sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3) but this difference might be motivated by the 
concern a number of NCAs seem to have that online sales markets are a starting distributive channel 
that should be protected and promoted. 
Stefan Schlotter discusses the Deuter case (section 6.5) which raises a highly topical issue relating 
to e-commerce: how far a manufacturer can restrict the sale of its products via on-line marketplaces (i.e. 
the likes of Amazon). In this case Deuter manufactures high quality backpacks, and has a selective 
distribution network of dealers who may sell on-line on their website, and wished to prevent these from 
selling also via on-line marketplaces. The court in this case held that under the Metro I criteria a ban on 
on-line marketplaces could be justified because it allows the manufacturer to ensure that the quality of 
on-line sales was maintained, and it also added that consumers would otherwise be induced to consider 
on-line marketplaces as authorized retailers when in fact Deuter had no contractual relationship with 
them. This judgment is in line with the subsequent judgment in Coty, reflecting a good understanding 
of the economics of vertical restraints, which are harmless unless inter-brand competition is hampered. 
Judge Soares Torres discusses a case brought by the Portuguese NCA against distribution agreements 
forbidding passive sales outside the geographical market assigned to a number of distributors (section 
6.6). The main issue for discussion in this case was how far it was possible to apply EU competition law 
and how to determine an effect on trade between Member States. However, one thing that appears not 
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to have been considered is what difference the application of EU law would have made. It is not clear 
whether the parallel application of EU and national law (required by Article 3 of regulation 1/2003) 
actually makes any meaningful difference. In this case for example, the agreement was condemned as 
restricting competition. The original intention behind Article 3 was to prevent national competition law 
interpretations that would diverge from what was decided under Article 101, but one wonders if there is 
now sufficient convergence that this alignment occurs spontaneously. 
State Aid 
Judge Baker (Dellway Investments Limited & Ors v. NAMA & Ors, section 7.1) discusses an important 
Irish judgment where the state aid point was ultimately not determinative. In brief, NAMA is Ireland’s 
bad bank, designed to purchase non-performing loans from Irish banks. Its operation constitutes state 
aid (through it the state gives banks funds they would not be able to get otherwise) but this was 
authorized by the Commission to secure the financial stability of the Irish financial market. The 
claimants were persons whose loans were acquired by NAMA but who considered that their loans were 
not bad loans and they should not have been purchased by NAMA. The Supreme Court ruled that 
NAMA should have given the parties whose loans it obtained a right to a hearing and this sufficed to 
dispose of the case. On the state aid point the Court ruled that NAMA’s acquisition of these loans did 
not appear to offend against the decision to authorize state aid, and so there was no state aid granted 
which would go beyond the terms of the Commission state aid decision. 
Judge Gkana comments on Judgment 533/2016 of the Council of State (section 7.2) where the court 
discussed the appropriate basis for calculating interest in a state aid recovery procedure. The judgment 
is important for the close reading of EU Law sources and the attention paid by the Council of State in 
distilling which EU Law sources are binding on the national court. It reveals an interesting tension 
between the national court’s duty to apply the national law as it sees fit and the duty to cooperate with 
the EU: under the former simple interest would be calculated, since statements by the Commission about 
compound interest were not (at the time of the Commission decision) binding, while under the latter 
interest would be compounded to ensure state aid recovery is effective. The judgment shows the 
difficulties in balancing effectiveness in the respect of European rules with the application of national 
procedures. 
Judge Helm (section 7.3) comments on a state aid decision made by the Estonian State Aid Authority, 
were the national court had to consider the extent to which the aid had an incentive effect – on the facts 
it found that the beneficiary had already begun the work for which it sought state aid, a clear indication 
that the state aid had no impact on the commercial decisions of the beneficiary. The court recalls also 
the duty on the beneficiary to ensure that state aid rules are respected.  
Judge Noonan (Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council v. West Wood Club Limited, section 7.4) 
discusses a dispute where the plaintiff sought to avoid the payment of certain rates to the defendant local 
authority on the basis that this payment was state aid. The argument was that both it and the local 
authority provided sports facilities and thus any rates paid by the plaintiff would subsidise the work of 
the local authority on the same market. This claim appears fairly far-fetched as there needs to be 
evidence that the funds obtained are hypothecated to the local authority’s competing activities. What is 
striking however is the court’s reluctance to engage with the state aid arguments, suggesting a much 
more limited scope for national courts than that which the Commission would wish to see. 
Judge Dirvonas (section 8.1) looks into a similar type of claim. State aid was granted before the 
Commission decision authorizing the aid, and some of the funding for the state aid was funded by a levy 
on certain firms in the energy sector. One of them sought restitution of the funds it had paid. Much of 
the judgment hinges on issues of whether the claim fell foul of the limitation periods, and it reveals the 
complex legal issues that arise when states do not comply with the standstill obligation in Article 107(3). 
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It leads one to ask whether better deterrent mechanisms could be devised and made available to courts 
to secure compliance with state aid law. 
Judge Doina (section 8.2) discusses a state aid claim by the would-be beneficiary of state aid. The 
Romanian state had obtained approval for a state aid scheme for 10 years whereby certain undertakings 
would be able to apply for an exemption to pay certain fees (specifically undertakings had an obligation 
to buy green certificates and the state aid would exempt them from this duty). The plaintiff applied to 
secure this exemption and claimed that it was granted later than he expected with the result that he paid 
certain fees that should have been exempted. The issue for the national court was how far the plaintiff 
was justified in expecting to benefit from the scheme earlier in time. The national court makes reference 
to the decision of the Commission as a basis for determining the starting date of the beneficiary’s 
entitlement. This is an unusual damages claim which, as with the cases discussed previously, does not 
fit into the kinds of damages claim that the Commission would like to see. 
Judge Grassellini (section 9.1) takes us through the complicated ad politically delicate measures 
taken in 2008 to rescue Alitalia. She notes both the manner in which the national courts were able to 
justify an exemption from the application of merger rules by reference to wider public policy 
considerations and the manner by which the Commission analysed the state aid components, oddly not 
requiring a repayment of certain loans which were identified as unlawful state aid. 
Judge Weinzierl (section 9.2) discusses the saga of alleged state aid by Lubeck Airport. This is an 
exemplary example of how the intermingling of EU and national procedures working in parallel can 
yield a worrisome ten year gap between the commencement of proceedings and their final conclusion. 
This is not atypical of similar cases (see e.g. the CELF saga). The case is also typical of many similar 
cases where a regional authority decides to offer inducements to certain airlines for use of its airports. 
In this case the plaintiff (Air Berlin) complained that the inducements offered by Lubeck Airport to a 
competing airline (Ryanair) were unlawful state aid. The importance of the judgment is in revealing the 
tension between the view of the CJEU (according to which national courts should be tough enforcers of 
EU state aid law) and the view of the national court (according to which it cannot jump to conclusions 
about state aid cases in a situation where the Commission is still assessing whether the measure in 
question constitutes state aid). As is made clear in the annotation, national judges feel some unease at 
the demands placed upon it by EU Law. Matters are not rendered any easier by the slow pace of 
Commission procedures. 
Judge Palligiano (section 9.3) discusses the judgment in Lgv S.r.l vs Ministero delle Infrastrutture e 
dei Trasporti. This is another instance where the presence of an incentive effect was discussed in the 
case of an aid scheme. The litigation was about whether or not the would-be beneficiary had already 
made certain investments before the aid scheme was approved, which would deny its capacity to benefit 
from state aid. 
Judge Federico (section 10.1) discusses the important case of Marras v. Regione Sardegna. The 
plaintiff (acting as an undertaking) had obtained a mortgage at a favourable rate because this was 
subsidized by the Region. That subsidy was later found to be unlawful state aid by the Commission, 
with the result that the bank renegotiated the mortgage. Marras sought damages from the Region because 
he claimed that but for the subsidy he would not have taken on the mortgage so that the extra costs 
should be borne by the Region as damages. The impact of the claim would thus be that one relies on a 
breach of EU Law to secure that very same benefit that the breach of EU Law had conferred on the 
beneficiary. Indeed, the Supreme Court held that Marras was not the type of plaintiff that the rules on 
state liability sought to protect – competitors, not disappointed beneficiaries, should be the parties 
legitimately bringing damages claims. 
Judge Czap (section 10.2) discusses the detailed manner with which the Hungarian Supreme Court 
engaged with the ECJ judgments to determine how to apply the concept of selectivity to measures that 
were implemented in the wine sector, with certain wine distributors complaining that authorization fees 
which they had to pay were used to grant selective advantages to Hungarian wine producers. On the 
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facts the national court finds that the fees were not hypothecated to the benefits and so did not clearly 
constitute state aid. 
Judge Maravelaki (section 10.3) presents a similar case. the gist of the dispute is that a private TV 
broadcaster complained at having to pay a fee to use the spectrum, while the state TV broadcaster was 
exempted from paying a similar fees. Here the Greek court took the view that the claimant could not use 
state aid law to seek a reimbursement of the fee because the funds it paid to the state were not then used 
to grant a selective advantage to other beneficiaries. This is a correct application of the principles 
established by the EU courts, but one wonders if this may somehow undermine the possibility of 
stimulating private actors to keep in check state activities that grant anticompetitive assistance to certain 
undertakings. 
Judge Tainhas (section 10.4) also discusses levies fixed on wine producers designed to promote the 
industry. This is another instance where there is an overlap of competences: the Commission reviewing 
the scheme as a whole, while the national courts addressing the question over whether certain measures 
were de minimis and thus outside the scope of the TFEU. 
Judge Stoyanova (section 11.3) discusses the grant of an exclusive right in the market for the delivery 
of pensions in Bulgaria. This case is ongoing and raises questions on the application of the notion of 
services of general interest and whether the Altmark criteria are fulfilled. 
Judge Antal (section 11.4) considers litigation between a software firm and the state. The state had 
initiated a tender and required that all tenderers use the software of a rival to the plaintiff. It is not clear 
why the plaintiff insisted on using state aid law for basing its claim, since it appeared that the funding 
was going to come from the tenderers and not the state. This seems to be a case about the failure to use 
public procurement rules and possibly the application of EU internal market law would have been more 
useful. 
Unfair competition 
Judge Angelov (section 11.1) discusses the Tuna Fish Cans imitation case, where a Bulgarian company 
took unfair advantage of the design of a popular brand of canned tuna from Italy. This case is decided 
exclusively on the basis of national law. Judge Janas (section 11.2) instead looks at how unfair 
competition law applies in the relationship between a supplier and a distributor and how Polish law has 
been interpreted to address exercises of buyer power.  
While the first two judgments are fairly standard, Judge Belicka (K.V and others v ADENTA section 
3.3) discusses a damages claim in the context of acts of unfair competition where the court gave an 
innovative reading of the rules. The allegation was that the defendant had wrongly appropriated the 
goodwill and equipment of the plaintiffs to establish its own dental business. What is interesting about 
this case is that the national courts discussed how far the acts of the defendant impacted competition 
because the defendant’s business only started after the plaintiff had closed its business. While the Court 
of Appeal focused on the absence of overlap in the activities of the two undertakings as evidence that 
there was no actual competition, and so no infringement, the Supreme Court focused on the potential 
competition that could arise between the two businesses, and that the relevant question was how far 
ADENTA, in preparing to enter the market, had denied the plaintiff the possibility to compete by 
securing its assets. This judgment is significant because both courts try and ‘import’ ideas from antitrust 
law (here the question of actual/potential competition) into the field of unfair competition law, where 
such economic rigour is often lacking.  
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Conclusion 
The judgments reported here were presented and discussed in small workshops. The idea of these 
discussions is to allow judges to trade ideas about how to best handle cases, and it is hoped that these 
informal conversations for a can help foster a common sense of how to best handle competition cases. 
The greater confidence with economic ideas, the close consideration of fundamental rights and the 
sophisticated manner in which the case law of the ECJ is handled by national judges point to a growing 
culture of competition among the judiciary. 
In any case, the use of European substantive law, and sometimes also of European procedural 
principles, like the ones contained in Regulation 1/2003, from one side, but also the capability to 
originally interpreter the facts of the cases in view of local circumstances and economic rationality from 
the other, witness an increasing enrichment of the vital relation between national courts and the 
enforcement of European competition law. 
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2.1. Jeannette Haijdinova (Regional Court of Bratislava) 
Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic 
Judgment No. 3 Sžhpu 1/2013 of 9th June, 2015. 
Siemens AG vs. Protimonopolný úrad SR (National Competition Authority) 
Facts 
The Plaintiff and other undertakings signed a QC-Agreement (a horizontal cartel agreement) on 15th 
April 1988, under which they coordinated their conduct in the relevant production market and in the 
selling of gas-insulated-elements (switchgears) of 72 kV and more, by: 
 price fixing, 
 the sharing of markets,  
 the allocation of quotas and the maintenance of the respective market shares,  
 the mutual limitation of licence agreements with third parties, and  
 collusive conduct in public procurement, 
from 1st March 1991, to 30th April 2004, (i.e., before the accession of the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union). The Defendant – Protimonopolný úrad SR – as the Second Instance National 
Competition Authority (NCA) -- increased the fine that was imposed by 40%: the First Instance 
authority imposed a fine of €1,659,695.94 and the NCA increased it to €2,987.450. The NCA considered 
the previously imposed fine to be insufficient and considered aggravating circumstances, such as the 
Plaintiff´s active role in mediation between the undertakings concerned, the formulation of the QC-
Agreement in the distribution of mobile phones with codes, and the paying of the expenses for their 
calls. 
The conduct of the Plaintiff and the undertakings that were collaborating were also the subject of the 
European Commission´s decision No. COMP/F/38.899 of 24th January 2007, and led to a fine of 
€396,562,500, which was imposed upon the Plaintiff (Siemens AG). The European Commission ruled 
on the case under the former Art. 81 of the Treaty (Art. 101 TFEU) and the Slovak NCA initiated the 
administrative proceedings and ruled on the case under the domestic Competition Act; both of which 
imposed a fine upon the Plaintiff for an identical horizontal cartel agreement.  
Decision  
The Regional Court in Bratislava set aside the NCA´s decision imposing a fine of €2,987,450 upon the 
Plaintiff (Siemens AG) for the cartel agreement. The only reason for setting aside the Defendant´s 
decision was that it was in breach of the in peius reformation principle. 
The Supreme Court’s task was to examine whether there was a breach of the in peius reformation 
principle, or not, and beside this the Supreme Court dealt with the ne bis in idem principle due to two 
proceedings that were pending with the Commission and with the NCA, which were based on identical 
issues of fact and time. The Court had to test also the application of EU competition law in this case, 
because the administrative offence was committed before the accession of the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union. 
As to the ne bis in idem principle, the Regional Court and the Supreme Court followed the Court of 
Justice‘s decision in Case C-17/10 of 14th February 2012, which dealt with the ne bis in idem principle 
in an identical case. The Court of Justice ruled that the provisions of Article 81 EC and Article 3(1) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a proceeding 
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initiated after 1st May 2004, they do not apply to a cartel which produced effects in the territory of a 
Member State which acceded to the Union on 1st May 2004, during periods prior to that date. The 
opening by the European Commission of a proceeding against a cartel under Chapter III of Regulation 
No 1/2003 does not, pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation No. 1/2003, read in combination with 
Article 3(1) of the same regulation, cause the competition authority of the Member State concerned to 
lose its power by the application of national competition law, in order to penalise the anti-competitive 
effects that are produced by that cartel in the territory of the said Member State during periods before 
the accession of the latter to the European Union. The ne bis in idem principle does not preclude penalties 
which the national competition authority of the Member State concerned imposes on undertakings 
participating in a cartel on account of the anti-competitive effects to which the cartel gave rise in the 
territory of that Member State prior to its accession to the European Union, where the fines imposed on 
the same cartel members by a Commission decision taken before the decision of the said national 
competition authority was adopted were not designed to penalise the said effects. The Supreme Court 
thus decided that the NCA had the power to penalize the Plaintiff for his anti-competitive conduct in the 
territory of the Slovak Republic. Moreover, there was no breach of the ne bis in idem principle. 
The Supreme Court tested the in peius reformation principle from a historical and systematic point 
of view. In the first Administrative Proceedings Code No. 8/1928 Coll (passed during the first 
Czechoslovak Republic) the in peius reformation principle was explained in Art. 81 Para. 2, that in 
relation to a case with no public interest, the appellate administrative authority is bound by the appeal 
and is entitled to reverse the decision on the failure of the appellee only when it reviews decision under 
the appeal of the other party. In the assessment of the applicability of penal policy principles in the 
administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court bore in mind the Engel criteria that arise from the ECHR 
case law (judgment in the case of Engel et al. vs. Netherlands, Application No. 5100/71, 8th June 1976): 
the classification of conduct in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned risks incurring. As to the first, an administrative offence relating to an anti-
competitive agreement is not defined as a crime under Slovak law (the Supreme Court drew attention to 
the ECHR judgments in cases of Neste St. Petersburg et al. vs. Russia, Application No. 69042/01, 3rd 
June 2004; Lilly France S.A. vs. France, Application No. 53892/00, 3rd December 2002). The second, 
anti-competitive agreement has to be deemed to be the most serious type of breach of competition rules 
under the national and the European law. As to the the third criteria, it is necessary to assess the sanction 
that can be imposed and not the one imposed by the decision. Nowadays, under the Slovak constitutional 
rules, domestic Administrative Proceedings Code3, Art. 6 of the Convention, Art. 2 Par. 1 of Protocol 
No. 7 to the Convention and Art. 36 Para. 1 of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms it 
is not possible to follow penal policy principles without assessing any other circumstances in the field 
of competition law. A sanction imposed on the subject under the provisions of competition law has a 
preventative function, not only for the participant, but also for other undertakings. 
The in peius reformation principle cannot be applied in every case without any other circumstances 
and without assessing the nature of the case; on the other hand, it is not possible to exclude it more 
generally in the field of competition law. However, if this principle is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Administrative Proceedings Code, it is necessary (by using an analogy) to interpret the in peius 
reformation principle, neither in contravention with the rights of individuals nor with the values 
protected by public interest. The Supreme Court emphasised the opinion of the Advocate General, 
Eleanor Sharpston, in Case C-272/09-P (KME Germany AH et. al. v. Commission): “if the fining 
procedure in the present case thus falls within the criminal sphere for the purposes of the ECHR (and 
the Charter), I would none the less agree that, in the words of the judgment in Jussila, it ‘differ[s] from 
the hard core of criminal law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply 
with their full stringency.” The Supreme Court also referred to the decision of the Court of Justice in 
                                                     
3 Under Art. 59 of Administrative Proceedings Code appellate administrative authority is entitled to assess all circumstances 
of the case and take the evidence and then impose a fine. 
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the joined cases T-101/05, T-111/05 BASF AG a UCB SA v. Commission, where the Court increased 
the fine imposed in the cartel case. 
Under these circumstances and the case law of the ECHR and the Court of Justice, the Supreme 
Court overruled the Regional Court´s decision and dismissed the complaint of the Plaintiff against the 
NCA´s decision as being inadmissible. 
Comment 
This decision is an important one if compared with administrative offences committed outside the scope 
of competition law. Generally, the Slovak Courts respect the in peius reformation principle and other 
penal policy principles in administrative proceedings. However, the competition law field can be 
deemed to be an exception of thus, thus increasing sanctions in the Second Instance proceedings may 
be possible.  
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2.2. Mirella Rodin (Municipal Court of Rijeka) 
High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia 
Croatian Society of Orthodontics v. Croatian Competition Agency 
Number and date of the judgment: No: UsII-70/14-6, 5.3.2015. 
Brief summary of the facts of the dispute 
An article in Croatian newspapers said that the lowest price in almost all branches of the private health 
care system is determined by the chambers, but, in the case of orthodontics, the lowest price for services 
has not been prescribed. Among orthodontists there is an agreement about the lowest prices, so as not 
to cause unfair competition for each other. 
This article came to the attention of the Croatian Competition Agency, which commenced an ex 
officio procedure. The Agency found that the "Dental Services Price List - Minimum Costs" and the 
lowest prices charged by dental technicians are published on the official web site of the Chamber. The 
Croatian Society of Orthodontics (hereinafter: CSO) published an act entitled the "Minimum Price List 
of Orthodontic Services" on their website, which includes the prescribed minimum prices for 12 services 
that are provided by orthodontists, which are not specified in the Price List of the Chamber.  
According to the Statute of the CSO, CSO membership is voluntary and has 75 permanent members 
who are engaged in orthodox activities in the territory of the Republic of Croatia. 
The Agency decided that the CSO breach the provisions of the Croatian Competition Act because 
the document: "Minimum Price List for Orthodontic Services", which was effective in the territory of 
the Republic of Croatia between September 24th, 2010, and October 9th, 2013, (when the CSO removed 
it from the Internet site) was a prohibited agreement. The Agency explained that this is a price fixing 
agreement which is a “hard core” breach of competition law and had as its object the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition. For that reason, it was not necessary to prove the anti-
competitive effects of such behaviour on the market. The provisions for block exemptions and 
agreements of minor importance are also not applicable. So, the Agency pronounced the Minimum Price 
List for Orthodontic Services ex lege null and void and fined the CSO 150,000.00 Croatian Kuna. 
Summary of the judicial proceedings 
The CSO, as the Plaintiff, brought an action against the decision of the Croatian Competition Agency 
before the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia seeking the annulment of that decision.  
The Plaintiff stated that the Minimum Price List document was not a prohibited agreement, because 
it was merely a proposal that was sent to the Croatian Chamber of Dental Medicine, and it was never 
applied. The proposed minimum price list was not therefore aimed at distorting competition, nor had it 
had any consequences in the relevant market. The Plaintiff also pointed out that it is not an undertaking, 
because it is not an economic entity, but is a professional association, which does not have the goal of 
achieving profit, but of educating and providing scientific and professional training. Further, the CSO 
claimed that orthodontists did not, in any way, directly or indirectly, express that they had accepted that 
document, so it was not an agreement which would oblige them to give their services at the suggested 
prices.  
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The Ruling of the Court 
The High Administrative Court accepted the claim and annulled the decision of the Agency. It stated 
that the area of dental health care is regulated by a Dental Care Act, which is a special law. According 
to that Act, the Chamber adopts a price list for dental services, in which it defines minimum prices. The 
Court argued that only the Chamber has the competence to carry out expert supervision, and if it 
establishes a breach of the law provisions in the field of health care, it is obliged to report this to the 
Inspection of the Ministry of Health. So, the Court didn`t accept the opinion of the Agency that the 
Minimum Price List was a prohibited agreement in accordance with the Croatian Competition Act. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Minimum Price List was not applied, nor could it apply, because 
only the Chamber can define the lowest prices for dental services. Charging for those services below the 
minimum price is subject to sanction in accordance with special regulations. If the Plaintiff breaches the 
provisions of Law on Dental Health Services, the Chamber is therefore exclusively competent in taking 
measures and preventing such conduct. A document of this type thus does not have a binding character, 
nor can it be applied, since doctors of dental medicine are obliged to comply with the minimum price 
list that is provided by the Chamber. In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the view that the Minimum 
Price List in question, could not have the aim or effect of distorting competition in the relevant market. 
Personal Comment 
In my opinion, the most interesting aspect of this case is the relationship between competition law and 
the special rules which prohibit "unfair competition" between professionals, such as lawyers, medical 
doctors in private practice, and other such persons, for which their chambers, according to the law, have 
the right to set prices or minimum prices for their activities.  
Here, the High Administrative Court applied the principle "lex specialis derogat legi generali", but 
with some doubt, it did this in a situation where there was no prescribed price list for the type of services 
in question from the Chamber. The Court took a view that, even in a case where there are no prescribed 
minimum prices from the Chamber, the Chamber is exclusively competent to undertake the surveillance 
of activities in the field of dental care, including reporting breaches to the Inspectorate of the Ministry 
of Health. In this way, the Court gave the advantage to the self-regulatory system and to the Inspectorate 
of the Ministry of Health, and not to the Croatian Competition Authority, to inspect and prevent illegal 
price fixing agreements in the field of dental care. The question is thus whether the Court can, for these 
reasons, exempt an association of orthodontists from the competition rules. 
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2.3. Luis Manuel Ugarte Oterino (Court of Madrid) 
UNDERTAKINGS AGREEMENTS AND RULES ON COMPETENCE. THE LIMITS 
The Ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain (TS), Room of Administrative Affairs, 3rd Section, of 
20/04/2017, (Cassation 3251/2014), which overturned the ruling of the National Audience (AN), Room 
of Administrative Affairs, 6th Section, of 25th June, 2014, in the action of annulment by the enterprise 
ADVEO GROUP INTERNATIONAL, S.A. (formerly UNIPAPEL, S.A.), that left the sanction of the 
National Competition Authority, on the infringement of Article 1 of the Spanish Act on Competition, 
15/2007, of 3rd July, and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TFUE, 
about an agreement to export envelopes, without effect. 
I.- Brief summary of the facts of the dispute 
The HISPAPEL company was formed with the aim of exporting envelopes to third countries, so-called 
white envelopes, surplus envelopes from the production of its shareholders, all manufacturers of 
envelopes, which were removed from the Spanish market to avoid a reduction in their prices, according 
to the deal and to the agreed transfer prices that were adopted.  
The leading manufacturers of paper envelopes in Spain, in percentages similar to the market share 
they owned at the time, which meant more than 90% of market share, owned share capital in the 
company.  
Subsequently, some of the share holding companies became part of multinational groups or were 
acquired by other companies, which were also HISPAPEL shareholders.  
In early 2011, the shareholders of HISPAPEL had a total estimated share of the market which 
amounted to more than 80% and after the instruction of the sanction procedure, only one was a 
controlling shareholder of HISPAPEL, since it held 89.88% of the shares. 
II.-Summary of the judicial proceedings 
The National Audience (AN), Room of Administrative Affairs, ruling of June 25th, 2014, allowed the 
action of the mercantile ADVEO GROUP INTERNATIONAL, S.A. (formerly UNIPAPEL, S.A.) 
against the decision of the National Competition Authority from October 15th, 2012, which imposed a 
fine of €2.013.468, for violation of Article 1 of Article 1 of the Spanish Act on Competition, 15/2007, 
of 3rd July, and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union European TFUE, of an 
agreement for the export of envelopes. 
The AN, according to the interpretation made of Article 1 of the Spanish Act on Competition and 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, said that neither the “constituent 
Hispapel rules nor the agreements adopted in her womb», by all the partners, “constitute a restrictive 
practice of competition» as they were aimed at achieving the entry into markets of partners who did not 
have individual access, and prohibition or a coercion mechanism, direct or indirect, to the free initiative 
of the partners to operate, did not exist as they were not competitors in the relevant markets.  
The Ruling of the Supreme Court TS overturned that from the National Court (AN) and considered 
that there was an infringement but a reduction in the penalty had to be applied. 
The TS considered that the First Instance Court had inadequately interpreted Article 1 of the Spanish 
Act on Competition and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as the 
main companies operating in the market of the manufacture, distribution and marketing of envelopes in 
Spain formed a holding company in order to apparently promote the export of the surplus production of 
envelopes paper to non-EU markets, but that, in the development of the activities of the 
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commercialization of such products, it acted as a cartel, coordinating the actions of the partners in order 
to share the market and set prices, which evidences anti-competitive behavior. 
The TS considered that the de minimis rule – the absence of effects on the intra-Community European 
market and the low impact of adopted agreements - was not applicable, because it was sanctioned as an 
anti-competitive behavior by its object and according to the entirety of the collusive agreements that 
were adopted to restrict competition in the market for the export of envelopes.  
The Supreme Court, however, reduced the amount of the sanction, setting aside from the criterion of 
the National Competition Authority, which applied Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, saying that, as the 
European Commission itself admits, the legislation of the European Union in this matter does not impose 
a uniform model for the design of the national implementation of the rules on competition regimes 
because it gives freedom to Member States to determine in their territory their own sanctions which are 
to be applied. 
The sanction on one of the members of the cartel was partially reduced by collaborating on the 
instruction of the sanction procedure, which provided crucial information that allows the scope and the 
illegal nature of the infringement to be checked, and the necessary measures being investigated to be 
adopted. 
III.- Ruling of the Court 
The TS appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct that was imputed to Hispapel, S.A. and its partner 
companies, have proven that leading companies operating in the market of manufacture, distribution 
and marketing of envelopes in Spain had formed, in 1981, a holding company (Hispapel, S.A.), in order 
to apparently promote the export of the surplus production of envelopes to non-EU markets, but that, in 
the development of the activities of the commercialization of such products, they acted as a cartel, 
coordinating the actions of the partners in order to share the market and to set prices, which evidenced 
an anti-competitive behavior. 
IV.-Personal comment 
This case raises the difference in approach of the two Courts, specialized in the matter, on what type of 
consideration it deserves, in the light of the rules on competition and, in particular, of Article 101 of the 
TFEU, the agreement for the export of envelopes, which was adopted by the main undertakings in that 
sector, concerning the production, distribution and pricing, taking into account that they covered almost 
all of the total market and that exports were involved in extra-EU trade. 
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3. Procedural aspects of competition law enforcement 
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3.1. Maria Constantinou (Cyprus Supreme Court) 
Cyprus Telecommunications Authority vs. Commission for the Protection of Competition 
Recourse No. 2004/2012, Judgment delivered on 29.9.2015  
The facts of the dispute  
The case concerns a recourse in the Supreme Court of Cyprus that was filed by the Cyprus 
Telecommunications Authority, hereinafter referred to as “CYTA”, which sought to annul the decision 
of the Cyprus Commission for the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Commission”) taken on 8th October 2012, to impose a fine of €960.000 on CYTA.  
CYTA is a legal person, governed by public law, and is responsible for supplying the whole of 
Cyprus with public networks and electronic communication services.  
Thunderworx Ltd, a telecommunication services provider, aimed to expand its business to the service 
of Premium SMS – Mobile Termination. For this to become possible it was necessary to gain access to 
CYTA’s mobile telephony network and, more specifically, its SMS Centre, in conjunction with certain 
easements by CYTA. Thunderworx therefore applied to CYTA to request access to its infrastructure 
and its SMS Centre. CYTA refused to satisfy the request with the following justification: the whole 
matter is under study as it is possible that supply of the said service could create problems in the handling 
of customers, especially in cases where there are challenged charges. It was therefore not anticipated 
that the supply of the service would be possible in the near future. It is worth noting that, five years later, 
on the 15th April 2010, Thunderworx was notified that the technical problems were solved, and the 
supply of the required service was now possible.  
This initial refusal led Thunderworx to the filing of a complaint to the Commission for abuse of 
CYTA’s dominant position. The complaint was based on the provisions of S. 6(1) (b) (that is, the 
restriction of the disposal of technological means to the detriment of the consumers) and S. 6(1) (c) (that 
is, the application of discriminatory practices to the detriment of the undertaking) of the national 
Protection of Competition Law 13(I)/2008, (hereinafter referred to as “the Law”).  
The Commission was guided in its decision by Cases C-7/97 Oscar Bronner, Series 1998, p. I-7791, 
and C- 82/01 Aéroports de Paris v. European Commission, Series 2002 p. I-9297, and decided that the 
refusal of CYTA, which was in a dominant position to supply a rival undertaking with services that were 
indispensable in carrying on its business, and this amounted to an abuse of its dominant position.  
The case goes back to 2005 when the complaint was filed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court, in 
another case, ruled that the Commission was wrongly constituted -- which meant that any decision 
already taken was void. The procedure in the present case was therefore revoked, and the newly 
constituted Commission issued its decision in October 2010, imposing an administrative fine on CYTA. 
In 2011, CYTA filed a recourse to the Supreme Court requesting the annulment of the Commission’s 
decision.  
The scenario was the same in 2011 when, following an appeal, it was found that the President of the 
Commission was wrongly appointed, the composition of the Commission was, as a result, illegal, and 
therefore the Commission itself consented to the annulment of its decision.  
Again, a new Commission was appointed, and in 2012 it revoked all of its previous decisions that 
were relevant to the case and decided to examine the case ab initio. Both parties submitted their remarks 
and the Commission ultimately imposed an administrative fine of €960.000 on CYTA.  
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The judicial proceedings  
CYTA argued, among other factors, that the Commission did not have the power to re-examine an 
annulled decision on the basis that CYTA had already been “convicted” and could not be “prosecuted” 
and “convicted” twice for the same offence, which was contrary to Art. 12.2 of the Constitution. The 
view was supported that the procedure was quasi criminal. Furthermore, it was alleged that the 
Commission had exceeded its statutory powers because a fine was imposed regardless of the lapse of 
five years since the day the complaint was filed, contrary to S. 41 of the Law. More specifically, it took 
the Commission seven years to examine the complaint. It is interesting to observe that the Commission 
noted that S. 41 does not provide for cases in which decisions of the Commission are annulled by the 
Supreme Court and must be re-examined. The Commission therefore turned to S.50 of the Law, 
according to which, in such cases, the Commission or, indeed, the Court, may apply, mutatis mutandis, 
the relevant clauses of community competition law, in this case, Regulation 1 of 2003, under which the 
limitation period is suspended for whatever time the case lies before the Court.  
In addition, it was claimed that the Commission was barred from re-examining the case as the fine 
that had been illegally imposed was not returned to the applicants.  
Further arguments included that the Commission had wrongly defined the relevant market, that there 
was an objective justification of the refusal of access to the infrastructure which would enable the service 
of Premium SMS, and that attention was not paid to the fact that CYTA was not active in the retail 
market. Furthermore, it was argued that CYTA was not in a dominant position in the relevant market 
and, moreover, that there was an alternative way for Thunderworx to have access to the required service 
through another of CYTA’s services. In any case, it was technically impossible for CYTA to formulate 
a control system which would verify which users had consented to the receival of messages. Such a 
system was not available anywhere in the market. Finally, it was argued that the infrastructure was not 
governed by international standards and it therefore required special planning.  
On the other hand, the Commission suggested, among other things, that the Court does not have the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon technical matters, such as the definition of the relevant market, and 
rejected all of CYTA’s.  
Ruling of the Court  
With regard to the argument that the Commission is barred from re-examining the case, the Court ruled 
that, despite the time that had elapsed, the circumstances of the case made it necessary that it be re-
examined. The Court noted that both the revocation and the annulment were not related to the facts of 
the complaint. Instead, they concerned the appointment of the President of the Commission. Applying 
S. 41 of the Law, with regard to the time limit within which the Commission may exercise its power to 
impose fines for breaches of the law, the Court stressed that due to the fact that the violation of the law 
was ongoing, it was the time of the termination of the violation that should be taken into account, that 
is, the 15th April, 2010, when CYTA informed Thunderworx that it had finally found the technical means 
for the termination of short messages. As the administrative decision was taken on 8th October 2012, 
there had been no lapse of time that was greater than the time provided for by the law. The Court added 
that, in any case, under S. 17(1) of the relevant legislation, the time limit was interrupted from the 
moment that the Commission decided on the existence of a prima facie case against an undertaking. The 
Court noted the Commission’s indication that CYTA had started working towards the “solution” of the 
problem only in 2009, a solution having been found within a year. The Court went on to rule that the 
fact that the annulled fine was not returned to the undertaking did not constitute a barrier of any kind.  
The Court further pointed out that it does not intervene where, from the facts before it, as in the 
present case, it appears that the administrative act was reasonably open to the Commission. The Court 
maintained that there was no doubt that the Commission exercised its discretionary powers and set down 
its findings in a justified manner that was reasonably open to it.  
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As a result, the recourse was rejected, and the decision confirmed with costs against the applicant.  
Comment  
The Court, albeit that it found in favour of the Commission, did not share the Commission’s view that 
the matter of whether the limitation period could be suspended, or not, for the imposition of a fine, was 
unregulated by national law. In fact, it resorted to S. 41 of the national law, which is similar to Article 
25(2) of Regulation 1/2003, whilst the Commission applied, mutatis mutandis, Article 25(6) of the 
Regulation instead, deciding that the limitation period was suspended because the case still lay before 
the Court, while the Court ruled that time began to run on the day on which the infringement ceased. 
Both views lead to the same result, that the fine was imposed within the appropriate time, but for 
different reasons.  
It is worth noting that S. 41 of the national law has since been amended so as to include the suspension 
of the limitation period in cases when, and for such time as the decision of the Commission lies before 
the Court, thus bringing S. 41, in line with Art. 25(6) of the Council Regulation. S. 50 of the Law has 
also been amended to provide for the mutatis mutandis application of European Union competition law 
in matters that are not governed by national law. 
An appeal has been lodged and it is therefore yet to be seen whether the Court of Appeal will, or will 
not, confirm the judgment. 
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3.2. Carlos Manuel Gonçalves de Melo Marinho (Lisbon Court of Appeal) 
Judgment number: 138/2016 
Parties: Public Prosecutor Office (Appellant) and NOS Comunicações, S. A. (Respondent) 
Court: Constitutional Court of Portugal 
Facts 
In this case, which is pending before the First Instance Court, that is, the Portuguese Court for 
Competition, Regulation and Supervision, the decision was built around the fact of the non-payment 
between electronic communication operators of compensation that is granted by the Phone Number 
Portability Regulation in disrespect of the time delay that is defined for the sending of documents 
between undertakings in the portability process. 
The imposition of sanctions, due to that fact and under this Regulation, was analysed at the light of 
two Articles of the Portuguese Constitution that assure that nobody can be criminally sentenced unless 
a previous law declares punishable the action or omission, and it further states that, in the procedures 
for administrative offences and in any sanctions procedure, the rights to audience and defence are 
granted to the Defendant. 
Arguments of the Appellant 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office presented the following arguments against the decision of the Court that 
declared that the imposition of those sanctions violated the national Constitution: 
1. The Portuguese National Regulatory Authority (ANACOM) has, among its responsibilities, the 
obligation to promote and preserve competition in the offer of networks, services and resources for 
electronic communications, in order to contribute to the European Union Internal Market and to defend 
the interests of citizens; 
2. It is thus one obits tasks to assure that the consumers can gain the most benefit in terms of choice, 
price and quality, suppressing the obstacles to the offers of such networks, services and resources at a 
European level; 
3. In such a context, it does not act alone, but in concert with the European Commission and other 
NRAs, aiming to grant a common regulatory practice and the coherent application of a joint regulatory 
framework for the networks and services of electronic communications, being that its obligation is to 
execute policies similar to those of other European countries; 
4. Such policies aim to grant the existence of an internal electronic communications market that can 
be transparent, effective and without distortions, namely, in the matter of tariffs and the imposition of 
penalties on an undertaking that is operating in such a market; 
5. This determines that the NRA cannot act outside the parameters imposed on similar authorities in 
other countries since, if it does, it is the internal market that feels the consequences resulting from the 
use of the different electronic communications services that are accessible to the public; 
6. The judicial decision under appeal introduces a private insight in terms of penalties, with negative 
consequences for national users, especially in relation to being able to distort the competition between 
undertakings operating in the sector, creating different functioning and sanctioning conditions for those 
that follow the rules established by the NRA in the face of those that do not respect it; 
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7. We are in the domain of a legal framework for administrative offences, conceived as a tool for 
administrative intervention with a sanction’s nature, with a view to giving more effectiveness to such 
intervention; 
8. That legal framework for administrative offences appears as a different branch, autonomous from 
the Criminal Law but retaining deep connections with it; 
9. However, the application of the Criminal Law, as a subsidiary Law, has as its limits the 
safeguarding of the regime of the administrative offences’ procedure; 
10. The autonomy of the administrative penalties’ ruling determines that the administrative offences 
procedure is not entirely applicable to the principles that guide the Criminal Procedure Law, varying the 
degree of attachment to those principles according to the nature of the process. 
11. The national law on electronic communications (Law no. 5/2004 of 10th February) expressly 
gives the NRA the competence to perform sanctioning functions. 
Arguments of the Respondent(s): 
1. The NRA doesn’t have the legal qualification to sanction as an administrative offence the omission 
of the payment of compensation between operators in the electronic communications’ market; 
2. In the present case, the lack of constitutionality emerges from the fact that a sanction ruling could 
only have been created through a legislative act that assures the rights to defence and audience, and not 
through an act with a merely regulatory nature; 
3. To give such regulatory power to the NRA, an express and specific law that contemplates that 
power in situations where it would be necessary and indispensable for the exercise of the tasks of the 
NRA, would have to be mandatory; 
4. The competences given to the NRA for the execution of the portability of phone numbers 
comprehend the technical, digital and administrative procedures that are needed and that are suited to 
such a goal, but not the assignment of compensation between operators where there has been an undue 
portability or where the time delays for the sending of documents between undertakings have not been 
respected; 
5. The undue portability and the disrespect of the time delays for the sending of those documents are 
not connected with a requisite for the implementation of portability, an absence in the regulation of 
which might have the effect or consequence of limiting or endangering such implementation. 
6. The rights to defence and audience can only be ruled by law created by the Parliament; 
7. The consumers, and not the operators, are the addressees of the protection that is granted by the 
Portability Regulation; 
8. The lack of payment between operators doesn’t imply any violation of the rights of the subscribers 
to the services to the portability of their numbers; 
9. The compensation between operators is not necessary in order to assure and expedite the technical 
procedure of portability, and they are not indicated in the legal rule that allegedly sanctions its omission 
of payment; 
10. The Law on Electronic Communications, interpreted either alone or in combination with the 
Regulation of Portability, does not contain the essential definition of the lack of payment between 
operators as an administrative offence. 
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Ruling of the Court: 
The Constitutional Court decided that the rules referred by the First Instance Court were not 
unconstitutional and declared that the administrative offences established through Regulation by the 
NRA can be punished with a fine for non-compliance with the obligation to pay compensation between 
operators for disrespect of the rules on the portability of phone numbers. 
To justify its decision, the Court presented the following reasoning: 
1. The obligation to provide information and to deliver documents to the regulatory body is a 
condition of the effective safeguarding of the need for the regulation and supervision of the economic 
activity, in an area where the cooperation between the economic agents becomes essential for the 
exercise of such functions that are of exceptional public relevance; 
2. If it is necessary to ensure the effective fulfilment of this typical obligation of the Administration, 
the sanctioning of its non-compliance as an administrative offence is, as an alternative to criminal law, 
the appropriate and proportionate coercive means to meet that need; 
3. In a business world, patrimonial sanctions are indicated in order to compel the various actors to 
comply with the public rules on economic activity; 
4. The constitutional guarantee of the double degree of jurisdiction that constitutional jurisprudence 
has recognized for the accused in criminal proceedings in hard core cases, such as their conviction and 
the decisions that can affect their freedom, does not apply to this specific sanctioning domain for reasons 
which make it a branch of law that is substantially different from criminal law; 
5. The evoked rule of the Constitution does not give the accused in cases of administrative offences 
the right to see a review by a higher court of a decision on facts; 
6. The isolated circumstance that the sanctioning law remit part of its ruling to a lower regulatory 
source (in this case, the Portability Regulation) does not deserve any constitutional censure and it does 
not appear that the adoption of such a technique compromises the principles of legal certainty and the 
protection of trust; 
7. The portability process is a true process, not just a proceeding; it contains not only a simple 
succession of facts and formalities, but also a true conflict of interests between operators: the interest of 
the donor provider or that the holder does to win a new client, and the interest of the recipient provider 
in not losing such client; 
8. The law considered – and well, since this is the only way to defend and promote competition – 
that the duty should be imposed on the recipient provider to facilitate competition, in some way acting 
against its interests, knowing that it will benefit from the same rule in any future reverse situation; 
9. The imposition of this duty is only effective in so far as a failure to comply could result in a 
disadvantageous economic consequence for the relapsed operator. Hence, the mechanism of 
compensation between operators; 
10. It is not at all indifferent to the consumers' rights as regards whether the operators pay 
compensation to other operators, or not. If they do not do so, the recipient providers may not comply 
with their portability obligations without facing unfavourable consequences. In other words, compliance 
with such compensations is an indispensable instrument in order to ensure portability, which is a benefit 
to consumers. 
Final comment: 
In Portugal, appeal against the NRAs decisions on administrative offences is granted to a First Instance 
specialized Court – the Court for Competition, Regulation and Supervision. Since Portugal has a 
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separate administrative jurisdiction, the appeals against all the other acts of the NRAs are presented 
before the Administrative Courts. In addition, when interpretation of the Constitution is required, the 
Constitutional Court can be called upon to decide on questions of constitutionality that are raised in 
cases of appeals against decisions of the NRA, as happened in the present case, which has the relevance 
of showing a different level of control of such decisions and the wider objectives involved, which are 
essentially focused on the Constitution, but never lose the notion of the interests at stake in the field of 
intervention by the Regulatory Authority. 
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3.3. Inese Belicka (Regional Court of Aizkraukle) 
K.V., I.V., K.V., A. V. and I.V. v. “ADENTA” Ltd. and P.A. on compensation for damages caused by 
unfair competition 
Facts of the Case  
SIA "ARK Dental Clinic" (hereinafter also referred to as ARK Dental Clinic) was registered in the 
Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia on September 2nd, 1998. The ARK Dental Clinic was 
focused on providing high quality dental services. In 2005, the Company worked with a profit of LVL 
149,487, and the turnover continued to grow in 2006, while large amounts of money were directed 
towards the development of the clinic; and it was therefore operating at a loss in 2006. The company's 
net turnover in 2007 and 2008 showed a tendency to increasing. 
From 23rd December 1999, Dr. Z. V. was a member of ARK Dental Clinic and owned 50% of the 
company's shares. Dr.Z.V. died on 26th May 2006, and after receiving the inheritance, his heirs K.V., 
I.V., K.V., A. V. and I.V.owned 50% of the total number of shares of the company. Dr. P.A., who had 
been a member of the company since 2nd September 1998, owned 18,060 shares in the company, which 
was 50% of the total number of shares. At the same time, Dr.P.A., from 2nd September 1998, until 28th 
March 2002, was also the Chairperson of the company's board, but from 24th May 2004, he was the 
only member of the board of the company. 
Z.V.'s heirs have not worked in dentistry, but Dr.P.A. was an experienced doctor, as well as a member 
of the company from its foundation and a long-term member of the board of the company, and therefore 
the company's management was entirely entrusted to Dr.P.A. 
At the end of 2006, the parties engaged in negotiations on the sale of the shares owned by the 
Claimants, but the negotiations did not lead to agreement on sales and they were therefore terminated. 
Shortly afterwards, the Claimants learned that the dental services were provided by another dental 
clinic - ADENTA, whose sole member and board member was Dr.V.A., while the ARK Dental Clinic 
had suspended its business on September 4th, 2008. 
ARK Dental Clinic’s website www.ark.lv was closed, and the information specified therein was not 
available to the clients, but the website’s maintainer forwarded all visitors to the ADENTA website.  
ADENTA had used the ARK Dental Clinic’s premises and the company's logo. The premises’ lease 
contract with the ARK Dental Clinic had expired, and a new lease contract was concluded with 
"ADENTA" on September 4th, 2008, for use of the same premises at 13 Skanstes Street, Riga.  
The logo sign "ARK Dental Clinic" was still on the wall of the building at 13 Skanstes Street, in 
Riga. The ARK Dental Clinic sign was on the front page of ADENTA's website, and ADENTA received 
calls from the clients of the ARK Dental Clinic at the same phone number as of that of the ARK Dental 
Clinic. Receptionists informed clients that only the company’s name had changed, from ARK Dental 
Clinic to ADENTA, but nothing else had changed. In addition, the ADENTA website’s design was 
identical to the ARK Dental Clinic website’s design. This information in mutual connection undoubtedly 
gave the website’s visitors a misleading notion that ADENTA was simply a new name for the ARK 
Dental Clinic.  
Most of the former employees of the ARK Dental Clinic were working at ADENTA. The leading 
physician of the clinic was Prof. Dr. P.A. 
With the decision of the 4th September 2008, by the Board of Directors of the ARK Dental Clinic, 
the company's economic activities were suspended. The term of the lease agreement for the premises 
expired on 4th September 2008, and the company’s board member, P.A., did not extend the term of the 
contract.  
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ADENTA had bought all the medical equipment belonging to the ARK Dental Clinic for its book 
value on instalment payment terms and there was no additional remuneration for the deferred payment. 
The decisions to suspend the economic activity of the company, the non-renewal of the lease of 
premises, the release of the employees, the sale of all the medical equipment and the referral of the 
website were taken secretly without informing the Claimants.  
Claimants stated that ADENTA acquired the premises that were necessary in order to provide dental 
services, ARK Dental Clinic’s equipment, hired doctors and other specialists, who had previously 
worked at the ARK Dental Clinic, copied the company's customer database, obtained the company's 
telephone number, and used that to provide its own services. ADENTA thus had to be considered to be 
the continuer of a business of the ARK Dental Clinic, as it started its active business immediately after 
the ARK Dental Clinic suspended its operations with the decision of its board member, Dr.P.A. This 
takeover of business took place without respecting the principles of fair business practice. There was no 
preparation time for the launch of ADENTA, since ADENTA received a fully operational dental care 
company from the company, with its board member, Dr.P.A. At the commencement of its business 
ADENTA had not invested any of the financial and other resources that were necessary for the start-up 
of a new market participant and had benefited from unfair practices in the market in question, which 
was an objective basis for the recognition of those activities as being aimed at the restriction or 
deformation of the competition.  
ARK Dental Clinic continued developing in 2006, 2007, 2008. There were no objective reasons 
preventing the company from continuing its commercial activity on the relevant market, therefore, the 
board's decision to discontinue the company’s business was inappropriate, and it was knowingly 
contrary to its interests. 
First Instance Court’s judgment 
Vidzeme District Court of Riga satisfied claim partially. The court found the violation of the prohibitions 
set forth in Section 18, Paragraph 3, Clauses 1 and 3 of the Competition Law in the activities of 
ADENTA and awarded Claimants of the compensation of damages from ADENTA in amount of 
141,462 EUR. The claim was rejected against the Defendant Dr.P.A.  
Appeal Court’s judgment 
Having examined the case in connection with the appeal of "ADENTA", the Riga Regional Court's Civil 
Department dismissed the claim. 
The Appeal Court noted that in assessing whether ADENTA's actions were to be considered unlawful 
and as infringing on Competition Law in relation to the ARK Dental Clinic, it is necessary to distinguish 
unfair commercial practices from unfair competition by assessing the consequences of ADENTA's 
actions, and whether its actions had delayed, restricted or distorted competition. 
Pursuant to Clause 9, 6 and 7 of Article 1 of the Competition Law, it was recognized that ARK Dental 
Clinic and ADENTA were not competitors within the meaning of the Competition Law. 
The Court concluded that ADENTA was registered at the Commercial Register on July 22nd, 2008; 
ADENTA acquired the assets necessary for its business on August 31st, 2008; ADENTA concluded a 
lease agreement with SIA SWH Group on September 4th, 2008; ADENTA recruited 31 employees for 
business activity on September 4th, 2008; Both the ARK Dental Clinic and ADENTA were providing 
their services in the market for dental services. 
The ARK Dental Clinic was operating on the market for dental services until September 4, 2008, but 
ADENTA started its activities on September 4th, 2008, and thus it was concluded that the both 
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companies did not operate at the same time in the dental services market. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that, according to the Competition Law, there was no actual competition between these two 
companies. 
The ARK Dental Clinic was not a market participant after September 4th, 2008, because it had no 
premises, no assets, no employees, and its economic activity had been suspended and ADENTA had 
completely replaced it in the dental services market. 
The Court stated that the Claimants had not provided evidence that these events had, in some way, 
delayed, restricted or distorted the competition existing in the market for dental services. The Claimants 
specifically stated in their claim petition that "ADENTA continued the ARK Dental Clinic's business 
[...], the takeover of the business had taken place contrary to the principles of fair business practice." 
The Court found that there was no real competition between the ARK Dental Clinic and ADENTA; 
there was there for no reason to believe that ADENTA had committed unfair competition actions within 
the meaning of the Competition Law.  
Supreme Court’s judgment 
The Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Appeal Court and pointed at the incorrect 
interpretation of Section 1, Clauses 6 and 9, and Article 3 of the Competition Law, and to the fact that 
the Appeal Court did not assess the circumstances specified in the claim regarding the activities of 
ADENTA, since the registration of the company on the Commercial Register on 22nd July 2008, and 
until 4 September 2008. 
According to Article 1, Paragraph 6 of the Competition Law, competition is an existing or potential 
economic rivalry between two or more market participants in the relevant market. Article 1, Paragraph 
9 states that a market participant is any person who performs, or is preparing to perform, economic 
activity in the territory of Latvia, or whose activity will influence competition in the territory of Latvia. 
The Supreme Court stated that the Appeal Court had to determine whether the ARK Dental Clinic 
and ADENTA were competitors in the market for dental services at the time when ADENTA was about 
to embark on an economic activity, and whether the activities of ADENTA were recognizable as being 
the activities of a competitor. 
The Appeal Court also had to clarify the concepts of competition and the relevant market, inter alia 
by assessing the range of services provided by both companies and the geographical area in which the 
services were provided, since these considerations played an important role in detecting unfair 
competition. 
The Supreme Court stated that the opinion of the Appeal Court on the absence of real competition 
between the ADENTA and the ARK Dental Clinic was based on an incorrect interpretation of Section 
1, Clauses 6 and 9 of the Competition Law, and contradicts the evidence of the case. 
The conclusion of the absence of competition was based on the fact that the ARK Dental Clinic 
operated until 4th September 2008, but ADENTA started its operations on 4th September 2008. 
However, it was not taken into consideration that the activities of ADENTA in the dental market started 
following its foundation, and even before 4th September 2008. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that, in this context, the correct interpretation of the term 
"competition", according to Article 1, Paragraph 6 of the Competition Law is essential. The Regional 
Court wrongly assumed that the provision applies only to the existing competition, although the norm 
expressly states that competition may also be potential. The Supreme Court acknowledged that it was 
important to assess the probability of potential competition, namely, whether there would be competition 
between the two companies in the relevant market if the ARK Dental Clinic had not been deprived of 
this opportunity by transferring its assets to the Defendant. 
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The Supreme Court also pointed out that the Appeal Court, when examining the existence of a breach 
of the Competition Law, had to consider that, under Section 9, Paragraph 9 of the Competition Law, 
ADENTA's status as a market participant might have been acquired not by the actual commencement 
of commercial activities, but at the moment the company was actually founded. As indicated in the 
applicable provision: "which [...] intends to carry on an economic activity"  
The Supreme Court also stated that the Appeal Court had to consider the case law of the 
Administrative Court on the application of Clause 9 of the Competition Law in similar cases. 
The Supreme Court noted that the Appeal Court had not justified why the method for determining 
the value of the shares could not be used as a method for determining losses. In the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, this may be one of the methods by which the amount of the material loss of a member 
of a limited company can be justified within the meaning of Article 1770 of the Civil Law. 
Appeal Court’s judgment 2 
The Appeal Court acknowledged that the activities of ADENTA were manifested as being unfair 
competition within the meaning of Section 18, Paragraph 3 of the Competition Law. 
When assessing the range of services that was provided by both companies, and the geographical 
area in which the services were provided, the Appeal Court recognized that, within the meaning of 
Section 1, Clause 9 of the Competition Law, at the time when ADENTA was preparing to start an 
economic activity, the ARK Dental Clinic and ADENTA were already competitors in the dental services 
market. If the ARK Dental Clinic had not been deprived of the opportunity, there would have been 
competition between the two companies in the relevant market. 
It was apparent that the actual reason why the ARK Dental Clinic suspended its commercial activities 
was a result of the disagreement between the board member, P.A., and the Claimants, on the purchase 
and the price of the shares. There was no evidence in the case that the ARK Dental Clinic had financial 
problems or other objective reasons for terminating its operations. 
The Court used the interpretation of Competition Law expressed in the judgment of the 
Administrative Regional Court of 16th November, 2009, in case NoAA430436-09/13, noting that all 
the possible activities that could impede fair and free competition in the sense of Article 18 of the 
Competition Law, were not stated, nor is the content of the concept of "fair business practice" fulfilled, 
so the list of indications of unfair competition contained in the said norm cannot be considered to be 
exhaustive.  
For the purposes of the Competition Law, the acquisition of the ARK Dental Clinic’s assets, and the 
lease agreement as such, did not play an important role, but the whole set of operations and their results 
did. 
From the evidence of the case, the court established that the ARK Dental Clinic’s assessment on 30th 
June 2007, showed a market value of 205 540 LVL (€292,457). In turn, the market value on 30th 
November 2008, which was determined by the liquidation value method, was LVL 6700 (€9533). 
The Court decided to recover, in favour of the Claimants, the compensation for damages from 
ADENTA in the amount of €141,462. The said amount was calculated as 50% (the number of shares 
owned by the Claimants of the ARK Dental Clinic) of the difference between the market value of the 
ARK Dental Clinic on 30th June 2007, and its market value on 30th November 2008. 
Supreme Court’s decision 
The Defendant submitted the cassation complaint, but the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation 
court proceedings. 
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Comment  
According to Article 21 of the Competition Law, a person who has incurred losses due to a violation of 
this law is entitled to seek compensation for those losses from the violator and from the interest due, 
which is set by law. Upon a request by the Claimant, a Court may, at its discretion, set the amount of 
the compensation. The claims regarding the damages are adjudicated according to the Civil Procedural 
Law. Article 5 Clause 6 of the Civil Procedural Law states that, in applying legal norms, the Court shall 
consider case law.  
In this case, it was the first time that the Supreme Court had clearly stated that the Civil Court should 
have applied the case law and the interpretation of the law that had been done by the Administrative 
Courts in similar cases. In case the Civil Court decided not to consider the interpretation made by the 
Administrative Court, the Civil Courts give the reasons why this interpretation of the law is not 
applicable.  
The Supreme Court gave an interpretation of the term "competition" according to Article 1, 
Paragraph 6 of the Competition Law, explicitly stating that he potential competition should also be 
considered. 
The approach to the determination of the material losses by assessing the value of the company both 
before and after the activities of unfair competition carried out by the competitor could be useful in 
assessing material damages in similar cases. 
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4. Horizontal agreements  
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4.1. Martin Dekleva (Administrative Court of Ljubljana) 
MLADINSKA KNJIGA Trgovina Ltd (office supplies company) as Plaintiff v. SLOVENIAN 
COMPETITION PROTECTION AGENCY (hereinafter “the Agency”) as Defendant. 
Case No. I U 1823/2014, decided before the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia 
(hereinafter “the Court”) on the 15th of September 2015 
Facts of the case: 
The Agency adopted (1) the disputed decision on the investigation, on which the Agency carried out an 
investigation against the Plaintiff (and two other undertakings) in the proceedings initiated for 
investigating the breach of the Article 6 of the Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (hereinafter 
“the National Competition Act”) regarding the prohibition of restrictive agreements, and (2) the disputed 
decision finding that the Plaintiff and two other undertakings made discussions with each other and/or 
conduct concertedly when selling office supplies to public authorities at least from 5th of June 2007 to 
26th of November 2012. 
The infringing conduct – a restriction of competition by object, was about the sharing of public 
procurement. 
Judicial proceedings: 
Under the Article 6 (1) of the National Competition Act “agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices by undertakings with the aim or effect to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia are prohibited and null 
and void.” 
The Agency based its decision on Article 6 (1) of the National Competition Act, claiming that the 
Plaintiff has been involved in the restrictive agreement and concerted practice, which was a restriction 
of competition by object. The issue was the consortium agreement – the joint contract of 17 August 
2007, which was related to the submission of a joint offer in two public procurements “JN ODPISMAT 
– 9/2007” and “JN ODPISMAT – 28/2009”. The Agency cited a number of facts (e.g., method of sharing 
the public procurement to thirds, according to the value of supplies in year 2006) from which it follows 
according to its findings that the aim of the joint offer was to restrict a competition. The conclusion of 
the agreement on the submission of a joint offer was also not necessary due to the potential complexity 
of the public procurement. The purpose of the undertakings involved was to offer prices higher than the 
market prices. Although the Public Procurement Act allows joint offers under certain conditions, in the 
concrete case there was no need for one joint offer. The Agency argued the Plaintiff also restricted the 
competition in submitting a single offer in two other public procurements “JN MNZ” and “JN ODGAL-
24/2010”; following the Agency's argumentation in these cases a concerted practice has been based on 
the continuation of the parties' agreement on the sharing of the procurement to thirds. In an 
administrative dispute, the Agency insisted on its views and proposed the dismissal of the action. 
On the other hand, the Plaintiff claimed errors of law (both procedural rules and substantive law) and 
facts, stated that he had not acted in concert with other two undertakings. He claimed the likelihood of 
the infringement did not arise even from the reasoning of the decision to initiate the procedure and that 
the description of the infringement in the contested final decision was not identical to the description in 
the (previous) decision to initiate the procedure. Also, the decision on the investigation has been issued 
without a court order, which is contrary to the Constitution. The Plaintiff adduced evidence in his favor 
but the Agency did not produce them without proper explanation, which constitutes an infringement of 
the adversarial principle. The Plaintiff stated that the submission of a single offer, without making an 
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agreement with two other undertakings, would not be possible due to business risk (i.e., financial 
reasons) and a large number of locations to deliver goods (i.e., technical reasons), that is to say, the 
Plaintiff himself would not be able to fulfill all the conditions of the public procurement. He argued that 
even in the case of a standalone offer, he could not offer lower prices. The Plaintiff also argued that he 
did not have the opportunity to prepare a proper defence because the Agency had exceeded instructional 
deadlines. He proposed the Court to uphold the action, set aside a contested decision and refer the case 
back to the Agency. 
Ruling of the Court 
The Court first held that the existence of certain circumstances indicating the likelihood of a relevant 
violation of the National Competition Act was sufficient to initiate the procedure, that is to say that the 
Agency had sufficient evidence on the basis of documents for this decision (in the first stage of 
procedure). 
Regarding the Plaintiff's claims about the unlawfully extended procedure before the Agency the 
Court found that according to the contested final decision, the description of acts by which the Plaintiff 
(an two other undertakings) committed the alleged infringement is not identical with the description in 
the decision to initiate the procedure, which does not mention the submission of two offers in public 
procurements “ODGAL- 24/2010” and “MNZ” in 2009. So, the key question is whether the Agency 
was allowed to issue the contested final decision (finding an infringement of Article 6 (1) of the National 
Competition Act) without having previously issued an extension of the decision to initiate the procedure. 
The Court held that such extension was not necessary since the summary of the relevant facts contained 
also findings concerning the submission of standalone offers in cases “ODGAL-24/2010” and “MNZ”. 
Moreover, the complaint – sharing of market of office supplies, remained the same. 
Regarding the Agency's decision on the investigation, the Court found it was legitimate and justified. 
It is true that the decision was not based on the prior court order, which would be in accordance with 
the Constitutional requirements, but this was not required by the National Competition Act then in force. 
The Constitutional Court ruled that such rules of National Competition Act were unconstitutional, but 
that they could still be a valid legal basis for Agency's investigations until the National Assembly 
changes the law. The Court made ex post control of the legality of the decision; necessity – 
proportionality of the unannounced investigation. 
Regarding the Agency's decision finding an infringement of Article 6 (1) of the National Competition 
Act, the Court first noted that the existence of the consortium agreement between the Plaintiff and other 
two undertakings is not disputed. This agreement was about the submitting the joint offer in public 
procurements “JN ODPISMAT - 9/2007” and “JN ODPISMAT – 28/2009”. What was disputed was 
whether this consortium arrangement constituted “a sufficient degree of harm to competition”, which is 
an essential legal criterion in CJEU case-law (see in particular case C-67/13 P – Groupement des cartes 
bancaires v European Commission). Considering the aforementioned CJEU judgment (and some other 
case-law), the Court assessed to ensure the correct application of the substantive law: (1) content of the 
provisions of the agreement, (2) objectives of the agreement and (3) economic and legal context of 
which it forms a part. 
With regard to (1) content of the agreement, it was found that the contracting parties agreed to carry 
out the order to the extent that each contracting party would get 1/3, according to the distributor which 
was annex to the agreement. The content of the agreement was not disputed. 
With regard to (2) objectives of the agreement, the Plaintiff stated that the purpose of the parties was 
to meet the demanding requirements of the public procurement due to its nature, extent and number of 
delivery locations. For the same purpose, the possibility of submitting a joint offer is enacted by Public 
Procurement Act. Even if the conclusion of the joint offer follows a legitimate aim to satisfy the 
conditions of the public procurement, this does not exclude that the aim of the parties was to restrict 
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competition, but such aim should be sufficiently proven. The Court held that the Agency failed to prove 
that the number of delivery locations was not the reason for the conclusion of an agreement on the 
submission of a joint offer (split per third in relation to the number of delivery locations). The Agency 
concluded that the requirements of the public procurements could be satisfied by two undertakings (not 
just one), but this finding could not be a legally relevant proof that the objective of the joint offer was 
to restrict a competition. Namely, this argument followed the Plaintiff's claim that it was not possible to 
submit a standalone offer. Evidence that the objective of the agreement was to restrict a competition 
could only be an indisputable finding that the terms of the public procurement could be satisfied by each 
party in the standalone offer, so the Plaintiff's claims about the business risks relating to the 
unpredictable raw materials market had to be dismissed. However, the Agency did not completely 
disproved the Plaintiff's defence that the joint offer was submitted in order to satisfy the conditions of 
the complex public procurement and the dispersion of business risks. The Agency further argued that 
the purpose of the parties to the procedure was to offer prices higher than the market prices. The Court 
agreed with the Agency that, in so far as the price in the joint offer was higher than the market price, 
under the given circumstances, when all major suppliers of the office supplies submitted the joint offer, 
this could be considered as the evidence that the aim of the joint offer was to restrict a competition. The 
Plaintiff adduce different evidence before the Agency, challenging it's claims that the prices in the offers 
were higher than the market prices. However, the Agency did not produce the evidence which the 
Plaintiff has adduced.  
Regarding the price level, the Agency only summarized the conclusions of the customer which 
considered the first offers as inappropriate because the prices were higher than the market prices. The 
Court held that the Agency would have to prove the Plaintiff's aim to restrict a competition; it is not 
enough to summarize the conclusions of the customer. The fact that the customer lowered the prices in 
negotiation procedures is also, in itself, not enough to prove that the prices in a joint offer were higher 
than the market prices. In support of his claims, the Plaintiff adduced evidence to defend himself from 
the Agency's claims that the agreement on joint offer has been concluded with the aim of restricting a 
competition, and the Agency should have produced the evidence which represented the Plaintiff's 
defence thesis. By not doing so, the establishment by the Agency of the relevant facts was incomplete. 
In addition, the Court found an infringement of the principle of the right to a fair hearing. 
With regard to (3) the economic and legal contexts of which the agreement forms a part, the Court 
examined whether the national legal order allows the parties to submit a joint offer in public 
procurement. The answer is yes: the Public Procurement Act regulates a joint offer as legally valid offer 
with the purpose to satisfy the conditions of complex public procurements (i.e., disadvantage linked to 
economic/financial capacity or technical and/or personnel competence). Regarding such reasons for 
cooperating in the joint offer, pointed out by the Plaintiff and not satisfactorily rejected by the Agency, 
the Court concluded that the Agency did not properly evaluate the legal and economic framework which 
nevertheless allowed the Plaintiff and other parties to the agreement to act as joint providers in a 
particular public procurement. The established factual situation was thus not sufficient to conclude that 
the agreement of the parties with regard to joint offer constitutes a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition, that is to say, restriction of competition by object. 
The Agency also complained that the Plaintiff has been involved in a concerted practice with regard 
to single offers in two other public procurements “JN MNZ” and “JN ODGAL-24/2010”. This complaint 
based on the continuation of the parties' agreement on sharing of the procurement to thirds. More 
specifically, the Agency based its arguments on the value of the offers (prices) and the conduct of the 
Plaintiff and another undertaking that were not selected in the tender but did not request insight into the 
competitive offer and did not file audits, as well as on communication between companies. The Court 
followed the practice of the Supreme Court and the CJEU, which states that the parallelism of a conduct 
is or could be regarded as evidence of a concerted practice if this is the only likely interpretation for the 
parallel conduct. On the one hand, the Court confirmed the existence of indications of concerted practice, 
yet, on the other, the Court found that the Agency did not correctly apply the Article 6 (1) of the National 
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Competition Act. Namely, the Agency failed to assess and/or clearly explain how alleged infringement 
– concerted practice restricts a competition by object. 
Apart from violations of the principle of adversariality (see above), the Court did not find other 
procedural law violations. The Court did not follow the Plaintiff's claim that he did not have the 
possibility of the effective defence due to exceeded instructional deadlines. The Plaintiff was acquainted 
with the procedure and had 6 months for access to written, documentary material and other records. The 
deadline of 45 days for a statement on the summary of relevant facts is laid down by the law and the 
Constitutional Court has already considered this deadline as appropriate. In the context of infringement 
of an essential procedural requirement the Plaintiff also objected the lawfulness of the rejection of the 
proposed commitments by the Agency (the Plaintiff proposed the adoption of a special rulebook). 
However, it should be taken into account that the Agency exercises its powers of discretion in 
assessment with regard to the proposed commitments and the Agency explained the reasons on which 
such decision is justified.  
Conclusion (personal comment) 
The case presented is important from the point of view of referring the Court in particular to the CJEU 
case Cartes Bancaires regarding the restriction of competition by object and illustrating some 
boundaries of this type of restriction. The Court incorporated CJEU views in case Cartes Bancaires into 
a national context, into the application of national provisions prohibiting restrictive agreements. The 
Court pointed out that a restriction by object must show a sufficient degree of harm to competition and 
should be interpreted narrowly. This standard is (in most cases) relatively high. The present case also 
clearly illustrates how important it is for the competition authority to correctly identify all legally 
relevant facts regarding context and objectives of the contested agreement or decision or concerted 
practice. Evidence adduced by the party may be refused only for well-founded reasons which the 
competition authority must explain in its decision. Thus, all relevant claims of the parties have to be 
properly assessed. The Agency freely evaluate evidence, but this must still be done carefully and 
convincingly. All evidence must be taken into account as a whole. If the party rebuts findings (facts and 
circumstances) on a restriction of competition by object, this may indicate that “de facto” effects should 
be assessed. Which is, of course, often more difficult, but this cannot be the criterion for choosing one 
or the other assessment. These are two separate concepts. Nevertheless, concrete application of the legal 
criterion for ascertaining a restriction of competition by object depends on the circumstances of 
individual case. 
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4.2. Cristian Daniel Oana (Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice) 
Name of the Court of Last Resort: High Court of Cassation and Justice (Romanian Supreme 
Court). 
Name of the parties: OMV Petrom v. Competition Council. 
Case no. 1604/2/2012, decision no. 1343 
Date of the judgment: 21.04.2016. 
Preamble 
The Claimant, OMV Petrom, is the largest oil and gas group in South-Eastern Europe while the 
respondent, Competition Council, is an independent administrative body that aims to protect and to 
stimulate competition. 
Following investigations carried out during the period of 2005 – 2011, the Competition Council noted 
the violation by many companies, among which the Claimant, OMV Petrom, of the provisions of article 
5 paragraph (1) letter b) of Competition Law no. 21/1996 and Article 101 Paragraph (1) of Treaty for 
functioning of European Union (TFEU), by violation meaning a horizontal anti-competition agreement 
under the form of sale limitation (comment: the national law prohibits anti-competition agreements in 
the Romanian market in the same conditions as the European law). 
Therefore, the Competition Council proceeded to sanction all companies in violation with the 
aforementioned provisions with fines consisting of 2.6% and 3.2% of turnover; the Claimant, OMV 
Petrom, having been sanctioned with 3.2% due to its quality of initiator.  
The companies have contested by separate paths (distinctive disputes) both in terms of deeds as well 
as their method of application of the law by the Competition Council before the contentious court and 
requested full annulment of the sanctioning acts. Consequently, these actions have been partly admitted 
and the fines reduced conform with national provisions that oblige – in case of changing the sanctioning 
law in time, as it was this case – the application of a more favourable contravention law.  
We illustrate below, in essence, the deeds, defences of the Claimant and the reasoning of the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice (briefly referred to as the ‘High Court’) in the case concerning the 
Claimant OMV Petrom. 
Case summary 
a) Deeds 
The anti-competition agreement consisted of simultaneous removal from the market by many traders of 
a special type of petrol without lead designed for vehicles without catalyser. Given that the number of 
these vehicles had been decreasing, the profitability of the product was reduced accordingly. The 
reasoning of the anti-competition agreement was to prevent the loss of customers who, at a unilateral 
withdrawal of the product (or the withdrawal only by some traders) would have migrated to a trader that 
continued to deliver this type of petrol.  
In other words, the idea was that for these customers – whose number was decreasing but remained 
significant - to replace the petrol without lead designed for cars without catalyser, with a similar type of 
petrol, but designed for cars with catalyser (the cars could have functioned with this inadequate type of 
petrol, but the technical consequences would have been unpredictable). In such a situation, leaving no 
alternative, it was expected the migration of customers not to occur.  
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b) OMV Petrom’s argumentation 
The strategy of the Claimant was to show that: 
- the investigation procedure was carried out in violation of legal provisions; 
- the understanding did not exist: the decision for the product’s sale cessation occurring independently 
from one company to another; 
- even if it had existed, the agreement was not anti-competition by its object (agreement ‘by object’ 
in the meaning of Art. 101 Paragraph 1 TFEU), as the Competition Council considered, but more 
‘by effect’; or, the respondent authority did not prove the anti-competition effects; in other words, 
the simple proof of anti-competition deed is insufficient as long as the anti-competition effects 
prohibited by law has not been proven; 
- assuming that it had existed, the agreement ‘by object’ does not violate legal provisions as the 
product in question (petrol without lead designed for cars without catalyser) was substituted with 
other products; it had been claimed that, from an objective, scientific point of view as well as from 
a consumer’s point of view, this type of petrol is substituted with other types of petrol without lead, 
which means that the relevant market of the product has been extended even more (includes all types 
of petrol without lead, both for cars equipped with catalyser and without catalyser) than the one 
envisaged by the summoned respondent Competition Council: 
- the sanction was wrongly individualized as the Claimant, OMV Petrom, did not have the quality of 
initiator of this agreement, the deeds are not so serious, and the Competition Council did not 
consider the contravention law the most favourable to the Claimant in the individualization of the 
sanction applied.  
During the judgment, the Claimant also requested the notification of Court of Justice of European Union 
(CJEU) for pronouncement of a preliminary decision regarding several issues among which: the 
distinction criteria between the restrictions of competition ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ and limits of data 
and documents collection during on-site inspection.  
Ruling of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (Romanian Supreme Court) 
The notification claim of CJEU for pronouncement of a preliminary decision was rejected with the 
motivation that, inter alia, the judicial practice of European court is sufficiently relevant and does not 
require supplementary clarifications (in particular, the Decision pronounced in the case Groupements 
de cartes bancaires, C-67/13 P, significant for the distinction criteria between the restrictions of 
competition ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ and the Decision of Deutsche Bahn AG et alii, C-583/13 P, 
significant for the limits of data and documents collection during on-site inspection).  
With reference to the investigation procedure, the Court ruled that the investigation was carried out 
in compliance with legal provisions. Thus, it was shown that the protection against an abusive 
investigation has been made by limiting the investigation to the anti-competition deeds for which there 
were clues. If the limits of the investigation (including the inspection) were observed, the evidences are 
legally produced even if they prove an anti-competition deed in another variant than the one for which 
there were initially clues.  
Regarding the deeds, the Court concluded that the anti-competition agreement was proven and 
presented the sufficiently large severity to the extent of being considered ‘by object’.  
On the notion of ‘relevant market’, the Court referenced the ‘Communication of Commission 
regarding the definition of relevant market in the meaning of community competition law’ published in 
the Official Gazette of the European Union series C no. 372 of December 9, 1997, indicating Article 
101 of Treaty for the functioning of the European Union (TFEU; former Art. 81 of TCE), and then laid 
down an analysis on several levels.  
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At the claim level, the Court thus retained that the petrol object of the agreement cannot be substituted 
by any other type of petrol sold on the market because, unlike any other type of petrol, this petrol had 
been designed exclusively for cars equipped with engines without catalyser. The functional substitution 
of products (insistently alleged by the Claimant) does not represent a sufficient de facto element for 
introducing all types of petrol in the same category and extending the relevant market of the product to 
all types of petrol without lead (especially since the long-term effects of substitution have not been 
tested). 
For as long as the products had been simultaneously on the market (2005-2008), the petrol object of 
the agreement and the other types of petrol without lead did not substitute in consumers preferences as 
they oriented to that type of petrol compatible with the corresponding type of engine, according to public 
communications made by traders. Therefore, the Court hold that there was no data regarding the 
substitution in the near past of petrol sale cessation.  
Also, after the withdrawal of the petrol from the market, at least a part of owners of vehicles equipped 
with engines without catalyser used the additives sold separately by OMV Petrom in order to be 
introduced (by consumers) in the petrol without lead in order to render it compatible with engines 
without catalyser.  
All these show that the consumer’s opinion (quite relevant for the definition of product market) was 
that the product in question could not be substituted by petrol without lead designed for engines with 
catalyser.  
Final comment 
Globally, the case is important as it highlights the particular complexity competition law disputes can 
reach. Beyond the de facto matters, the case raises many new legal issues for companies, lawyers, legal 
counsellors and, last but not least, judges of countries from Eastern Europe where competition law 
represents a new law institution (in Romania, for about 20 years). 
In particular, the case may be significant for the way in which the Court figured out some very 
technical matters, such as those related to protection against abusive investigation, or the notion of 
‘relevant market’. 
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5. Decisions of Associations of Undertakings 
  
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2017 
European University Institute 39 
5.1. Beatrix Crnogorac (Commercial Court of Zagreb) 
High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, Ref. No. Us II-70/14-6 of March 5th, 2015. 
Case name: Croatian Society of Orthodontics (Hrvatsko društvo ortodonata) vs. Croatian 
Competition Agency 
Case n.: CCA UP/I-034-03/13-01/034 
Summary of facts  
The Croatian Competition Agency, in its decision of 12th June, 2014, established that the association of 
entrepreneurs, the Croatian Society of Orthodontics, in the period from 1st October to 9th October, 2013, 
with the document „Minimum Price List for Orthodontic Services“, established the minimum prices for 
orthodontic services whereby it concluded a prohibited agreement in terms of Article 8 Paragraph 1 of 
the Competition Act (hereinafter: the CA) whose goal or consequence was to prevent, restrict or distort 
market competition. Moreover, it was established that the prohibited agreement is ex lege null and void, 
in terms of Article 8, Paragraph 4 of the Competition Act, and that also the said association of 
entrepreneurs was given a symbolic administrative and penal measure in the amount of HRK 
150,000.00. 
The Croatian Society of Orthodontics is entered in the Register of Associations of the Republic of 
Croatia and membership is voluntary. A dental practitioner, who is a specialist in orthodontics and a 
citizen of the Republic of Croatia, can become a regular member, while dental practitioners outside of 
the sphere of orthodontics can become associate members. Its task is the professional and scientific 
advancement of its own members. The Agency considered the position of the Croatian Society of 
Orthodontics with regard to the features of performing the activities of that legal entity on the market, 
whereby it considered Article 8 of the CA in which, amongst others, the decisions and allegations of 
entrepreneurial associations are considered to be prohibited agreements. The Agency took the position 
that the Croatian Society of Orthodontics represents one of the forms of professional associations and 
that its members are entrepreneurs who provide orthodontic services and participate in the trading of 
goods and services so that the provisions of the CA, in this particular case, apply also to the Croatian 
Society of Orthodontics. 
Since the association of the Croatian Society of Orthodontics also has, among its membership, 
orthodontic practitioners performing dental activities in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, the 
Agency, in terms of Article 6 of the Regulation on the relevant market, the relevant market, in the 
geographical sense, is established as the territory of the Republic of Croatia, pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Regulation on the relevant market, the relevant market was established, in terms of production, as the 
market for the provision of orthodontic services. 
Moreover, in its decision, the Agency states that, with regard to the fact that in this particular case it 
is a horizontal agreement containing limitations that are considered to be severe market competition 
limitations, it is not necessary to establish in detail the market forces for entrepreneurs, since their market 
shares do not have any impact on the fact relating to whether, in this particular case, there has been a 
violation of the provisions of the CA. 
In this particular case, this is thus about the creation of a Minimum Price List for the provision of 
orthodontic services by the Croatian Society of Orthodontics which, among its voluntary members, 
assembles dental practitioners who are specialised in orthodontics. 
The Croatian Society of Orthodontics stated that the document entitled „The Minimum Price List for 
Services“ was adopted as a proposal and, as such, was sent to the Chamber to be established and, 
immediately upon initiating the process by the Agency, it was removed from the pages of the Croatian 
Society of Orthodontics. 
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In their statement to the Agency, they stated that the orthodontic practitioners were obliged to abide 
by the minimum prices that are prescribed by the Dental Chamber, so that the Croatian Society of 
Orthodontics was obliged to submit to the Chamber a price list of services. It emphasizes that by 
proposing a minimum price to the Chamber the list established that its goal was not to disrupt market 
competition, nor has there been any consequence on the relevant market since the same presents only a 
proposal, and the said price list was published on the website for the sake of transparency. 
Croatian Competition Agency 
The Agency established that, in this particular case, the prohibited agreement referred to in Article 8 of 
the CA represents a cartel agreement, which is visible in the form of the adoption of the Minimum Price 
List, and this undoubtedly presents an agreement on the minimum prices for the orthodontic services 
that orthodontic practitioners provide on the free market, that is, outside of the network of the public 
health service. 
Having insight into the rule regulating the dental medicine activities, the Agency established that the 
Dental Chamber was awarded the right to establish the lowest price for dental services for doctors of 
dental medicine outside of the public health service network, as well as the lowest labour price of a 
dental technicians.  
At the same time, the Agency considers that the Act does not provide such authority to other entities 
and, bearing in mind that the Croatian Society of Orthodontics is an association of entrepreneurs whose 
voluntary membership assembles members performing an entrepreneurial activity, it is obvious that, as 
such, the „Minimum Price List“ was adopted without any legal background, i.e., contrary to the market 
competition regulations. Having had an insight into the provisions of the Act on Dental Practice and the 
provisions of the Articles of Association of the Chamber, the Agency established that the Chamber had 
adopted a unified price list for dental medicine services, defining the lowest dental service price, and 
that a dental practitioner must present the price list of its dental services in an accessible place where it 
is visible to patients. The Agency therefore emphasizes, in its decision, that the said provisions refer to 
individual dental practitioners and orthodontists when they perform their activities, but also to the 
Croatian Society of Orthodontics, which is an independent economic entity, comprised of members 
whose membership in the said association is voluntary. 
In this particular case, the Agency Council established that the Croatian Society of Orthodontics 
created a Minimum Price List without having had a legal basis to do so, because the Chamber is solely 
authorised to act in this way pursuant to its legal and statutory authority, but not the association of 
entrepreneurs, in this case, the Croatian Society of Orthodontics. The Agency is of the opinion that the 
fact that the Dental Chamber did not establish the lowest prices for orthodontic services in a separate 
price list does not authorise the Croatian Society of Orthodontics, either directly or indirectly, to create 
the Minimum Price List. 
The Agency is of the opinion that it is indisputable that the creation of the Minimum Price List is the 
consequence of an agreement on the price between persons competing amongst each other on the same 
relevant market, and that the same was published on the website of the Croatian Society of Orthodontics 
for three years. The Council emphasizes that agreements on prices, market division and similar activities 
by entrepreneurs operating in the same market make the competitors oppose the very nature and purpose 
of a market economy. Such agreements prevent the optimal allocation of resources and abolish 
competition among entrepreneurs. In cases where such agreements exist, there is no motivation, i.e., no 
need for the participants in the agreement to compete in terms of the quality of service and to introduce 
innovation. In this way, the participants in the agreement are ensured of survival on the market as long 
as they abide by the agreed price list. The entrepreneurs who could not survive on the market under 
efficient market competition conditions will therefore also survive. 
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The Agency is of the opinion that the Croatian Society of Orthodontics, by creating such a document 
and publishing it on its own website in order to also make it available to other members, who were not 
present while the aforementioned was being adopted, digressed from common and permitted market 
behaviour at the expense of efficient market competition. The Council emphasized that this was an 
agreement that was prohibited in regard to its aim, so that its effect did not need to be proven. In other 
words, since such agreements, per their nature, have the aim to distort competition, so, in this particular 
case, it is not necessary to prove the anti-competitive effects of such behaviour in that very market. The 
Agency did not therefore analyse it in detail, nor did it establish any concrete consequences for the 
market, i.e., in relation to the interests of the consumers that were created by the conclusion of the said 
agreement. 
Pursuant to Item 20 of the Guidelines, once it is established the agreement has as its goal to prevent, 
limit or distort market competition, there is no need to also consider its concrete effects. This means that 
such agreements are prohibited per se, regardless of whether their particular effects on market 
competition have occurred, or not. 
They also state that the provisions of the Act on the Collective Exclusion of Individual agreements 
cannot apply to the said agreement, because the provisions of collective exemption can in no way apply 
to the agreements of entrepreneurs containing such severe market competition limitations. Since the said 
agreement is precisely a type of an agreement on prices, i.e., it contains severe market competition 
limitations, the agreement does not fulfil the conditions for collective exclusion. 
Ruling of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia 
Against the decision of the Agency, the Croatian Society of Orthodontics filed a claim and the High 
Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia adopted the plea and annulled the decision of the 
Croatian Competition Agency of 12th June 2014, UP/I-034-03/13-01/034 
(The Croatian Society of Orthodontics filed a claim against the decision of the Croatian Competition 
Agency and the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia (Ref. No. Us II-70/14-6 of March 
5th, 2015) ... (adopted the claim)  
The High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia stated in its decision that it was disputable 
whether the document entitled „Minimum Price List“ represented an agreement as envisaged by the 
provision of Article 8 Paragraph 2 of the Competition Act (hereinafter: the CA).  
Namely, Article 8 Paragraph 1 of the CA prescribes that all agreements between two or more 
independent entrepreneurs are prohibited, as well as decisions of entrepreneurs’ associations and aligned 
action that, as a goal or consequence, has the distortion of market competition in the relevant market, in 
particular those that directly or indirectly establish the purchase or sales prices, i.e., other trade terms. 
Paragraph 2 of the quoted legal provision considers as legal provisions of agreements, in terms of 
Paragraph 1, in particular agreements, individual provisions of the agreements, and verbal or written 
agreements among entrepreneurs and the aligned practice that is the consequence of such agreements, 
the decisions of entrepreneurs or associations of entrepreneurs, the general terms and conditions, and 
other entrepreneurial acts that are, or could be, an integral part of the agreements, etc., regardless of 
whether such agreements were concluded between entrepreneurs acting on the level of production, i.e., 
distribution (horizontal agreement), or among entrepreneurs who do not act on the same level of 
production, i.e., distribution (vertical agreements). 
The Court states that this is the area of dental medicine, which is regulated by a special law, i.e., the 
Act on Dental Practice, which regulates the organisation and conditions for dental medicine‘s practice 
as a service that ensures the provision of dental assistance to persons when they exercise their rights and 
protect their oral health. Provision of Article 34 of the said Act stipulates that the Chamber adopts a 
unified Price List for dental medicine‘s services, which defines the lowest price for dental services, and 
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the Chamber defines the lowest price for the work of dental practitioners outside of the network of the 
public health service. 
The High Administrative Court is therefore of the opinion that the document „Minimum Price List 
of Services” does not represent a prohibited agreement, as established in Article 8 of the CA, because 
the terms and conditions of dental medicine‘s practice are regulated by a special law, from which it 
follows that it is the Chamber that is solely authorised to establish the lowest possible prices for the 
work of a medical doctor outside of the network of the public health service. 
The Court found that the conclusion of the Agency was inaccurate, i.e., that this is a prohibited 
agreement which is manifested in the agreement on the prices, and this agreement represents the 
limitations of market competition, because the agreement of the entrepreneurs on the prices must have 
as a goal or consequence for the application of such agreed prices in the market, which was not the case 
here because the Minimum Price List was not applied, nor could it be with regard to the legal regulations 
from the sphere of dental medicine, according to which only the Chamber can define the lowest prices 
for the dental services, whereby the account below the minimum prescribed price is subject to sanctions 
pursuant on special regulations. In this particular case, the prices of services that are prescribed by the 
„Minimum Price List“ are above the minimum prices stated in the Nomenclature, which follows the 
regulations of the Chamber. 
The Court concluded that the document „Minimum Price List“ does not represent a prohibited 
agreement, especially because it does not, directly or indirectly, establish the lowest price for dental 
services, since the definition of the same is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chamber, and not of 
the Croatian Association of Orthodontics. Such a document, not by its content or by its legal nature, is 
not of a binding character, nor can it be applied in reality, as doctors of dental medicine, in establishing 
the lowest prices for their services, are obliged to abide by the Price List adopted by the Chamber under 
the threat of sanctions in cases where they are acting to the contrary. 
Comment 
It should be noted that the goal of associations and professional associations is to promote the interests 
of their members, and any agreement on the prices, especially the prescribing of minimum prices and 
sanctions for their non-abidance, if not permitted by a special law, is considered impermissible. If they 
do not clearly distance themselves from such agreements, both associations and their members are 
concluding a prohibited agreement. 
It is, therefore, particularly important to take into consideration the decision of the High 
Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, which annulled the decision of the Agency because the 
Court is of the opinion that the document regulating the prices does not represent a prohibited agreement, 
because the definition of the prices is under the exclusive competence of another body, pursuant to law, 
and not of an association of entrepreneurs. 
I am of the opinion that the Competition Act, in accordance with the acquis communautaire of the 
EU, clearly defines that the decisions of the associations of entrepreneurs, establishing minimum or 
unique prices, are considered to be prohibited agreements, regardless of whether such associations are, 
or are not, authorised to adopt such decisions based on a special regulation. The participants in such 
agreements, especially associations of entrepreneurs, are subject to sanctions in the form of 
administrative penal measures, which are based on the very fact that there is evidence on the existence 
of the agreement, entirely independent of the fact of whether the agreement was applied in practice or 
not. 
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5.2. Jovita Einikiene (Circuit Court of Vilnius) 
Applicant – The Lithuanian Chamber of Auditors (LCA) is a public legal entity unifying all of certified 
auditors of Lithuania. The primary activities of the LCA are as follows: supervision of auditors and audit 
companies’ activities in Lithuania; the organization of qualification examinations in Lithuania; the 
organization of auditors and auditors’ assistants continuing professional development, in accordance 
with International Education standards; the submission of proposals for legal acts that regulate audit and 
accounting to the State authorities; the developing of audit methodology and recommendations for 
Lithuanian auditors, etc. 
Defendant – the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Council”) 
Summary of the facts 
The object for judicial review is Resolution No. 2S-15 "On the Compliance of the Lithuanian Chamber 
of Auditors with the requirements of Article 5 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania 
(hereinafter called “Law”), adopted on 21st June 2007. By this resolution, a fine of LTL 30,000 (the 
former currency) was imposed on the LCA for violation of Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Law. The LCA 
submitted a complaint to the Court with a request to annul Resolution No. S-15 of the Council.  
The main statements of the claim were the following: the Council unlawfully reopened the 
investigation, terminated by Resolution No. S-107 of 22nd September 2005, and added the material of 
this terminated investigation to the new one, thus violating Article 30 Paragraph 4 of the Law under 
which the Council is entitled to reopen the terminated investigation only if new circumstances arise. The 
fact that the LCA Praesidium meeting, held on 26th January 2006, approved the recommended Standards 
of Working Hours for Carrying Out Audits on Projects Financed by Implementing the Lithuanian 
Programme Single Programming Document (hereinafter called – “SPD”) for 2004-2006 is not the basis 
for reopening an investigation that was terminated in 2005. The approval of these standards is not to be 
considered a newly revealed circumstance, but a newly arisen circumstance, and therefore the Council’s 
resolution was adopted unlawfully. 
In the resolution, the Council spoke on the unlawfulness of the actions of LCA, although the 
investigation with regard to the actions of LCA has neither been initiated nor carried out. The activity 
of LCA was not a subject of the investigation. The Council violated the right of LCA to be informed 
about the investigation being conducted against it, and to take timely and appropriate remedies (Article 
34 of the Law). 
LCA could not be punished for violations of Article 5 of the Law, as the provision contained in this 
Article prohibits the creation of agreements restricting competition, which are understood as agreements 
between two or more economic entities, combinations of entities, or their representatives, and the LCA 
cannot be regarded as a combination of economic entities. LCA members are auditors who are 
employees or owners of the entities. Auditors themselves cannot be regarded as entities because they 
themselves do not sell audit services and cannot sell them. This is done, and can only be done, by audit 
firms. LCA is an association whose members are natural persons who are not personally engaged in 
economic activity and are most frequently in labour relations with audit firms, and therefore LCA cannot 
be considered a combination of economic entities and is not subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the 
Law. According to the applicant, the fact that the LCA carries out the functions of supervision and 
control of the activities of audit companies and therefore may influence the economic activity in the 
market for audit services, is not the basis from which to regard LCA as a combination of economic 
entities. 
The LCA’s actions, which aimed to restrict competition, were named in the Resolution of the Council 
– and the results of the round-table meeting "On the Audit of the EU Structural Funds" were prepared 
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in September 2004. Guidelines on the minimum audit fees for EU structural assistance funds were 
published on the website of LCA. These LCA actions did not limit, and could not restrict, competition, 
because the LCA is not the right entity to be held liable for carrying out such actions. The "Round Table" 
is not an LCA body or unit, and its decisions are not LCA's actions or decisions. Other actions of the 
LCA were approved by the Praesidium of the LCA at a meeting on 26th January 2006, by Protocol No.2: 
The Recommended Cost Plan of Minimum Working Time for Carrying Audits on Projects Financed by 
Implementation SRL measures in Lithuania between 2004 and2006, were approved. The applicant 
believes that the approval of the aforementioned document, and the sending of these documents to the 
audit companies, could not have any effect on competition, since it was only for the purpose of guidance. 
Since the audit type for the support received from the EU Structural Funds is a relatively new service in 
Lithuania, the methodological assistance of LCA for auditors, expressed in the recommendations 
adopted by the LCA, is objectively justified and necessary, as the LCA is an institution providing audit 
quality and thus fulfilled the functions entrusted to them by the law. The petitioner believes that the 
LCA requirement that the audit company justifies the established price and, if necessary, proves that the 
service provided for such a price is of a high quality, is the fulfilment and management of the duties and 
functions established by the Law on Audit and guided by EC Commission Recommendation of 16th 
May 2002, on statutory Auditors’ independence in the EU: a set of fundamental principles”. 
The Council did not consider the fact that the LCA did not receive any income from the activities 
that related to the subject-matter of the investigation: LCA did not act in the market of audit services 
and it did not receive any income from the provision of audit services, and therefore a monetary fine 
could not be imposed on LCA.  
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court announced a decision on 14th February 2008, 
(Administrative Case No. I-14-561/2008) on the dismissal of the complaint as it was considered to be 
unfounded.  
The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania announced a decision on 25th November, 2008 
(Administrative file no. A39-1939-08), and in part upheld the appeal of the applicant and changed the 
decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court: it annulled the part of the Council's Resolution 
No. 2S-15, which re-assesses the actions of the LCA in 2004, the investigation of which was terminated 
by the Council in 2005, and reduced the fine imposed on the applicant to LTL 27,500. 
The Supreme Court explained that the decision to terminate the investigation should assess the 
actions performed during the investigation in order to determine that an offence was not found. 
However, later, after the termination of the investigation, it may have become apparent that the previous 
conduct of the entity had to be regarded as being a violation of the Law on Competition. The possibility 
of renewal of the terminated investigation in accordance with Article 30 Paragraph 4 of the Law is thus 
related to the circumstances, enabling a decision on the actions of an economic entity to be performed 
before the termination of the investigation. Those circumstances which are associated with violations 
committed before the discontinuance of the investigation, but which were, at that time, not known, and 
could not have been known, to the Council, which carried out the investigation, are considered to be 
new circumstances. The circumstances that appeared only after the termination of the investigation, 
cannot be considered to be newly discovered circumstances (Latin factum superveniens) for the re-
starting of the investigation. This can be considered, since new breaches of competition law appeared 
after the termination of the investigation. Such new violations are the basis for launching a new 
investigation. The circumstances for the renewal of the investigation should be directly linked to the 
anti-competitive behaviour that the Council has already assessed. On the contrary, the new and 
independent violations of the Law on Competition, which were committed after the decision to terminate 
the investigation was taken, do not justify the restarting of this investigation. 
Having assessed the minimum audit prices of the recommended EU structural funds that were 
adopted in 2004, and the Time-cost Rules and the Plan of Costs of Working Time adopted in 2006, and 
the nature of these actions, the judicial panel determined that the reasons given by the Council relating 
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to the nature of the continuing infringement are abstract considerations that are based on assumptions 
and unfounded evidence. Despite the fact that both proceedings of the LCA carried out in 2004 and 
2006, might have had the same objective (as the Council states, restricting competition), these actions 
were clearly defined in time, had their beginning and end, and, even if they were similar Actions, they 
could be classified as being separate infringements and not as a continuous one. Article 3, Paragraph 3 
of the Law presents the concept of an economic entity. Economic entities are companies, associations 
(associations, unions, consortia, etc.), institutions or organizations, or other legal or natural persons who 
carry out, or who may carry out, economic activity in the Republic of Lithuania, or whose actions 
influence, or may influence, economic activity in the Republic of Lithuania, if implemented. Article 10, 
Paragraph 3 of the Law defines an agreement as being any contract concluded by two or more economic 
entities in any form (written or verbal), or by the concerted actions of economic entities, including a 
decision taken by the combination of any economic entity (association, unification, consortium, etc.). 
Article 5 of the Law provides for the prohibition of restrictive competition agreements. All agreements 
that are aimed at restricting competition, or that restrict, or may restrict, competition, are prohibited and 
invalid from the moment they are concluded. 
By the Court, the systematic assessment of these provisions leads to the conclusion that the Law on 
Competition, in addition to prohibited agreements concluded by two or more economic entities, also 
prohibits the decisions of associations of economic entities which violate competition law. The Audit 
Chamber is a public legal entity (Article 56 Part 1 of the Audit Law), and all Physical Persons - Auditors 
are members of the Chamber of Auditors; the Auditor may perform the audit only as the owner of the 
Auditing legal entity, no matter what the legal form, or by being employed in an auditing company 
(Audit Law Article 27 Paragraph 1). The rights and duties of the Chamber of Auditors are governed by 
Articles 60 and 61 of the Audit Law. These rights do not include the right to provide audit services to 
the Chamber of Auditors. The Chamber of Auditors themselves thus do not work on the audit services 
market. However, the Audit Chamber brings together auditors who can carry out audits as the owners 
of an audit entity, a real member of the audit firm, or a member of the audit firm, or one who is working 
in an audit firm. Auditors provide audit services in return for payment, and therefore they are to be 
regarded as economic entities within the meaning of Article 3, Paragraph 4 of the Law. Despite the fact 
that the LCA does not directly engage in economic activity within the meaning of Article 3 Part 1 of the 
Law, they undoubtedly connect (combine) such activities (providing audit services) of the entities - the 
auditors. The Supreme Court referred to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(see Judgment of 19th February 2002, in Case C-309/99 JC W. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price 
Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene, Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten) to 
supporting arguments qualifying the LCA as the entity that is responsible according to the Law. 
Moreover, the decisions of the LCA, as well as the decisions of other similar associations of 
economic entities, regardless of their binding or purely indicative nature, may enter into the scope of 
economic activities and, therefore, fall into the scope of the Law on Competition, if they are intended to 
restrict competition or if they directly or indirectly restrict (may limit) competition. Moreover, the LCA 
may be considered to be an economic entity because its actions can influence, or its intentions may have 
an impact on economic activity in the Republic of Lithuania, if implemented. The recommendations of 
the LCA were, by their very nature, aimed to fix the prices of audit services by co-ordinating the relevant 
conduct of the auditors in the market for audit services. The Court established that there were 
investigations that were initiated on the quality of the performance of audit services, in accordance with 
the firms offering the lowest audit costs. So why was the clear intention of the LCA to consider the 
recommendations as binding and, moreover, to implement them in real terms. Why were the 
recommendations of LCA regarded as being an agreement that aimed to restrict competition within the 
meaning of Article 5 of the Law on Competition? The Court stressed that supervision could not be 
carried out while violating the rules of competition law. Neither the Audit Law, nor any other legislation, 
regulates the LCA’s function in influencing the prices of audit services, or any other terms of this 
service, in such a way as to limit the competition between operators providing audit services. 
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The LCA, as an association of economic entities, can be punished under the Competition Law. 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty, which expressly provides that, as it is incompatible with the common 
market, all decisions of associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States, 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market, are, inter alia, prohibited. In the EC Commission and case-law, there are cases 
where infringements of Article 81 of the EC treaty are penalized, not by individual undertakings but by 
their associations (see, inter alia, the Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf and the Federatie van 
Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven, No 94/272/EC, Essentially confirmed by the judgment of the 
Court of First Instance in Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse 
Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v Commission, Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96; Judgment of the Court of 
Justice in Case 246/88 Belasco v Commission, Para. 7). The Regulation (EC) of Council No 1/2003 on 
the implementation of the competition rules, which is laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, also 
provides the possibility of imposing fines, not only on undertakings, but also on their Associations. 
Article 23, Para. 4 of that regulation provides the subsidiary liability of members of the association for 
the payment of the fines imposed on the Association. So, the concept of an Association (a union of 
entities) falls within the concept of an economic entity within the meaning of Article 3 Paragraph 4 of 
the Law on Competition. 
Article 41, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Competition stipulates that "For prohibited agreements <...> 
a fine of up to 10 percent of the total annual income in the previous financial year shall be imposed on 
economic entities." The amount of the fine is not related to the income received during or from the 
violation, but it is calculated from the general years’ income. Similarly, the amount of fines from the 
Association's turnover is calculated also in European Union law (see Article 23 of the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003), mentioned above. Taking into account the fact that the Competition 
Council assessed the actions that the LCA carried out in 2004, although the investigation regarding these 
violations was unjustifiably renewed, the Supreme Court partially complied with the appeal and reduced 
the amount of the fine imposed. 
Although the decision of the Court is not the hottest one, the statements and the Court’s 
argumentation are still in use, both in later Court decisions and in decisions of the lower Courts. The 
Court referred to the ECJ case law and EU legislation as the definition of entity (a subject liable under 
competition law) in the national Law on Competition was narrower and was unclear. At the present 
time, the Law on Competition is laid down in a new version. 
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5.3. Maria de Fátima Galante (Court of Appeal of Lisbon) 
Name of the parties: Portuguese Competition Authority v. Professional Association of Chartered 
Accountants (OTOC)  
Case No. 938/10.7TYLSB.L1-5  
Date of the judgment by the Court of Appeal: 19th May, 2015.  
Object  
The present case concerns the interpretation of Article 101 No. 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), in particular, in relation to compatibility with Article 101 TFEU of Training 
Credits Regulation, in order to know whether, in the light of EU competition law, a professional 
association may impose the requirement, for the practice of the profession, of training that only it 
provides.  
Background information  
The Order of Chartered Accountants is a public legal person and is organized to include a professional 
membership, which is responsible, on the basis of mandatory registration, for representing the 
professional interests of chartered accountants and for overseeing all matters relating to the exercise of 
their functions.  
According to Article 3, nº. 1, al. b) of the Training Credits Regulation, Diário da República, 2nd 
series, Nº. 133, Series II, of 12th July, 2007, OTOC promotes institutional training, which consists of 
events organized by OTOC for its members, of a maximum duration of 16 hours. This aim, in particular, 
to make the professionals aware of legislative initiatives and amendments and of questions of ethical 
and professional conduct, and only OTOC can promote institutional training (Article 5 of that 
Regulation).  
Under Article 15 (1 a) b)) of the Training Credits Regulation, chartered accountants taking part in 
institutional or professional training, are awarded 1.5 credits per hour of training, and all chartered 
accountants are required to earn 12 institutional training credits per year.  
Ruling of the Court  
1. By a decision of 7th May, 2010, the Portuguese Competition Authority held that the Training Credits 
Regulation had distorted competition in the market for compulsory training for chartered accountants 
throughout the national territory, and this was in breach of EU law.  
A fine was, for that reason, imposed on the OTOC. That market, it was found, had been artificially 
segmented, a third of it being reserved for the OTOC (12 credits from a total of 35), and, in the other 
segment of that market, discriminatory conditions were imposed that were to the detriment of 
competitors to that professional association.  
2. The OTOC sought the annulment of that decision before the Portuguese courts, but the Lisbon 
Commercial Court confirmed that OTOC had breached Article 4 of the Portuguese Competition Act 
(Law 18/2003, dated 16-11) and Articles 81 and 101 TFEU, and imposed on OTOC a fine of €90.000. 
The Court also maintained an order requiring the publication of an extract of the decision.  
The OTOC appealed the decision of the Lisbon Commercial Court.  
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3. Lisbon Court of Appeal had sought Court of Justice clarification concerning the interpretation of 
Articles 56 TFEU, 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and 106 TFEU, about whether EU competition law applies to 
professional associations, and reported the main arguments in the order of referral.  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), on 28th February, 2013, answered two of the 
questions submitted by The Lisbon Court of Appeal, and stated that the Training Credits Regulation 
adopted by the OTOC should be regarded as being the decision of an association of undertakings within 
the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, and when it adopts rules such as the Training Credits Regulation, a 
professional association, such as the OTOC, does not exercise powers which are typically those of a 
public authority, since the Training Credits Regulation was adopted by the OTOC without any input 
from the State, thus imposing discriminatory conditions.  
According to the ECJ judgment, a regulation, such as the one adopted by the OTOC, constitutes a 
restriction on competition that is prohibited by Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).  
4. The Lisbon Court of Appeal, bound by the interpretation given, decided that by adopting the 
regulation for remunerated mandatory continued training for chartered accountants, the OTOC had 
violated both Portuguese and European competition law, upholding the Lisbon Commercial Court 
Judgment, which confirmed the Competition Authority’s decision.  
In the view of the Court, the Regulation on the Formation of Credits that was adopted by the OTOC, 
constitutes a restriction of competition that is prohibited by Art. 101 TFEU, in so far as it eliminates 
competition in a substantial part of the relevant market to the advantage of the applicant, and it imposes 
discriminatory conditions on the other part of that market, to the detriment of the competitors of the said 
professional order.  
As regards the measure of the fine, which the applicant considers to be manifestly excessive, account 
must be taken not only of the criteria set out in Article 44 of Law 18/2003, dated 11-6, as well as those 
established in Art. 18, 1, of DL 433/82, of 27-10.  
It is therefore necessary to consider the high objective and ethic-subjective depreciation of conduct, 
and that it calls into question fundamental values for the structure and functioning of the economy, 
namely, the values of freedom to form, supply and demand, and of market access, on the one hand, and 
the safeguarding of the interests of consumers, on the other, and the economic importance of TOCs at 
the enterprise and general economic levels is evident. Consequently, in view of the criteria and 
circumstances set, the Court of Appeal decided that it was appropriate to impose on the applicant the 
fine imposed by the Lisbon Commercial Court.  
Comment  
This decision clearly reinforces the understanding of the CJEU in the context of competition law. For 
the Court of Justice, in the context of competition law, the concept of an undertaking includes any entity 
engaged in any economic activity, irrespective of the legal status of that entity and its mode of financing, 
and any activity which consists of proposing goods or services in a given market.  
This is why the Regulation of Credit Formation that was adopted by the Order of Chartered 
Accountants should be considered to be a decision taken by an association of companies within the 
meaning of Art. 101 of the TFEU.  
A regulation establishing a system of compulsory training for accountants in order to guarantee the 
quality of the services provided by the latter, such as the Regulation of Credit Training, which is adopted 
by a professional order, such as the Order of Official Accountants, etc., constitutes a restriction of 
competition that is prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, in so far as it eliminates competition in a substantial 
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part of the relevant market for the benefit of that trade, and it imposes discriminatory conditions on the 
other part of that market, to the detriment of competitors in that professional order. 
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5.4. Ana Paula Lobo (Portugal Supreme Administrative Court) 
Decision of the Court of Commerce which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal following referral 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling 
Subject 
Within the scope of the Appeal of Administrative Offence, which was heard at the Court of Commerce 
of Lisbon, the accused Order of Technical Officers of Accounts, was condemned for the practice of an 
infraction that was planned and punished by Article 4 (1) of Law No 18/03, Article 81 (1) of the Treaty 
and Article 43 (1) A) of Law no. 18/03, of 11/6, with a fine of € 90,000.00 (ninety thousand euros). In 
accordance with the provisions of Arts. 4 n ° 2 of Law n ° 18/2003 of 11/6 and 81 ° n ° 2 of the UE 
Treaty provisions of the Regulation on Credit Training published in Diário da República n. º 133, Series 
II, dated July 12, 2007, and attached to Notice n. º 4539/2007 of the Chamber of Accountants, were 
declared null and void. It was also decided to publish, at the expense of the Defendant, the decision, by 
extract, in the III series of the Diário da República, and in a daily newspaper of national circulation, 
within 20 days which were to be counted from the passing of the decision. In disagreement with the 
content of such a decision, the Defendant filed the present appeal requesting the revocation of that 
decision and its replacement by another that would acquit them. 
1. All the material in the file is related to the approval of the Credit Training Regulation 1, which is 
approved by the Direcção da Câmara dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas and was published in DR N.º 113, 
Series II, of July 12, 2007, which regulates the compulsory training of Accountants, provided for in 
Decree- Law n.º 452/99 of 5th November, and, at present in al. S) of Article 3 (1) of the Statute of the 
Order of Official Accountants, approved by Law-Decree N.º 310/2009 of 26th October. The judgment 
under appeal, in the main proceedings, considered that recourse to the compulsory training of TOCs, in 
the manner in which it was made in the Credit Regulation, infringed Article 4 of Law N.º 18/03 of 11th 
June and Article 81 (1) of the UE Treaty As an aggravating factor, it considered that it was a decision 
of an association of undertakings in a relevant market, whose purpose was to prevent, distort or restrict 
competition in all or part of the defined market, and that this has happened in a noticeable way. 
2. It therefore maintained the decision in the part in which it considered the administrative infraction 
- violation of Article 4 (1) of that Law – had been verified but reduced the amount of the fine imposed 
in this regard from €114 654.10 to €90 000.00. The "a quo" Court also declared the provisions of the 
Regulation on the Formation of Credits, published in DR Nº 113, Series II, 3 of 12th July, 2007, to be 
null and void, and ordered the publication of the decision at the expense of the accused, in the III Series 
of the DR and in a national newspaper, to be published within 20 days of its final res judicata. 
Allegations of the applicant 
Proven facts 
1. The Law-Decree n. º 265/95, of 17th October, regulated the profession of official accountant, and it 
created the Association of Technical Officials of Accounts and the system of compulsory registration. 
2. The Law-Decree n. º 452/99, of 5th November, changed the designation of the former Association 
of Technical Officials of Accounts to the Chamber of Accountants, and it revoked Decree-Law No 
265/95 of 17th October. 
3. One of the objectives of the approval of the Statute of the Order of Chartered Accountants was to 
"strengthen (...) the credibility of statutory auditors as privileged interlocutors with the tax 
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administration", determining, for this purpose, "a (...) professional training [through] quality control 
mechanisms supported, inter alia, in a system of compulsory permanent training ". 
4. The Law-Decree n. º 310/2009, of 26th October, revised the Statute of the Chamber of Official 
Accountants, approved by Decree-Law No 452/99, of 5th November, changing the name of this 
association of professionals to the Order of Chartered Accountants. 
5. In accordance with Article 1 of the Statute, "The Order of Chartered Accountants (...) is a public 
legal person of an associative nature who is obliged to represent, by compulsory registration, the 
professional interests of statutory auditors and to superintend in all aspects related to the exercise of 
their functions ". 
6. The Office of Official Accountants has the following duties, which are, among others:  
a. To admit the registration of the Official Chartered Accountants, as well as to grant the 
respective professional license; 
b. To defend the dignity and prestige of the profession, to promote respect for ethical and 
deontological principles and to defend the interests, rights and prerogatives of its members; 
c. To promote and contribute to the improvement and professional training of its members, in 
particular, through the organization of courses and seminars; 
d. To define standards and technical schemes for professional action, taking into account the 
guidelines issued by the Accounting Standards Committee and other international bodies; 
e. To represent the Chartered Accountants before any public or private entity; 
f. To organize and keep up-to-date the Official Accountants’ Register; 
g. To certify, whenever requested, that the Official Auditors are in full exercise of their functional 
capacity; 
h. To organize and regulate traineeships; 
i. To promote and regulate the examinations of candidates for Official Accountants; 
j. To promote the publication of a bulletin or magazine, with the aim of providing updated 
information in the technical, scientific and cultural areas; 
k. To collaborate with any entities, national or foreign, in the promotion and execution of studies, 
research and work that are aimed at improving matters of accounting and a fiscal nature. To 
propose to the legally competent entities the measures needed to defend the functions of 
Chartered Accountants and their professional and moral interests, and to pronounce on legislation 
relating to them; 
l. To exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over the Official Auditors; 
m. To establish the principles and norms of ethics and professional deontology. 
7. In order to pursue its purposes, the Order of Chartered Accountants exercises its action through: 
a. The General Meeting; 
b. The ‘Bastonary’; 
c. The Board of Governors; 
d. The Governing Board; 
e. The Fiscal Council; and 
f. The Disciplinary Council. 
8. In accordance with Article 35 of the Statute of the Order of Chartered Accountants, it is the 
responsibility of the Governing Board, amongst others: 
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a. "To resolve on the institution and regulation of quality control mechanisms for the services 
rendered by members of the Order"; (...) 
b. "To deliberate on the institution and regulation of vocational training systems". 
9. In accordance with Article 6 (1) of the Statute of the Order of Chartered Accountants, in the version 
of the Law-Decree n. º 310/2009, of 26th October, “The following duties are assigned to the Official 
Accountant”: 
a. To plan, organize and coordinate the accounting procedures of those entities which have, or 
need to have, regularly organized accounts in accordance with the officially applicable accounts 
or the accounting standardization system, as the case may be, in compliance with legal 
requirements, accounting principles Guidelines of entities with competence in accounting 
standardization; 
b. To assume responsibility for technical regularity in the accounting and tax areas, of the 
aforementioned entities; 
c. To sign, together with the legal representative of the above entities, their financial statements 
and tax returns, proving their quality, under the terms and conditions defined by the Order, 
without prejudice to the competence and responsibilities of the respective commercial and tax 
law; 
d. On the basis of the elements made available by the taxpayers responsible for accounting, they 
take responsibility for the supervision of declaratory acts for social security and for tax purposes 
that are related to the processing of wages. " 
10. In accordance with Paragraph 2 of the same article, "It is also incumbent upon the Official 
Accountant to:  
a. Perform advisory functions in the areas of accounting, taxation and social security; 
b. Intervene, on behalf of taxable persons for whose accounts are responsible, during the grace 
period of the tax procedure, in matters related to their specific competences; 
c. Perform any other functions defined by law, suitable for the performance of their duties, 
namely those of an expert appointed by the Courts, or by other public or private entities. " 
11. Article 15 (1) of the Statute of the Order of Chartered Accountants specifies that: "The following 
are conditions for registering as Official Accountant: 
a. They must be of Portuguese nationality, or nationals of any of the Member States of the 
European Union; 
b. Be suitable for the exercise of the profession; 
c. Must not be inhibited or barred from the exercise of the profession; 
d. Have not been convicted of the commission of an intentional crime, in particular one of a 
fiscal, economic or financial nature, unless rehabilitation is granted, or it has been declared 
forbidden or disabled; 
e. Must have the qualifications required by the Statute; 
f. Must carry out professional or curricular internship; 
g. Must have passed the professional examination. Pursuant to Article 57 (1) (a) of the Statute of 
the Order of Chartered Accountants, it is the duty of the Official Chartered Accountants to 
comply with all the regulations and resolutions of the Order. 
13. Article 59 (2) of the Statute Order of Chartered Accountants, says that it constitutes a "disciplinary 
offence, [by]the violation by the official accountant of an act or omission of any of the general or special 
duties entered in the [.] Statute [...], or other norms or resolutions adopted by the Order, albeit by way 
of negligence”'. 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2017 
European University Institute 53 
14. Pursuant to Article 63 of the same statute, disciplinary penalties applicable to statutory auditors 
for the offences they commit are: a warning, a fine, suspension for up to three years, and expulsion. 
15. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Code of Ethics of Accountants, this applies to all those "in force and 
who are working in a system of dependent or independent work, whether or not they are part of 
professional societies or accounting societies ". 
16. In accordance with Article 2 of the Code of Ethics for Accountants, "in the performance of their 
duties, statutory auditors must comply with generally accepted legal rules and accounting principles, 
adapting their application to the specific situation of entities. Those who provide services, avoiding any 
diminution of their independence in the interests of personal interests or external pressures, striving for 
accounting and fiscal truth. " 
17. Article 3 (1) of the Code of Ethics for Accountants prescribes that accountants are required to 
"act on the principles of integrity, suitability, independence, responsibility, competence, confidentiality, 
fairness and professional loyalty “. 
18. The Regulation on Quality Control was published in the Annex to Notice 131/2004 of the Order 
of Official Auditors, in the Official Gazette of the Republic, No 175, Series II, dated July 27th, 2004. 
19. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Regulation on Quality Control "This Regulation shall apply to 
statutory auditors who are registered in the Chamber of Chartered Accountants who are (...) in the full 
exercise of their duties". 
20. Pursuant to Article 2 thereof, the Quality Assurance Regulation for Chartered Accountants aims 
to: 
a. Ensure that the Chartered Accountants present their work with the highest level of quality; 
b. Maintain public confidence in the profession, showing concern for maintaining high quality 
standards in the work performed; 
c. Ensure the dignity of interprofessional relations, ensuring compliance with ethical and 
deontological standards; 
d. Encourage and support the Official Accountants in order to achieve the highest standards of 
quality in the work that is consistently developed in the exercise of the profession; 
e. Avoid the adverse consequences of substandard work and unfair competition. 
21. It is stated in Article 4 (1) of the Regulation on Quality Control that the quality control of the activity 
of Chartered Accountants will be measured by: 
a. The relationship between the number of clients and their size, the fees charged, the number 
and qualification of employees; 
b. The complexity of the work to be carried out and the training and professional competence of 
the Official Accountant; 
c. the premises where it operates, in relation to the number of persons working in it; 
d. the available material means, namely, equipment and software, library and archive; 
e. the obtaining of an annual average of 35 credits, in the previous two years, in training that is 
promoted by the Chamber of Accountants or approved by it; 
f. training activity, in training courses promoted or approved for the purpose of granting credits 
by the Chamber of Accountants, or by teaching in higher education in the areas of accounting or 
taxation, that are exercised in the relevant year or the previous year. This is a condition sufficient 
to comply with Paragraph e) of this Paragraph. 
22. Article 4 (5) of the Regulation on Quality Control provides that "if there are any impediments to the 
verification [of the documents subject to quality control of the official's account] it is obliged to obtain, 
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through formation, the number of credits referred to in Paragraph e) of Paragraph 1 of this Article, plus 
50%, in the year in which the impediment occurs and in the following year,”, stipulating Paragraph 6 
that, in the event that the official accountant does not comply with this procedure, he will be subject "to 
providing proof of examination .. "on a subject of his choice and also on matters of ethics and 
professional deontology ". 
23. The Regulation of Credit Training was published in the Official Gazette n. º 133, Series II, dated 
July 12, 2007, attached to Notice no. 4539/2007 of the Chamber of Accountants. 
24. A preamble to the notice (extract) n. º 4539/2007 states: "Institutional reasons advise that a 
specific and unique area of intervention be set up by the Chamber of Auditors to enable it not only to 
transmit its Institutional message, but also for the mobilization of professionals to the great challenges 
and goals that only the Chamber of Chartered Accountants is responsible for defining and executing”. 
25. Article 2 (2) of the Regulation on Credit Training sets out, among other things, the objectives of 
Quality Control of Chartered Accountants: 
a. The promotion of the updating of the knowledge of Accounts Receivers, namely, the 
acquisition and settlement of knowledge, monitoring, understanding and the full knowledge of 
legislative changes and initiatives; and 
b. The promotion of the constant updating of the dense, complex and constantly evolving 
normative framework (with special emphasis on accounting and taxation) that governs the 
practice of the Official Accountant. 
26. In accordance with Article 3 of the Regulation on Credit Training: 
a. "1-The Chamber of Chartered Accountants promotes the following types of training: 
i. Institutional formation; 
ii. Professional qualification. 
b. 2-The institutional formation consists of communications carried out by the Chamber of 
Accountants to its members, lasting up to 16 hours, whose objective is (...), the awareness of 
professionals for initiatives and legislative changes, as well as issues of an Ethical and 
deontological nature. 
c. 3-The professional training consists of sessions of study and the deepening of the themes that 
are inherent to the profession, with a minimum duration of more than 16 hours. 
27. Pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Credit Training Regulation, institutional training can only be provided 
by the Chamber of Chartered Accountants. 
28. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Credit Training Regulation, vocational training may be provided by 
the Chamber of Accountants, by higher education institutions and by entities that are authorized by Law 
to provide training, as well as by other entities that are registered for the purpose of training. Professional 
training with the Order of Chartered Accountants is also possible. 
29. In accordance with Article 15 (1) (a) and (2) and Article 15 (2) of the Regulation on Training for 
Credits, the presence in any training action - institutional or professional is ,5 credits per hour, and these 
are required in order to obtain 12 annual credits in institutional formation. 
30. Under the Credit Training Regulations, the Order of Chartered Accountants: 
a. Determines the criteria for admissibility of other entities as trainers of statutory auditors 
(pursuant to Articles 8 and 9); 
b. Lays down the conditions for the assimilation, for the purpose of crediting, of courses which 
grant academic and postgraduate degrees (in accordance with Article 10), and of training 
provided by other bodies (in accordance with Article 12); 
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c. Lays down the conditions governing the monitoring of trainees' attendance and quality, and 
the quality of training (in accordance with Articles 13 and 14); 
d. Lays down the conditions for the allocation of credits (in accordance with Article 15); 
e. Determines the compensatory amount for respective registration and/or approval and 
supervision of the quality of training (in accordance with Articles 16 and 17). 
f. has a period of three months to decide on the admissibility of enrollment of the training entities, 
as well as on the training actions they intend to give (in terms of Articles 9, 10 and 11), 
31. In accordance with Article 16 of the Credit Formation Regulation, other training entities must pay 
the Order of Chartered Accountants a fixed fee, either for the application for registration as a training 
entity, or for the request for approval of each of the training courses they intend to administer. 
32. A FDF - Serviços de Contabilidade e Formação Profissional, Ldª.is a company, whose main 
activity is the administration of training courses and, as a secondary activity, the provision of an 
accounting service. 
33. The FDF requested its registration as a training entity by the Order of Accountants on January 
30th, 2008 and received a favorable response to this request on March 12th, 2008. 
34. The FDF paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration with the Order of Chartered Accountants, 
as a training entity. 
35. Up to 24th April, 2008, the FDF had not yet applied to the Order of Chartered Accountants for 
the equalization of any training action it had undertaken. 
36.GEST H - Consultores de Recursos Humanos, Lda (GEST H) is a company dedicated, amongst 
other activities, to the training of professionals in the accounting and fiscal areas. 
37. GEST H requested it be registered as a training entity, with the Order of Official Accountants, 
on October 12th, 2007, and it was resolved at a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Technical 
Officers of Accounts on December 15th, 2007, with a favorable response T=to that request. 
38. GEST H paid the sum of € 200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
39. On 27th November, 2007, GEST H applied for the matching of four training courses it intended 
to administer, and, at least until the end of April, 2008, it had received no response from the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
40. GEST H was informed by the Order of Chartered Accountants, by e-mail, on 15th November, 
2007, that the matching of each of the training actions would cost € 100.00. 
41. Sagabi - Cooperativa de Formação e Consultoria em Gestão, CRL (Sagabi), applied for 
registration with the 'Order of Chartered Accountants' on 26th September, 2007, and received a 
favorable reply to that request on 20th December, 2007. 
42. On 20th February, 2008, Sagabi applied to the Order of Chartered Accountants to compare two 
training courses which it intended to administer and, at the latest by the end of April 2008, it had not yet 
received any response from the Order of Chartered Accountants. 
43. Sagabi paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration as a training entity, with the Order of Chartered 
Accountants. 
44. The Citeforma - Centro de Formação Profissional dos Trabalhadores de Escritório, Comércio, 
Serviços e Novas Tecnologias (Citeforma) is a Professional Training Center for Participatory 
Management, created by a Protocol granted by SITESE – the Union of Workers and Technical Services 
and I.E.F.P. – the Institute of Employment and Training. 
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45. It has as its main activity the promotion of professional training for the valorization of human 
resources, in the sector that constitutes the scope of action of the granting union. 
46. Citeforma requested registration as a training entity with the Order of Accountants, on October 
3rd, 2007, and received a favorable response to this request on December 20th, 2007. 
47. Citeforma requested, on March 4th, 2008, from the Order of Chartered Accountants, the matching 
of a set of training actions that it intended to administer. 
48. The Order of Account Technical Officers only replied on 23.4.2008 but did not accept the request 
due to an alleged lack of framing of the subject matter of the same for the purpose of assigning credits 
to Official Technicians of Accounts. 
49. The Order of Chartered Accountants required the payment of €100.00 to certify the equivalence 
of each of the training services provided by others. 
50. The AEP is an association of public interest, whose purpose, amongst others, is to provide 
services to the business community in the fields of fairs, exhibitions, congresses, information, and 
support to companies, in relation to consulting and training. 
51. AEP requested its registration as a training entity from the Order of Chartered Accountants on 
15th October, 2007 and received a favorable reply to that request on 20th December, 2007. 
52. In March, 2008, AEP requested from the Order of Chartered Accountants the acceptance of 
training courses that it intended to administer in partnership with the Angra do Heroísmo Order of 
Commerce, which was granted by telephone contact with the Order of Official Account Technicians 
during that month. 
53. AEP paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of Chartered 
Accountants. 
54. The GTI - Technical Support to Investment, SA (GTI) is a company that is dedicated, amongst 
other activities, to the training and qualification of people in different areas of activity, and to supporting 
companies in the provision of consultation services unfunctional areas. The GTI requested its 
registration as a training entity from the Order of Accountants on January 11th, 2008 and received a 
favorable response to this request on February 26th, 2008. 
55. GTI paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration with the Order of Chartered Accountants. 
56. Certform - Formação e Consultadoria, Lda. (Certform) is a company dedicated, amongst other 
activities, to the development of training services, and to supporting companies in terms of professional 
performance. 
57. Certform applied for registration as a training entity with the Order of Accountants on September 
4th, 2007 and received a favorable response to this request on December 4th, 2007. 
58. This company paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
59. In February, 2008, Certform asked the Order of Accountants to match five training courses it 
intended to administer, with a workload of 18, 24, 36 and 48 hours, of which only a legal action was 
approved together with some administrative practices in human resources. 
60. Certform paid the Official Chartered Accountant €100.00 for each approved training course. 
61. The CEI - Centro de Educação Integral (CEI) is a private educational institution with the support 
of the Ministry of Education whose main objective is the integral formation of its students in order to 
prepare them to participate actively and fully in society, through the implementation of a school 
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programme in accordance with official standards that are defined by the Ministry of Education, and with 
competence and efficiency at all levels of education. 
62. The CEI requested its registration as a training entity from the Order of Accountants on October 
26th, 2007 and received a favorable response to this request on December 20th, 2007. 
63. This Centre paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
64. In a letter of January 17th, 2007, the CEI asked the Order of Chartered Accountants to compare 
the four training courses it intended to administer – in regard to tax updates on IRC; VAT updates; fiscal 
amendments in property, general tax law and the tax procedure code and Updates in Labor 
Law and Commercial Law - which were approved by the Order of Official Chartered Accountants. 
65. The CEI paid the Order of Chartered Accountants €100.00 for approval of each of the training 
actions. 
66. Ciclorama - Estudos, Projectos e Produções, Lda. On November 7th, 2007, applied to the Order 
of Chartered Accountants as a training entity and received a favorable response to this request on 
November 21st, 2007. 
67. Ciclorama paid the sum of € 200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
68. The Companhia Própria – Formação e Consultadoria, Lda. is a company dedicated, amongst 
other activities, to the formation of small and medium enterprises of executed and technological 
companies. 
69. The Companhia Própria – Formação e Consultadoria, Lda. requested its registration as a training 
entity with the Order of Technical Officers of Accounts, on October 29th, 2007, and received a favorable 
response to this request on December 20th, 2007. 
70. The Companhia Própria paid the sum of € 200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the 
Order of Chartered Accountants. 
71. IATOC is a private legal entity, whose main objective is to ensure the practical application of the 
legal regulations governing the activity of Chartered Accountants. 
72. The IATOC did not require its registration as a training entity, because it considered that "the 
Regulation [of Credit Training] limits the freedom to choose the subjects of the training actions, besides 
being the Order of Account Technical Officers 'To judge for its own benefit' the 'suitability' of training 
activities to be carried out by other bodies'. 
73. APECA - Associação Portuguesa das Empresas de Contabilidade e Administração (APECA) is 
a non-profit business association, whose purpose is to promote studies and training activities, in 
particular, professional ones, with a view to the technical improvement of associated companies. 
74. APECA applied for registration with the Order of Chartered Accountants on 27 February 2008 
and received a favorable reply to that request on 12 March 2008. 
75. APECA paid the sum of €200.00 for its registration as a training entity with the Order of 
Chartered Accountants. 
76. The APPC (Associação Portuguesa dos Peritos Contabilistas) (APPC) is a private association, 
whose objectives are to intervene in the development of accounting education in Portugal and to promote 
ongoing training for its members. 
77. In a letter of September 17th, 2007, APPC applied to the Order of Chartered Accountants for 
approval of its new training course - New Accounting System - which it intended to administer. 
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78. In a letter of 2nd October, 2008, the Association of Chartered Accountants replied that only 
training activities with a workload of more than 16 hours could be treated as being equivalent for the 
purposes of granting credits, and that the equalization of training could only occur at a time subsequent 
to the application for registration of the entity concerned as a training entity. For that purpose, the 
respective fees will be paid. 
79. The APPC requested its registration as a training entity with the Order of Chartered Accountants, 
on February 16th, 2009, and received a favorable response to this request on May 20th, 2009. 
80. APOTEC - Associação Portuguesa de Técnicos de Contabilidade (APOTEC) is a non-profit 
association of public interest, whose objectives are the cohesion of all professionals covered by its scope, 
which are respectively valuation and professional training, the defence and promotion of the respective 
interests, and the study and deepening of the sciences and techniques related to accounting and taxation. 
81. APOTEC did not require its registration as a training entity with the Order of Chartered 
Accountants, because it disagreed with the current system of quality control of the activity of Chartered 
Accountants by the Order of Chartered Accountants. 
82. According to this Association, "more than 90% of the training [by itself] is designed for actions 
lasting 6 to 8 hours (...) because these actions are most appropriate to the needs of the recipients, allowing 
them to update their knowledge without departing for more than one day from their job. Since almost 
all of the training done by APOTEC is less than 16 hours, this Association is prevented from carrying 
out training that is approved by the Order of Official Technicians Of Accounts, due to not fulfilling the 
requirement for training of 16 hours of duration or more." 
83. APOTEC received a letter from one of its associates, stating that "I hereby request that the 
resignation of a member of this Association be done on my personal behalf (...) and that of my daughter. 
This decision is made by virtue of being statutorily obliged to be members of the Order of Chartered 
Accountants, and, at the same time, that the training that we attend at your Association does not count 
towards the credits that must be obtained for the Chamber’s quality control." 
84. The Order of Chartered Accountants sent the Official Accountant, Silvino FG, a letter dated 
August 16th, 2007, through which it also transmitted to it that non-compliance with the provision of the 
Regulation of Credit Training that requires the 70 credits in training, in a period of two years "is subject 
to disciplinary procedure". 
85. In October, 2008, APECA provided a training course on the "Revision of tax matters", in two 
modules, lasting two days, from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., in which a daily workload of eight and a half 
hours is mentioned. 
86. In December, 2008, APECA gave a training session on the new Labor and Social Security Code, 
which lasted two days and offered the following hours: 9.30 am/10.45 am - training; 10h45/11h00 - 
coffee break; 11h00/12h30 - training; 12:30 a.m./2:30 p.m. - lunch break; 2:30 p.m./4 p.m. - training; 
16h00/16h15 - coffee break; 16h15- 18h00 - training; In the announcement for this session a daily 
workload of eight and a half hours is mentioned. 
87. Amongst others, the following subjects are taught within the scope of the training of the Official 
Auditors: 
a. "Consolidation of Accounts", with a duration of 16h; 
b. "Public Accounting", with a duration of 16h and 32h; 
c. "The National Accounting Standards, with a duration of 16 hours; 
d. "Analysis of Balance Sheets and Economic and Financial Indicators", with a duration of 16h 
and 32h; 
e. "The Ethics and Deontology of the Official Accountant", lasting 8 hours; 
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f. "A New Model of Accounting Normalization", with a duration of eight hours and seven and a 
half hours. 
88. On 17th June, 2010, those that were included on the list were registered as training entities are 
included on the list that is attached to the records on pages 2024 to 2027, the content of which is 
reproduced here, with a total of 77. 
89. The Order of Official Accountants conducts training courses in the districts of Aveiro, Beja, 
Braga, Bragança, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, Évora, Faro, Guarda, Leiria, Lisbon, Portalegre, Porto, 
Santarém, Setúbal, Viana do Castelo, Vila Real And Viseu and in the Autonomous Regions, covering 
the Municipalities of Angra do Heroísmo, Funchal, Horta and Ponta Delgada. 
90. APELA carries out training activities in Lisbon, Porto and Vilamoura. 
91. APOTEC carries out training in Lisbon, the Azores, Faro, Torres Vedras, Madeira, Guarda, Braga 
and Leiria. 
92. Free Meetings, totally free. 
93. In the districts of Angra do Heroísmo, Aveiro, Beja, Bragança, Castelo Branco, Évora, Faro, 
Funchal, Guarda, Horta, Ponta Delgada and Vila Real, expenses for training paid in 2009 were higher 
than earnings. 
94. The amounts collected for the assimilation of entities and the equalization of training actions are 
not advertised on the official website of the Order of Chartered Accountants. 
95. By a letter sent to the Order of Accountants on 4.12.2006, under reference I-DPR-
OF/634/2006/DPR, the Competition Authority requested clarification regarding the implementation of 
the "quality control service" of the Official Accountants and, in particular: 
a. the basis for the non-approval/disclosure of other public or private entities qualified and 
recognized as providing the training services in question; 
b. the justification for the absence of the setting of the criteria or standards regulating a standard 
programme, with subjects and time duration, in order to be able to define equivalences; 
c. the criteria for choosing the subjects selected for compulsory training; 
d. the criteria for defining the duration of each module; and (v) the reasonability of the amounts 
charged for the courses, in particular for those of short duration, that are provided for the 
segmented and permanent formation of Official Accountants. 
96. Once this letter was received, a meeting with the Competition Authority was requested in order to 
discuss the matter, and this took place on 12.12.2006. 
97. It was agreed at that meeting that the Order of Chartered Accountants would draw up a Regulation 
for the Formation of Credits, and that, before approving it at a meeting of the Board of Directors, it 
would discuss it with the Competition Authority. 
98. The meeting was attended by Dr. M.M.S., the Competition Authority, the current member of the 
Order of Official Accountants, D.A., and the lawyer of the Order of Chartered Accountants, Dr. D.A. 
99. A meeting was held between the Competition Authority and the Order of Official Accountants 
on January 16th, at which the issues of professional and institutional training segmentation were 
discussed, and the latter (compulsory training for a duration of less than 16 hours) would be the exclusive 
responsibility of the then Chamber of Accountants, and the need for accreditation would be the 
responsibility of the Chamber of Accountants of the training entities. 
100. All of these meetings were held at the premises of the Competition Authority. 
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101. The M.M.S. participated in these meetings, on the part of the Competition Authority, the present 
official of the Order of Official Accountants, D.A., and the lawyers of the Order of Official Accountants, 
D.A. and R.L.V. 
102. The Order of Chartered Accountants responded to the letter of 4.12.2006, with the reference I-
DPR-OF/634/2006/DPR, on 6/19/07, penalizing the late reply, which was justified by the "need to 
conceive and carry out a set of documents ... which, because of its complexity and scope, could not be 
carried out in a shorter time" and which was aimed at "answering the questions ... formulated ", the 
Order of Chartered Accountants states that "It has drawn up ... a regulation that fits in and defines the 
way the various players intervene in the administration of training for Official Auditors. " 
103. On 6th November, 2007, the Order of Chartered Accountants received a request for further 
clarification from the Competition Authority. 
104. The Order of Chartered Accountants replied in a letter dated 3.4.2008, constant of fls. 112 a fls. 
122 of the case-file, the content of which is reproduced hereunder for all legal purposes, with a view to 
"presenting ... clarification of elements" and "responding to the comments made regarding the 
Regulations for the Formation of Credits ". 
105. The Competition Authority sent a request for information to the Order of Chartered Accountants 
on 15th April, 2008, to which the Order of Chartered Accountants replied on 3rd June, 2008. 
106. On 10th November, 2008, the Order of Chartered Accountants sent a draft of amendments for 
the Regulation of Credit Formation, to the Competition Authority, and this includes: 
- Regarding the amount of financial compensation, the Order of Chartered Accountants proposed to 
amend Articles 16 and 17 of the Credit Formation Regulation in order to establish that the amounts of 
the said compensation be published on its website, and they affirm that they reflect the costs actually 
incurred by the Order of Chartered Accountants for their enrollment and/or the approval and inspection 
of the quality of the training provided. As regards the need for the transparency of the requirements on 
which the registration of other entities depends for the purpose of carrying out equivalent training, the 
Order of Accountants proposed the simplification and implementation of the requirements that are set 
out in Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Credit Training Regulation, which would read as follows: 
“The registration of other entities with the Order of Chartered Accountants, for the purpose of 
carrying out similar training courses, depends on the demonstration of the following conditions: 
* A proven ability to carry out training actions; 
* The stopping of the necessary means to ensure the quality of the training actions; 
* The proficiency of the holders of the management bodies of the respective entity and those 
responsible for the organization of the training ". 
- With regard to institutional training, the Order of Chartered Accountants states that "the duration of up 
to 16 hours for institutional training, and the consequent need for vocational training lasting more than 
16 hours, is perfectly reasonable, justified, and is even in the public interest, given the important public 
function of the Official Accountants, inasmuch as no professional training lasting up to 16 hours would 
meet the necessary quality requirements for training." He also says that "institutional training is not 
confused with vocational training, the first being essentially directed to the learning of professional 
ethics and to communication, in a merely informative way, of initiatives and legislative and 
administrative changes." 
- As for the deadlines for deciding on the enrollment of other entities and the equivalence of these 
courses, for the purpose of obtaining credits, the Order of the Official Accountants accepts the 
reduction to a month of the term for a decision on the registration of other entities, for the purpose 
of carrying out equivalent training, and proposes that the duration of the approval of the training 
measures be increased from three to two months for the purpose of obtaining credits. 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2017 
European University Institute 61 
- As regards the obligations of other similar entities in relation to the control of the attendance of 
trainees, the Association of Chartered Accountants considers that there is a disparity between the 
obligations for frequency control in the case of training actions that are provided by higher education 
institutions and by qualified entities, or by training that is provided by other entities, which is why 
it maintains the discrepancy between the two types of entities, in regard to frequency control in 
relation to the respective actions. 
107. The Order of Official Chartered Accountants requested that a meeting be held so that the draft of 
the amendments to the Credit Formation Regulation could be discussed with the Competition 
Authority’s technicians. 
108. Such a meeting, despite having been noted, was later cancelled by the Competition Authority 
and was not rescheduled. 
109. Case 3/9 was filed/assessed on 19th February, 2009. 
110. Until the receipt of information on the opening of the investigation on 12th March, 2009, the 
Order of Chartered Accountants had not received any reaction from the Competition Authority regarding 
its proposal to amend the Regulation on Credit Training. 
111. The Order of Chartered Accountants, following a meeting held between the Competition 
Authority and the representatives of the Order of Chartered Accountants in August, 2008, made itself 
available to make certain changes. 
112. The interlocutor of the Order of Chartered Accountants at this meeting with the Competition 
Authority was no longer Dr. M.M.S., but instead there were two technicians from the Restrictive 
Practices Department of the Competition Authority and Dr. L. V . 
113. To date, the Order of Chartered Accountants has not amended any provision of the Credit 
Formation Regulations. 
114. In 2009, the Order of Chartered Accountants declared a turnover of €15,287,213.62. 
115. The Order of Chartered Accountants acted freely, consciously and voluntarily when approving 
and publishing the Regulations on Credit Training.  
116. It put forward that it was possible that this could cause restrictions in the competition and thus 
conformation to this consequence. 
117. It knew that practices restricting competition are punishable by law. 
118. There was no not of prior illegal practices against the Defendant. 
Issues to be decided  
The accused was charged with committing an offence against the provisions of Article 4, Paragraph 1, 
and a breach of the provisions of Article 6, Paragraph 1, both under Law No. 18/03, dated 11/6, which 
is based on the approval and publication of the Regulation on Credit Training, through which the Order 
of Accountants, as a professional order, created the market for the training of accountants for the purpose 
of the quality control of their activity and also defined the rules of that market and, as a formative entity, 
it competes in that market with other entities. 
The defence of competition, is, together with private property and free enterprise, one of the 
Institutions upon which the system of the free market economy, its assumption and the conditions of its 
operation, rests. Hence, its dedication at the level of Basic Law, both in the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic (Articles 80(a) and 81(e)) and in the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(Articles 3(1)(g) and 4(1), which relates to competition as an instrument of European integration itself. 
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Applicable laws and principles 
Law n. º 18/03, of 11/6, which is currently in force, has, in turn, repealed Decree-Law No 371/93, within 
the framework of an overall reform of competition law, both national and (Decree- Law No 10/03 of 
18/01) and taking into account the so-called modernization package and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 
16/12/02. 
The touchstone of the competition system is, in the wake of Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 
81), the prohibition of the anti-competitive practices that are provided for in Article 4 of Law N. º 18/03. 
In accordance with Article 4 – Law 18/03: 
1. Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices between undertakings will be prohibited, in any form whatsoever, which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, distortion or appreciable restriction of competition, in whole or in 
part, of the national market, in particular those which result in: 
(A) to fix, directly or indirectly, the purchase or sale prices or to interfere in its determination by the 
free play of the market, artificially inducing both their registration and their write-off. (..). "Article 
6 (1) of Law N. 18/03 provides: "The abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position on 
the national market or in a substantial part thereof, for the prevention, distortion or restriction of 
competition. 
Article 81 of the Treaty provides that: 
All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which are capable of affecting trade between Member States, and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, or restriction of trade between Member States are prohibited, or that 
distort competition within the common market, in particular those consisting of: 
(A) fixing, directly or indirectly, the purchase or sale prices, or any other trading conditions. 
The legal good, which is protected by these standards, is the functioning of the free market. The 
legislator has chosen not to specify and implement agreements, concerted practices or decisions by 
associations whose object or effect is to prevent, distort or restrict competition. Pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 32 of Law Decree n.º. 433/82 of 27/10, updated by Decree-Law no. 244/95 of 
14/09, to the type of illegality being analyzed, the rules of criminal law are subsidiarily applicable. 
The blank rule will be one that has the peculiarity of incompletely describing the assumptions of 
punishment for a crime by referring part of its implementation to other normative sources, naming both 
the first sanctioning norm and the secondary supplementary, or integrating, norms. 
There is also a need to prevent a specific infringement of the law - it is not necessary to verify the 
result (to prevent, distort or restrict competition), which is patent in the legal expression "having as its 
object or effect", but the capacity to produce such an outcome. 
The source of this provision is clearly, and almost repetitively, the aforementioned Article 85 (now 
Article 81) of the Treaty, which has been the subject of intensive work by the Commission of the 1PI 
and the TJC, which will, of course, have to be considered in the interpretation and application of Article 
2. It can safely be said that, with due adaptations, it is, in this case, through the Commission's guidelines 
and its decisions and the Community Courts that the integration of the rule should be sought. The 
concepts are the same, and they have been intensively worked out and studied, and they are valid in our 
domestic law as well as in Community law. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that in domestic law we must also consider such basic principles 
as in dubio pro reo, and all its procedural and substantive consequences when, as in this case, we 
consider the application of a fine to the Defendant who is Imputed in the practice of the facts that are 
subject to this provision and that are punishable under Article 43 (1) (A) of Law No 18/03. 
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Objective type 
In order to fulfill the objective type, it is necessary to analyze in turn: 
A. Whether the Defendant constitutes an association of undertakings, as provided for in the 
precept, and is thus subject to competition law; 
B. Whether the approval of the Regulation of the Formation of Credits configures a decision 
relating to the association of companies;  
C. What the relevant market is. 
D. Whether the decision taken has, as its object or effect, the prevention, distortion or restriction 
of competition, in whole or in part, of the defined market, and whether this is an appreciable 
distortion. 
A - Association of subject to competition law 
The professional practice of the activity of an official accountant in Portuguese territory is subject to 
registration with the Order of Official Accountants, and both Portuguese and nationals of Member States 
of the European Union may exercise activity as an official accountant in Portugal, provided that the 
conditions for registration that are provided for in Article 15 of the Staff Regulations are verified. 
Statutory auditors provide a service, one that is essentially intellectual, both autonomously and cost 
wise in a market, for remuneration. In view of this situation, it can be concluded that the technical 
accountants, registered with the Order of Chartered Accountants, are economic operators who provide 
their services, in a dependent or independent way, perceiving by the same a remuneration as 
professionals. 
The Order of Chartered Accountants is a company, in the definition of company/enterprise that is 
provided in Article 2 n. º 1 of Law n. º 18/03 of 11/6. 
The Order of Chartered Accountants is presented as an association of companies to which, pursuant 
to Articles 2 and 3, the legal regime of competition applies. 
B - Decision on the association of companies 
The approval, by the Board of Directors of the Order of Chartered Accountants, of the Credit Regulation 
is, in this context, the decision of an association of companies. 
C - Relevant market 
It is through the market definition that the boundaries of competition are identified and defined. 
The market, as Prof. Fernando Araújo says, is "... the interaction of the set of sellers and buyers, 
current and potential, who are interested in the transaction of a given product or factor of production" 
(Introduction to Economics, Almedina, p. 144). 
"The main objective of ‘market definition’ is to systematically identify the competitive constraints 
facing the companies concerned. The aim of defining a market, both in terms of its product and its 
geographic dimension, is to identify all relevant competitors. Competitors of the undertakings 
concerned who are likely to restrict their conduct and prevent them from acting independently of 
effective competitive pressure. " 
The product market identifies the good or service in question and consists of the set of interchangeable 
products, both in terms of demand and supply. From the point of view of demand, the market is identified 
by the existence of a set of products, goods or services that are interchangeable, i.e., that consumers see 
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as being similar, in order to satisfy a given need. Here, you have to consider factors such as price, product 
characteristics and how to use them. 
In turn, the geographical market is established, by taking into account the territorial area in which 
the producers or sellers of a given good or service compete under uniform conditions. From a demand 
point of view, if there is an increase in the price of a product at one location and demand moves 
significantly to another location, these two locations will be considered the same geographical market 
for that product  
2 52, Introduction, Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law - 97/C 372/03.  
The Competition Authority has argued that the relevant market is that of training for certified 
accountants for the purposes of quality control, on the demand side of which are the officially registered 
accounts technicians and, on the supply side, the Order of Chartered Accountants, educational 
establishments, and other entities that are authorized to provide training in accordance with the law and 
those inscribed with the Order. 
The Defendant does not accept this definition of the market, because she understands that the training 
she teaches is linked to her duties and should not be considered in that sphere of economic exchanges. 
We understand that the market to be considered in these proceedings is that of training for 
accountants who work in the national territory as liberal professionals, who are compulsorily enrolled 
in the Order of Chartered Accountants, and all those who seek such training. 
The special competencies and attributions of the Order of Chartered Accountants do not leave it 
outside this market, since it interacts with it as a training entity that is qualified to provide institutional 
and professional training, along with other entities. 
In geographical terms, the market to be considered is the national territory, insofar as the Order of 
Chartered Accountants carries out its duties and competencies throughout the national territory, and any 
official Portuguese or foreign accountant, in order to be able to exercise his profession in Portugal, must 
be registered in the Order, to comply with deontological standards and, in particular, to comply with the 
Regulation of Quality Control of Technical Account Officers, in the section where it stipulates the need 
to obtain an annual average of 35 credits. In the last two years, in training that is promoted by the 
Chamber of Official Accountants or approved by it takes place in the national territory.  
Decision having as its object or effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of 
competition. 
D - Limitation of the functioning of the market 
The Order of Chartered Accountants stipulates that all Accounts Receivable Technicians must obtain an 
annual average of 35 credits through training that it has promoted or approved, of which 12 annual 
credits are from training exclusively provided by itself, and she herself decides who the entities that can 
administer the training are, and which of the training programmes for credits are obviously interfering 
with the regular functioning of the market, thus influencing the formation of supply and demand, (the 
"credit allocation" factor being decisive in this supply/demand binomial), that is:, is engaging in the 
market distorting behavior. Why this happens is very well understood. The definition of those who can, 
a priori, enter the market, and on what terms they can act on it constitutes, firstly, a limitation on the 
functioning of the market, binding the economic agents to request prior approval by the Order of 
Chartered Accountants, and thus not allowing the free play of supply and demand. 
The limitation introduced by the Credit Training Regulation allows the obstacles to the entry of new 
competitors into the market to be reinforced, since they can only compete after being approved by the 
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Order of Chartered Accountants, and in that market they can only give training that is approved by it 
that has a duration of more than 16 hours, and a market share that corresponds to training of lesser 
duration is forbidden. 
Firstly, the absence of a time limitation for training measures would allow agents to compete with 
complete freedom, and consumers could choose the agent who proposed the product (the training action) 
that is best suited to their needs, in terms of thematic area, duration, price, etc. By means of the approval 
of the Credit Training Regulation, the contractual freedom of the service provider and the respective 
client is influenced, on the supply side, by previously obtaining accreditation from the Order of Account 
Technical Officers and by approval of the training actions to be administered, On the demand side, it is 
influenced by the frequency of the training through which credits are assigned. 
In addition, the Order of Chartered Accountants is in the market, along with the entities that it has 
decided are able to give training to accountants, offering training that is identical to that of those entities 
(see the fact proven in 91 .) and of equal or lesser duration (in particular, of less than 16 hours), and, for 
that reason (if appropriate), they are more suitable for the needs and the availability of official 
accountants and the attendants are guaranteed to be awarded the credits determined by the Order.  
In view of the above, it is clear that the approval of the Credit Training Regulation has the effect of 
restricting competition in the national market, a conclusion which may be reached without the need to 
assess whether any entity is no longer in the training market after approval since, we are dealing with 
an unlawful act in which the risk of harm to competition suffices to establish an infringement. 
D.1 - Appreciable limitation 
The Defendant contends that, in accepting such a limitation, it would never be appreciable, given the 
number of entities registered as trainers. 
Firstly, let us say that the concept of something being "sensitive" is not given to us by the Law and 
must therefore be analyzed casuistically. 
It is true that it was shown that on 17th June, 2010, that the list included in the case file had a total 
of 77 training entities registered, and this is shown on pages 20-24 to 2027. 
This does not mean, as the Defendant claims, that there is no appreciable limitation, since all training 
measures of less than 16 hours are barred from being offered by entities other than the Defendant. 
D.2 - Proportionality judgment - the interests of consumers and the tax administration 
The Defendant also argues that the Regulation of Credit Training was not only intended to pursue 
objectives that are inherent to the profession, but also to protect the interests of consumers and the tax 
administration and, to that extent, the proportionality judgment, for the interpretation of Articles 4 Of 
Law No 18/03 and Article 101 of the Treaty, is fulfilled. The truth, however, is that, in order to guarantee 
the interests of consumers and the administration, the limitations, particularly in terms of time, which 
were introduced by the professional and institutional training figures that are included in the Regulation, 
were unnecessary, hence the argument is unfounded.  
D.3 - Justification - Article 5, Law N. º 18/03 and Article 101 (3) of the Treaty 
The Defendant also claims that the Regulation on Credit Training is justified in the light of Article 5, 
Law N. º 18/03 and Article 101 (3) of the Treaty, by fulfilling the four cumulative conditions that are 
laid down in those rules, in particular: 
(a) it contributes to improving the production, distribution or promotion of technical or economic 
progress; 
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(B) reserves for the consumers a fair share of the profits; 
(C) that all the alleged restrictions are indispensable to the achievement of the proposed objectives; 
and 
(d) that it does not give the Order of Chartered Accountants the possibility to eliminate competition 
in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned. The requirement in (b) was not 
demonstrated by the Defendant. As regards the above, it is clear that the conditions set out in (c) and 
(d) do not exist, since it has not been established that the restrictions are indispensable, and the Order 
of Chartered Accountants has eliminated competition in regard to training lasting less than 16 hours. 
D.4 - Deontological point of view and technical-professional knowledge 
The Defendant also argues that several reasons contribute to the continuation of institutional training 
within its exclusive forum, since it is necessary to provide for the proper training of official accountants 
from a deontological point of view, and to ensure that they are well equipped with technical/professional 
knowledge, taking the distinction between the two types of training into account is justified, based on 
its content, institutional training being merely informative (sensitizing the Official Accountant to 
changes) and a more in-depth professional and developed specialist. 
We understand, however, that the need to guarantee the technical training of accountants is not 
ensured by obtaining the 12 annual credits of institutional training, because, as mentioned by the 
Defendant, in this training, deontological and informative content is given, and nothing prevents an 
Accountant Technician from completing all these credits only with the first type of training. 
In addition, if an hour of institutional training allows for 1.5 credits (Article 15 (1) (a) of the 
Regulation), 8 hours of training with the Order of Chartered Accountants allows this requirement to be 
met, without the quality (Which will have to be assessed in the light of his mastery of all the subjects 
necessary for the exercise of his profession) being even minimally guaranteed. 
In fact, and contradictorily, this also seems to be the understanding of the Defendant, who states that 
professional training should last longer than 16 hours, in order to guarantee a minimum duration, since 
it seeks to deepen matters. However, the Defendant does not explain the reason for the training taking 
16 hours, rather than 10 hours, or 8 hours, it being certain that it seems to us that depending on the 
materials and their novelty the time required will differ. 
D.5 - Training throughout the country 
The Defendant also advocates the need to be exclusively assigned part of the training, because the other 
entities that operate in the market do not guarantee the needs of professionals throughout the national 
territory. 
Having analyzed the elements provided by the Order of Official Accountants, these results show that 
they were carried out by such entities in the districts of Aveiro, Beja, Braga, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, 
Évora, Faro, Leiria, Lisbon, Portalegre, Porto, Santarém, Setúbal, Viana do Castelo, Viseu, and in the 
Autonomous Regions, in the municipalities of Angra do Heroísmo, Funchal and Ponta Delgada, and it 
was not proven, as the Defendant had argued, that the training entities registered for this purpose with 
the Order of Official Technicians of Accounts, had carried out, or would carry out, in 2009 and 2010, 
and primarily, the training in the following districts: Lisbon, Porto, Viseu, Coimbra, Aveiro and Braga, 
which are districts with a higher population density. 
It is clear from the foregoing that there is no need to remedy the gaps in the geographical training of 
official accountants, as alleged. 
In view of the above, we understand that it is sufficiently demonstrated that, in approving and 
enforcing the rules of the Credit Formation Regulation, the Order of Chartered Accountants has taken a 
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decision that has the effect of appreciably restricting its nature and representation in the market being 
considered - the Portuguese training market for accountants – and thus the competition in that market. 
The mere existence of the rules contained therein limits, in the abovementioned terms, the restriction 
of free competition between the various agents operating on the market, which appears to be a factor 
that inhibits the free play of supply and demand. 
One cannot argue, as does the Defendant, that there are identical situations, concerning the Order of 
Chartered Accountants, the Bar Association, the Order of Engineers, or the Order of Dentists. 
This is not the subject of our records. It is not the fact that, downstream, another entity, by legal or 
conventional means, practices similar acts, which are considered to be unlawful, without suffering, 
whether justifiably or not, (identical) persecution that precludes the responsibility of the Defendant. 
Finally, it must be said that an infringement is not an act of harm, but one of danger: if the legal right 
is endangered, that is to say, to establish an infringement it suffices to show the possibility of injury 
which, in casu, is verified. 
This offence was maintained as long as the rules in question were in force, since the Defendant took 
a decision and maintained it, unchanged. This is, moreover, an unlawful act of a permanent nature, since 
its execution and consummation endure in time, comprising, at a first stage, the whole conduct of the 
agent until the event, followed by a second phase that lasts until the Agent fulfills their duty to cease the 
unlawful conduct. The violation of the legal good is prolonged while the criminal resolution lasts, that 
is, the execution persists in time because the agent voluntarily maintains the illegal situation. 
In conclusion, the objective element of the type under analysis is fulfilled. 
Subjective type 
As for the subjective element of this type, acts with intent (if any), under the terms established in Article 
14 of the Criminal Code, that fulfill a type of wrongful act that is a possible consequence of their conduct, 
and act in accordance with that achievement. 
Arguments have been adduced by the Defendant to exclude deceit. It claims to have established prior 
contacts with the Competition Authority and to have approved the Regulation only after receiving an 
express expression of non-opposition to its content on the part of the Competition Authority, which is 
why it considers that fraud is excluded. 
It should be recalled here that this factuality was not established, but only that meetings were held 
between the Defendant and the Competition Authority in which the content of the Regulation was 
addressed. This does not, therefore, exclude deceit as being conscious and with the will to practice the 
act. 
Having determined that the Defendant wanted to approve and maintain the Regulation of the 
Formation of Credits in force with the mentioned dispositions, representing, as a consequence, the 
possibility to cause restrictions in competition and to conform with this consequence, it is concluded 
that it acted with possible deceit - Article 8 of the RJCOC. 
Having concluded that the conduct of the Defendant violates the provisions of Article 4 (1) (A) of 
Law N. º 18/03 of 11th June, it is now necessary to ascertain whether it is also in breach of Article 81 
of the EC Treaty. 
The decision infringing the competition rules affects trade between Member States 
As is clear from the abovementioned rule, it is the precondition for its application that the decision 
infringing the competition rules affects trade between Member States. 
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In order to help define and standardize the interpretation and scope to be given to this notion, the 
Commission issued a communication entitled "Guidelines on the concept of the effect on trade between 
Member States provided for in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty "(OJ No C 101 of 27th April, 2004). 
Since this communication is very clear, part of its content is transcribed. 
The effect on trade criterion circumscribes the scope of Articles 81 and 82 to agreements and abusive 
practices likely to have a minimum level of cross-border effects in the Community. According to the 
Court, the possibility of the agreement or practice affecting trade between Member States must be 
'appreciable'. 
It should be noted at the outset that, throughout the territory of a Member State, the Regulation is 
liable to affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty, since it 
makes it difficult for other providers to gain access to the market. It not been shown that the restrictions 
contained in the Regulation are necessary for the proper pursuit of the interests of accountants or the 
proper exercise of their profession (See, to that effect, Wouters of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, cited above, and Commission Decision of 24 June 2004, Case COMP/38.549 - OP). 
In view of all of the foregoing, the court considers that the Defendant's conduct is also in violation 
of Article 81 (1) (A) of the EC Treaty. 
Court of Appeal of Lisbon - Proc. 938/10.7TYLSB.L1-5, 19-05-2015 
Decision1 First Instance- Court of Commerce 
To order the accused, the Order of Technical Officers of Accounts, to pay a fine (for an administrative 
offence established and punished by Articles 4 (1) of Law N. º 18/03, Article 81 (1) and Article 43 (1), 
Al. A) of Law n.º. 18/03, of 11/6) of €90,000.00 (ninety thousand Euros). 
In accordance with the provisions of Arts. 4 (2) of Law Nº 18/2003 of 11/6 and 81 (2) of the EC 
Treaty the provisions of the Regulation on Credit Training published in the Official Gazette No 133, II 
Series of 12 July 2007, annexed to the Notice nº. 4539/2007 of the Chamber of Accountants, is declared 
null and void. 
Determining the publication, at the expense of the Defendant, of this decision, by extract, in the III 
series of the Diário da República, and in a daily newspaper of national circulation, within a period of 20 
days counted from the publication of the decision.  
The Appeal Court decided: 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of the Treaties and on the validity and interpretation of acts adopted by the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union - Article 267 TFEU. In the present case, the interpretation of 
Article 101 (1) of the TFEU is at issue, that is to say, it is necessary to assess, in the light of Union 
competition law, whether a Profession, a certain formation that only she administers.  
Pursuant to Article 267 (3) TFEU, where a question of that kind is raised in proceedings that are 
pending before a national court whose decisions are not open to judicial review under national law, the 
Clurt must submit the matter to the Court. Since the decision of the Lisbon Court of Appeal is not subject 
to appeal in Portuguese domestic law, the questions raised by the Order of Chartered Accountants fall 
within the so-called mandatory return. 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2017 
European University Institute 69 
Questions before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
1. If an entity such as OTOC is to be considered as an association of undertakings for the purposes of 
applying Community rules on competition (the training market)? In that case, the existing Article 101 
(2) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that an entity which, like the OTOC, adopts binding rules for 
general application, and in the development of legal requirements, concerning the compulsory training 
of TOCs, with the aim of ensuring to citizens that training is credible and of a sufficient quality? 
2. If an entity, such as OTOC, is legally required to implement a system of compulsory training for 
its members, the present Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted as allowing the calling into question the 
training that is legally required by the OTOC and the implementing Regulation, in so far as it is limited 
to giving translation that is strictly linked to the legal requirement? Or, on the contrary, such a matter 
falls outside the scope of Article 101 (0), and must be assessed under the current Articles 56 et seq. of 
the TFEU? 
3. Given that Wouters, and similar judgments, were concerned with legislation affecting the 
economic activity of members of the trade professions in question, the present Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU can be considered to refer to a regulation on TOCs’ training which does not directly influence the 
economic activity of those professionals? 
4. In the light of competition law (on the training market) of the Union, can a Professional Order 
require, for the exercise of that profession, a form of certain training that it alone oversees? The 
submission of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling lead to the suspension of the present case 
until the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is therefore clear that, as far as the 
dispute in the main proceedings is concerned, the requested interpretation of Article 56 TFEU and 
onwards, as well as Article 102 TFEU, bears no relation to the subject matter of this case litigation and 
is therefore not relevant to its solution.  
Firstly, the compatibility of the contested regulation with Article 56 TFEU et seq. is not the subject-
matter of the contested decision and, on the other hand, the partial annulment of that regulation by the 
Lisbon Commercial Court, in so far as it finds an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, was not contested 
before the national court. It must therefore be held that the first to third questions concern only the 
interpretation of Article 11 (1) TFEU. 
The questions referred. 
By its first and third questions, which must be examined together within the limits that are set out in 
Paragraph 32 of this judgment, the national court asks, in essence, whether a regulation such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings from a professional order, such as the OTOC, must be regarded as a 
decision that is taken by an association of undertakings, within the meaning of Article 101 (1) TFEU. 
In particular, it seeks to ascertain whether the fact that, on the one hand, the OTOC, by virtue of the 
law, has to adopt binding rules for general application that aim to establish a system of compulsory 
training for its members, in order to guarantee citizens the provision of a credible and high-quality 
service and, secondly, that those rules do not directly influence the economic activity of statutory 
auditors has an impact on the application of Article 101 TFEU. 
1- In those circumstances, accountants, in view of the way in which their profession is regulated in 
Portugal, are engaged in economic activity and they therefore constitute undertakings within the 
meaning of Article 101 TFEU, without the complex and technical nature of the services that they provide 
and that the exercise of his/her profession is regulated, is such as to alter that conclusion (see, by analogy, 
Wouters and Others, Paragraph 49). 
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2- Second, it should be examined whether OTOC should be considered an association of 
undertakings when it adopts a regulation like that under dispute or whether it is acting as a public 
authority. 
Even assuming that the regulation does not have a direct influence on the economic activity of the 
accountants themselves, as the national court seems to suggest in its third question, that circumstance is 
not in itself capable of subtracting the decisions of an Association. 
On the scope of Article 11 TFEU. 
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first and third questions must be that: 
- A regulation such as the contested regulation, that is adopted by a professional association, such as 
OTOC, must be regarded as a decision taken by an association of undertakings within the meaning 
of Article 101 (1) TFEU. 
- The fact that a professional order, such as OTOC, is legally obliged to introduce a system of 
compulsory training for its members is not such that it excludes from the scope of application of 
Article 101 TFEU the rules that are approved by that professional association, provided that they 
are attributable exclusively to the latter. 
- The fact that those rules do not have a direct influence on the economic activity of the members of 
that professional association does not affect the application of Article 101 TFEU, since the 
infringement imputed to the same professional order concerns a market in which it itself exercises 
an economic activity. 
The fourth question. 
By its fourth question, the national court essentially asks whether the Union's competition law precludes 
a trade order from requiring its members to follow a course of study which it has exclusively pursued 
under conditions such as those which are at issue in the main proceedings. 
The answer to the fourth question must be that a regulation introducing a system of compulsory 
training for statutory auditors, in order to guarantee the quality of the services provided by the latter, 
such as the contested regulation, that are adopted by an order such as the OTOC, constitutes a restriction 
on competition that is prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, which is for the national court to determine 
whether it eliminates competition in a substantial part of the relevant market for the benefit of that trade, 
and imposes on the other part of that market discriminatory conditions that are to the detriment of the 
competitors of that professional order. 
The Court of Appeal decided : 
As stated in the ECJ judgment, the restrictions of competition imposed by the contested Regulation thus 
go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the task that is entrusted to the OTOC. 
In addition, as the Court of Justice and the national court have already concluded, the ECJ also takes 
the view that the control exercised by OTOC in relation to the bodies applying for training, and the 
actions proposed by those bodies, are not organized on the basis of clearly defined criteria that are 
transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and capable of guaranteeing equal access to the relevant 
market for training bodies. In other words, in addition to competing in the training market (in which the 
exclusive market of about 1/3 is attributed), OTOC decides discretionally who can compete with it, takes 
advance knowledge of the offerings of others, can prevent current training by requiring a submission for 
approval of new courses at least 3 months in advance, and, as a rule, the duration of the training is 
differentiated. It must therefore be concluded that the contested regulation constitutes a breach of 
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competition that is prohibited by Art. 101 of the TFEU, in so far as, for the reasons set out above, it 
eliminates competition in a substantial part of the relevant market to the benefit of the OTOC and 
imposes discriminatory conditions on the other side of that market, to the detriment of their competitors 
in that business order. 
It should also be borne in mind that, as is apparent from both the Court of Commerce and the CJEU, 
the relevant market is the entire national territory and Art. 101 (1) TFEU covers both the present and the 
potential effects of the decision under consideration, and it is therefore necessary to consider not only 
the past or present product of the Regulation which have adverse effects on competition in the internal 
market, but also the possibility that such a risk to competition (It is necessary to remember that the 
breach of Article 4, 1 of Law 18/2003, of 11-6 requires only the concrete danger and not the result). 
Moreover, since it applies throughout the territory of the Member State concerned, a regulation such as 
the contested regulation is liable to affect trade between Member States, within the meaning of Article 
101 TFEU. The conditions governing access to the market for the compulsory training of TOCs that are 
imposed by the contested regulation, are likely to be of minor importance in the choice of the 
undertakings that are established in Member States other than the Portuguese Republic in order to carry 
on their activities in the latter Member State (Paragraphs 65 to 67 of the ECJ judgment).  
The Court of Appeal of Lisbon, in dismissing the appeal, fully upheld the contested decision. 
Personal comment 
I think that the case in question is particularly relevant, not only for the situation in itself, which 
examines the breach of competition rules by a statute that is drawn up by a professional order – the 
Order of Accountants – and which is probably replicable in most EU countries, but also because the 
decision required the intervention of the TJEU, where one can collect important data on how a 
professional should perform in order to comply with Community law, and particularly with competition 
law. 
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5.5. Vanya Valkadinova (Administrative Court of Blogoevgrad) 
Price Fixing by the Bulgarian Construction Chamber 
I. Summary of the facts 
The “Bulgarian Construction Chamber” (hereinafter referred to as BCC) is a legal entity, a non-
governmental organization that is established under the Construction Chamber Act (promulgated in 
State Gazette No. 108 of December 29th, 2006). BCC is an independent, voluntary, professional 
organization in the construction industry. It is the nationally representative organization in theis sector 
of the industry. The Chamber is comprised of 2297 members in 27 regional offices in the country. A 
major part of its members is made up of builders, both Bulgarian and foreign natural and legal persons, 
who are registered as traders under the national legislation and whose branches carry out construction 
on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria. The Chamber does not carry out independent economic 
activity in the provision of construction services, and it does not distribute profit. Its main activities are 
connected with the representation of its members, both within the country and abroad. 
At the end of 2007, the BCC launched an independent initiative to draw up recommended building 
prices by regions and types of construction, based on a survey that was conducted through the regional 
offices of the Chamber within the country. The initiative finds expression in the guide prices that were 
adopted in the field of high-level construction at a session of the Executive Bureau of the Bulgarian 
Construction Chamber on 05.06.2008 and by the Board of Directors of the BCC on 26.06.2008, and by 
the General Meeting of the BCC on 26.06.2008. In the field of hydro-technical construction, the guide 
prices were approved at a meeting of the Executive Bureau of the BCC on 31.07.2008 and on 
12.08.2008, and the prices of the services for road construction were adopted at a meeting of the Bureau 
on 19.12.2008. The guide prices are iin the field of high road and hydro technical construction and were 
published on the official website of the BCC, and they are part of its unprotected content, as free access 
to them was possible from the beginning of March 2010. 
On 26.06.2008, the General Annual Report of the Bulgarian Construction Chamber adopted a 
professional Ethics Code for the Constructor, the rules of which are obligatory for each builder (all 
Bulgarian and foreign natural and legal persons who are registered as traders under their national 
legislation). In a separate section, “Recommended Prices” (Article 25), in an imperative form, there is a 
regulated obligation for the constructor to seek to negotiate, with the contracting authority, the prices 
under the construction contract which are not below those that are average for this branch of business in 
the region. In violation of these rules, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the accused builder by 
a specially created body of the BCC - the Commission on Professional Ethics, is envisaged. 
II. Judicial proceedings 
On 15th June 2009, the Commission for the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as the 
Commission) initiated, on its own initiative, on the basis of a signal that the BCC had imposed a certain 
price impact on the construction services market, proceedings for a possible violation of Art. 15, Para. 
1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as the LPC), expressed in the 
decision of an association of enterprises, which aims to prevent, restrict and distort competition in the 
relevant market. 
The norm of Art. 15, Para. 1 of the LPC contains a general prohibition of any kind of agreement 
between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices between two or 
more enterprises which have, as their aim or result: the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition in the relevant market. The application of this prohibition requires the cumulative presence 
of the following elements in its actual composition: 
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- A participant in the relevant market who has the characteristics of an “enterprise” or “association of 
enterprises”; 
- An agreement or concerted practice between enterprises, or a decision by an association of 
enterprises; 
- The agreement, decision or practice must give rise to a specific anti-competitive effect, having as 
its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
For the purposes of the proceeding, the Commission defines the following affected product market: a 
market for the provision of construction services on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, as on the 
basis of the facts of the survey carried out it accepts that under: 
1. The first of the elements of Art. 15, Para. 1 LPC would point to the BCC bearing the marks of an 
association of enterprises within the meaning of the LPC - an independent, voluntary, professional 
association in the construction industry, which does not actually carry out an economic activity, but 
which brings together independent economic entities - natural and legal persons who are registered as 
traders under the national legislation (The legal form and the existence of legal personality are irrelevant 
- Case 96/82 IAZ International BV [1983]). 
The Commission submits that, although the activity of the builders is subject to regulation because 
of the technical nature of the services provided and their importance to society, it is economic in 
character. Builders carry out construction and assembly work in order to receive remuneration from the 
contracting authorities and they represent enterprises within the meaning of § 1, Item 7 of the AR of the 
LPC, and the BCC, as their association falls within the scope of the provision of Art. 15 of the LPC. 
2. The second of the elements of Art. 15, Para. 1 LPC -- that from the point of view of competition 
law, any statement and/or action that derives from an association of enterprises, regardless of its legal 
nature, and in which it is reflected, or with which the policy of the association is implemented, is a 
decision which is wwithin the scope of the prohibition under Art. 15, Para. 1 LPC. The activities of the 
BCC include a series of measures that have led to the setting of guide prices (recommended/exemplary) 
in the markets of hydro technical services and road construction, which are published on its official 
internet website. The fact that these documents are not mandatory, nor that the prices are recommended/a 
guide is irrelevant to their classification as decisions by associations of enterprises. It is enough that they 
are brought to the attention of members and society as a whole, as an act through which the Chamber's 
policy is implemented. 
3. The third component of the prohibition under Art. 15, Para. (1) of the LPC, the Commission 
underlines that the provision involves any conduct which, either directly or indirectly, leads to the fixing 
of prices, and the decision of the BCC is one of the types of infringements which have as their object 
the direct or indirect fixing of prices, which are the most serious infringements, illegal in their nature, 
even when they have not yet had a real effect on the market (Case C-49/92 P Anic Partecipazioni [1999] 
ECR I-4125, Para 99; Judgment of the Court in Joined Cases Consten and Grundig v Commission (56 
& amp; 58/64) [1966] ECR 299). The very subject-matter of the decision in this case - fixing prices, is 
in itself decisive for the existence of an anti-competitive effect. Even in the form of recommended prices, 
the decision has an anti-competitive effect, because it allows market participants to make reasoned 
conclusions about the pricing policy that is pursued by their competitors on the relevant market, thus 
creating a real likelihood of replacing the independent market behaviour of the participants in the 
relevant market with coordination between them, which distorts the normal market environment and 
adversely affects consumer welfare. Prices are thus artificially maintained at levels which are not 
established on the market through the action of natural self-regulation mechanisms (the fixing of 
minimum prices within an association was established by the European Commission as being anti-
competitive in the case of AROW v BNIC OJ [1982] L379/1). 
4. The existence of an anti-competitive purpose in the behavior of the BCC is also confirmed by the 
rule set out in the Moral Code of the Builder, which is that: the builder seeks to negotiate with the 
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assignor prices under the construction contract which are not below the average for the sector in the 
region. The Commission underlines that, although the content of the decision of the branch organization 
in question does not contain a specific pattern of conduct, inasmuch as those prices are not fixed, it 
establishes a pattern and a direction for economic behavior and, in essence, is a recommendation to the 
representatives of the sector that brings their activity into accord with the price parameters that are 
established therein (85/75/EEC: Commission Decision of 5 December 1984 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.307 - Fire insurance (D)).  
In conclusion, with Decision № АКТ-496-04.05.2010, published on 10.05.2010, the Commission 
has decided that, both on its own and in its totality, the actions and decisions of the BCC for the setting 
of guide prices, in this respect, the inclusion within the Ethics Code of the Constructor of a section 
entitled “Recommended Prices,” are a decision of an association of enterprises that aims to prevent, 
restrict and distort competition in the market for the provision of construction services, in breach of the 
general prohibition of Art. 15, Para. 1 of the LPC, imposed a proprietary sanction on the BCC and 
ordered the suspension of all actions that are aimed at defining fixed, guide or recommended prices that 
are related to the provision of construction services, and they change of the Code of Ethics by abolishing 
the provision of Art. 25 from it. 
III. Ruling of the Court 
The Commission's decision was appealed by the BCC through court proceedings, and it was confirmed 
by Decision No. 4091 of 22nd March, 2011, of the Supreme Administrative Court under Administrative 
Case No. 7721/2010, a three-member panel, the latter being confirmed by Decision No. 13124 of 17th 
October, 2011, of the Supreme Administrative Court under Administrative Case No. 8051/2011, a five-
member panel. 
The Supreme Administrative Court has added that the optional form of the adoption of guide prices 
is not the definition of such in the strict sense of the law, but it creates sufficient preconditions and 
encourages the coordinated behavior of the enterprises on the relevant market, as it refers to a sensitive 
element of the economic behavior of companies, namely pricing. From the point of view of protecting 
this essential element of the economic activity of the enterprises, which is initially a trade secret, and in 
view of the interests of the consumers and the contracting parties (the assignor and the sub-assignor) 
from price formation on a purely market-based basis, the BCC decision reveals a potential to deepen the 
anti-competitive effect. It not only assumes a coordinated behavior among the market participants, but 
it can be considered, hypothetically, to be the first step towards a process of hidden price fixing that is 
binding, and to eliminate effective competition principles in the sector. 
IV. Comment 
The case presented is a typical example of a banned decision of an association of enterprises which 
seeks to impose the pursuit of a particular economic behavior, thereby replacing effective competition 
between independent business entities that are in cooperation with each other. The decision regulates 
the price behavior of the members of the Chamber and limits an essential element of the competitive 
environment of a substantial part of the relevant geographical and product market in Bulgaria and 
therefore does not benefit from the protective action of Art. 101, Para. 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. This case also shows that, in practice, both the national competition authorities 
and the national courts strictly apply EU competition law - Art. 101 TFEU, while adhering to its 
interpretation in the practice of the EC and the CJEU on decisions that are related to fixing prices, both 
directly and indirectly, in the form of pricing mechanisms that harm consumers' interests, which is the 
main motivation behind the ban on any kind of coordinated behavior among the participants in a given 
market. This practice is followed in all other cases of decisions of professional organizations which are 
likely to influence the individual pricing behavior of participants in the market for goods and services 
in Bulgaria.  
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6. Vertical Agreements 
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6.1. Dimitrina Petrova (Administrative Court of Sofia) 
References 
Administrative Case No 14837/2013 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria, Trial 
Panel; Decision No 765/25.01.2016. 
Case No 461/2013 of the Commission for the Protection of Competition; Decision No 
1261/25.09.2013. 
Applicable Law and Decisions: Case T-7/89 - Hercules Chemicals v Commission 
[ECLI:EU:T:1991:75]; T-41/96 - Bayer v Commission, [ECLI:EU:T:2000:242]; Case 246/86 
Belasco v. Commission; C-199/1992; C-199/92, P - Hüls v. Commission [ECLI:EU:C:1999:358]. 
Parties involved: 
A producer of refined oil in the market of Bulgaria - "Biser Oliva" AD, hereafter called “The Producer”. 
The main distributors of the company - "Familex" OOD, "MA Malashkov" EOOD, “Zagora” 2000 
OOD, “Velizara 2000” EOOD, hereafter called “The Distributors”. 
Commission for the Protection of Competition - The Commission is the Bulgarian Administrative 
Authority, which is established by Law and which is considered to be an autonomous and independent 
organization, whose public authorisations and competencies are determined by the Law on the 
Protection of Competition.  
Facts 
1. The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) on the grounds of Art. 91, Para. 5, Item 1 
of the Law on the Protection of Competition (CPC), initiated, for the establishment of violations under 
Art. 15 of the LPC, by the Producer and the Distributors, based on agreements for trading. The 
proceedings were initiated on the occasion of a sector analysis of the competitive environment of the 
two interconnected markets for the production and trade in sunflower oil in the market. In the sector 
analysis, the CPC found stipulations in the contracts between the Producer of refined oil and the main 
Distributors of the company, the application of which are liable to restrict competition in the wholesale 
market for refined bottled oil, which are declared as being horizontal agreements.  
2. In its sector analysis, the CPC declared the geographical market for bottled sunflower oil to be one 
that is primarily intended to meet final consumption. The established practice for the commercialisation 
of the product to the end customer is through the use of the different distributors who sell on the 
wholesale market. The geographical coverage of the distribution network depends mainly on the 
capacity of the manufacturer and on its adaptation to the specific competitive conditions on the ground. 
The product is a traditional product in the Bulgarian market, and this fact alone is sufficient for the 
successful entry of the product into various territorial regions in the country. In addition, it should be 
pointed out that the marketing strategies of the product concerned are national, rather than local. No 
territorial restrictions on distributors have been established, which implies that the territory in which the 
undertakings compete are to be defined as national. The market share of the Producer was recognized 
as being 5% of the national market for the product.  
3. In accordance with Art. 3, Para. 1 of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, the CPC, as a national 
competition authority, has the obligation to apply Art. 101 and/or Art. 102, of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) whenever anti-competitive behaviour (by prohibited 
agreements or the abuse of a dominant market position) affects, or is likely to affect, trade between the 
Member States of the EU. In its Decision, the CPC, applied the criterion that had been established by 
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the Community Law, assessed on a case-by-case basis, and declared that EU law is not applicable to 
agreements and practices which cannot significantly affect trade between Member States. According to 
the application of the effect on trade criterion, the CPC assessed the three criteria requirements for the 
application of the EU law, in the current case: 1) the notion of "trade between Member States"; 2) the 
notion "can affect," and 3) the notion of "significance." The CPC declared that agreements involving 
RPMs can affect the pattern of trade in the same way as horizontal agreements. For the sake of 
completeness, the CPC analyses whether the effect on trade between Member States may be 
"significant." The CPC decided that, in the present case, the market position expressed by the Producer’s 
market share and the turnover of the company in the conversion of refined sunflower oil through 
distribution contracts does not imply such a likelihood and is not indicative of the ability of the 
agreement to affect trade between Member States. Based on this principle, the CPC decided that the 
specific case at issue, cannot have any effect on trade between EU Member States, and thus Art. 101 
and/or Art. 102 of TFEU are not applicable.  
4. The violation of competition that was declared by the CPC, was declared under the breach of the 
rules, established by Art. 15, Para. 1 (1) of the LPC. The legal norm provides for the general prohibition 
of any kind of agreement between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices of two or more undertakings which have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition in the relevant market, such as direct or indirect pricing, or other trading 
conditions. The Distributors have been declared independent entities that, according to the conditions 
of the contracts, assume the financial and commercial risk that arise from the agreement, and its conduct 
on the market is characterised as being part of the undertaking. In view of this and based on the 
application of the settled EU case law, the CPC concluded that the Distributors’ conduct falls within the 
scope of the prohibition under Art. 15 Para. 1 of the LPC, which applies to any form of regulation of 
business relations between independent undertakings through which an agreement is reached, and which 
restricts, or is likely to restrict, their freedom to determine their own and independent conduct on the 
market. The contracts signed between the Producer and the Distributors have been declared to be formal 
vertical agreements within the meaning of Art. 15 Para. 1 of the LPC, as the agreements, by their very 
nature, are intended to prevent, restrict or distort competition, and are thus agreements which have as 
their object the fixing of prices. Under vertical agreements, the resale pricing has been determined by 
the agreement of the parties to fix the resale prices for which the distributor offers certain goods or 
services on the market. 
The effectiveness of this resale pricing mechanism has also been strengthened by providing a 
monitoring system for the fulfilment of the distributor's obligations, and by providing for sanctions in 
various forms to ensure that the products will be marketed in the way that is stated by the Producer. 
Based on this, the CPC declared a breach of the LPC guarantee which establishes the economic freedom 
of enterprises in relation to their market behaviour. 
5. In its Decision No 1261/25.09.2013 in Case No 461/2013, the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition (CPC), based on the a.m. facts and legal analysis, established that the Producer and the 
Distributors have committed a violation of Art. 15, Para. 1, Item 1 of the LPC, consisting of a prohibited 
vertical agreement which, by its purpose, prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the market for 
bottled sunflower oil by means of the direct or indirect pricing of the resale price for the oil. Monetary 
sanctions were imposed by the CPC on all parties for violation under Item 1 of the Decision.  
6. Decision No 1261/25.09.2013 of CPC, has been appealed in front of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Bulgaria, which issued a final Decision No 765/25.01.2016 in Administrative Case No 
14837/2013, and revoked the Decision of the CPC, as issued in breach of the LPC and Community Case 
Law. The main allegations of the parties before the Court were based on their statements, that the CPC 
did not correctly apply the material law, in its assessment of the aims and purposes of the trade 
agreements between the Producer and the Distributors, and in regard to their anti-competitive effect.  
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7. The Supreme Administrative Court, declared that the provision contains a general prohibition of 
any kind of anti-competitive agreements, such as items 1 to 5 of Art. 15 of the LPC, and lists specific 
legal forms of prohibited behaviours. The Supreme Administrative Court analyses the existence of the 
cumulative presence of the elements of the factual composition of the provision in the current case, as 
follows: (1) that the parties to the proceedings should have the status of 'undertakings'; (2) that there was 
the existence of an agreement and/or concerted practice between the parties; and (3) there was an anti-
competitive effect, having, as its object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
Based on factual grounds and the assessment of certain clauses of the agreements, between the Producer 
and the Distributors, and by correctly applying the national law, in compliance with the established 
community case law (Case T-7/89 - Hercules Chemicals v Commission; T-41/96 - Bayer v. 
Commission, Case 246/86 Belasco v. Commission; C-199/1992; C-199/92 P - Hüls v. Commission), 
the Court comes to the conclusion that the third element - an anti-competitive effect, having as its object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, is not approved and established in the 
case at hand, and therefore the Parties did not commit, through their trade agreements a violation of Art. 
15, Para 1, Item 1 of the LPC, that was expressed in a prohibited vertical agreement that in its purpose 
prevents, restrict or distorts competition. 
8. The Court clearly stated in its Decision, that the anti-competitive effect, as an element of the norm 
of Art. 15 Para. 1, occurs when the very purpose of the agreement is to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition in the relevant market. Alternatively, where such an objective cannot be established 
immediately, the anti-competitive effect will be present when the outcome of the agreement/practice in 
question actually leads, or may lead, to the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the 
relevant market. In that sense, the definition of an agreement between undertakings, as a restriction of 
competition by object, precludes the need to analyse its specific, real or potential result in the market. 
The anti-competitive purpose is one of two alternatives, the consequences of which are insufficient to 
prove the breach of the general prohibition without the proof of an anti-competitive outcome. It must be 
emphasised that it is not necessary for that anti-competitive object to be specifically expressed or 
formulated by the undertakings concerned, but it may be inferred from the interpretation of the content 
of the agreement, or of the conduct of the parties in the light of the particular market situation. For an 
anti-competitive purpose, within the meaning of the general prohibition, it is not even necessary for 
undertakings that are involved in the prohibited agreement to be aware of a breach of the general 
prohibition and in its practice. In this sense, even in the absence of a subjective intention on the part of 
the undertaking or association of undertakings that are concerned to achieve an anti-competitive effect, 
merely the objective ability of its conduct to lead to that result is sufficient for the anti-competitive 
object, within the meaning of the general prohibition, to exist. In order to assess whether there is a 
sufficient degree of harm to certain types of concerted action between undertakings in order to be 
regarded as being a restriction to competition 'in the light of the objective', account should be taken, in 
particular, of the objectives that are pursued by it, and of the economic and legal context into which it 
fits. According to Art. 20 of the Law on Obligations and Contracts for the Interpretation of Treaties, the 
true common will of the parties must be sought. The individual clauses should be interpreted in relation 
to each other, and each should be understood in a sense that derives from the whole contract, in view of 
the purpose of the contract, the customs that are in practice, and good faith. The Court declared that the 
Commission did not systematically analyse all the provisions and did not take into account the fact that 
the price list set in the contracts is only applicable to the relations between the Producer and the 
Distributors, and this should be the basis on which distributors will receive stipulated discounts. In order 
to determine whether distributors have undertaken to apply the price in relation to third parties (sub-
distributors or end-users), the nature of the goods that are subject to the contracts, the structure of the 
relevant market and the behaviour of the companies should be analysed. In that sense, the Court 
considers that sunflower vegetable oil is a major food product that is used by Bulgarian consumers on a 
daily basis. Sunflower oil is dominant in the Bulgarian market, and consumers would hardly substitute 
it with another product. It is not interchangeable with animal fats, nor with other vegetable fats, as it has 
its own specific characteristics and purpose. As can be seen from the facts that are established in the 
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proceedings before the Court, the market share in this case does not exceed 5%, which is why the 
producer does not have the market power to be able to impose a vertical restraint on distributors, in 
terms of pricing. Setting a fixed resale price for distributors is therefore contrary to the economic logic 
that, in a highly competitive environment, requires a flexible change in the price of the merchandise that 
is sold by the distributors. Those conclusions are also fully supported by the forensic economic expert‘s 
report, in which the expert took into account, following a comparison of the unit sales prices on the 
invoices of the four distributors during the period in question, and that each of them sold for different 
distributors’ prices, each of which has also applied different prices to different customers in the same 
period. 
Comment 
The case shows a very good legal analysis of the status of horizontal trade agreements, on a specific 
market (without substitute goods), and the compulsory elements that are needed to assess and prove the 
anti-competitive effect, as an element of the general prohibition of any kind of agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices, expressed in a 
prohibited vertical agreement, which, in its purpose, prevents, restricts or distorts competition, such as 
direct or indirect pricing.  
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6.2. Monika Dominiak (Regional Court of Warsaw) 
Asseco Business Solutions Spółka Akcyjna w Lublinie v. the President of the Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection 
Abuse of dominant position 
Asseco Business Solutions S.A. (Company Limited by Shares) in Lublin was the producer of computer 
software that is used in corporate management, i.e., to keep tax books, to manage corporate finance and 
human resources. The company signed commercial cooperation agreements with its dealers, who sold 
the computer software that was produced by this company. The provisions of these agreements 
contained the minimum, fixed retail price. The agreement stated that the Asseco Business Solutions 
S.A., in Lublin, reserves its right to lower the dealers’ discounts with immediate effect in relation to 
dealers who violated the provisions of the agreement.  
The agreements, signed by Asseco Business Solutions with its business partners from 2001-2010, 
(which were modified several times during this period), always contained provisions which imposed on 
the dealers the obligation to sell its products to purchasers for the retail prices that were indicated in the 
contract.  
The Company concluded 1106 such agreements, in total. 
The retail prices of the Asseco products that should be used in direct sales to final consumers were 
published on the company’s website.  
The dealers were informed about the price change 30 days in advance, by e-mail, and the prices were 
also published on each occasion on the company’s website.  
The dealers fixed the retail prices, regardless of the pricing at which they received the goods. The 
Asseco Company did not take any repressive measures in order to reduce the discounts for dealers who 
did not comply with the provisions of its agreements. 
On the 24th December, 2013, the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
adopted a decision, concluding that the agreements between Asseco and their business partners 
constituted an infringement of the conditions of fair competition and violated the Art. 6 Paragraph 1 
Point 1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (the national competition law). This act 
introduces the prohibition of agreements which have the purpose or effect to eliminate, restrict or violate 
the conditions of fair competition in the relevant market, including inter alia, the direct or indirect setting 
of prices or other conditions for the purchase or sales of goods. 
The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection said that the failure of this 
practice was found by the Authority to be a restriction of competition. 
The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection imposed on Asseco a penalty 
payment of 373 548 PLN (about €93,387). The Competition Authority alleged that the Asseco signing 
the agreements presented anti-competitive behavior. 
Asseco Business Solutions brought an appeal against the decision of the national competition 
authority, claiming that it had neither violated the public interest, nor had it undertaken any actions that 
resulted in the restriction or breach of competition rules. Asseco denied that the contract signed by the 
Company with its dealers constituted an anti-competitive act.  
Imposing penalties on the Company was therefore unjust and grossly excessive. The Company, in 
its appeal, claimed that the retail prices of the software were suggested prices, and they were not 
obligatory for its dealers. 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2017 
European University Institute 81 
The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw (the Competition Court) dismissed 
the company’s appeal, claiming that the prices specified in the agreement were fixed prices, not 
suggested ones. The agreements clearly stated that Asseco reserved its right to lower the dealers’ 
discounts with immediate effect in relation to dealers who violated the provisions of their agreements.  
Company agreements showed, however, that the Company had a direct or indirect influence on fixing 
prices, so the prices became fixed prices, or minimal ones, and they were not suggested ones. 
The fact that the company’s agreements did not contain suggested prices does not indicate that 
Asseco did not impose penalties on the dealers who were violating the provisions of the agreement. This 
does not really mean that prices were suggested, rather than being fixed.  
The Court of Competition claimed that such provisions of the agreement constitute an anti-
competitive agreement, since the current legal regulations prohibit the setting of retail prices for products 
by producers. Such practice, according to the Court of Competition, causes a limitation of competition, 
and it is legally banned. 
Asseco brought an appeal against the judgment of the Competition Court claiming that the 
Competition Court had violated Art.1 Paragraph 1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection 
in the contested verdict, in which it recognized that Asseco had breached the public interest. It also 
claimed that the intervention of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
was unjustified. 
The Company pointed out that the Competition Court had violated Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the Act 
on Competition and Consumer Protection, claiming that the Company had undertaken actions which 
later resulted in the limiting or violating of the anti-competitive regulations in the market. The 
agreements signed by the Company with its dealers constituted anti-competitive agreements. 
Penalty payments imposed by the Competitive Authority penalty were unjustified and grossly 
excessive. 
On 25th November, 2016, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw overruled the decision of the President of 
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection. 
The Court of Appeal claimed that it was crucial to examine the position of the Company in the 
relevant market. The Court also pointed out that it was necessary to check whether the same software 
was offered by other, foreign, companies. In addition, the Court should examine whether the raising of 
the prices by the Polish Company had caused foreign companies to enter the Polish software market. 
The Competition Authority did not examine the real or potential influence of the agreements on the 
wholesale market in Poland, which was the subject of the contested decision. 
The Competition Authority claimed that the agreements stated that “they already influenced Polish 
retail market,” not that they “may have influenced the retail market”. However, the Competition 
Authority did not demonstrate the influence of the agreements on the Polish retail market. The Court of 
Appeal claimed that the Competition Authority did not identify the markets that are the subjects of the 
contested agreements, and it did not establish Asecco’s position in the market. The Court of Appeal also 
pointed out that the Competition authority did not take into consideration European Union Competition 
Law, which should have been applied in this case. The Competition Authority did not examine the 
influence of these agreements on trade between European countries. 
The Court of Appeal stated that the European Court of Justice had made a lot of judgments in relation 
to that matter. The Court of Justice, in its judgments, claimed that if the agreement sets the trade rules 
in just one country, this does not mean that it does not influence the trade between European countries 
(A. Jones, B. Surfin, EC Competition Law, New York 2008, s. 197).  
The Court of Appeal pointed out that the European Competition Law should be applied in this case, 
which may directly influence the interpretation of Polish Law. To justify its view, the Court of Appeal 
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quoted D. Vaughan, S. Lee, B. Kennelly and P. Riches, who claimed that the question of whether an 
agreement has the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition is a question of the 
foreseeable effects of an agreement, not of the subjective intentions of the parties – EU Competition 
Law: General Principles, Oxford University Press 2006, s.75). 
The Court of Appeal claimed that it should be pointed out that, according to Art. 3 Sec. 1 of 
Regulation 1/2003, the application of national competition law cannot lead to the prohibition of 
agreements which may affect trade between EU Member States, but it does not restrict competition 
within the meaning of Article 101 Sec. 1 of the Treaty, nor fulfill the conditions of Art. 101 Sec. 3 of 
the Treaty, nor do they fall under the Regulation for the application of Article 101 Sec. 3 of the Treaty. 
The European doctrine says that it is now clear that, in order to appraise the economic context of an 
agreement, it is necessary to analyze the market and, therefore, to define it – (An Introductory Guide to 
EC Competition Law and Practice, Oxford, Portland 2007, s.79). This quotation is relevant in this case. 
The Court of Appeal claimed that the Competition Authority had completely failed to establish the 
position of the participants in the contested agreements in the relevant markets, and it had committed 
serious misconduct in defining the relevant markets. It cannot therefore be considered that the 
Competition Authority has shown that the purpose of the agreement contested by them was anti-
competitive. 
The lack of analysis of the relevant markets, and the position of the participants in the agreements to 
them, is contrary to the line of the EU judiciary. In the judgment in Case C 5/69 Franz Völk v 
Établissements J. Vervaecke ([1969] ECR - 295), the Court of Justice held that the prohibition in Article 
85(1) is applicable only if the agreement in question also has, as its object or effect, the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. Those conditions must be 
understood with reference to the actual circumstances of the agreement. Consequently, an agreement 
falls outside the prohibition in Article 85, in which it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, 
taking into account the weak position that the persons concerned have in the market for the product in 
question. An exclusive dealing agreement, even with absolute territorial protection, may, having regard 
to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question in the area 
covered by the absolute protection, thus escape the prohibition that is laid down in Article 85(1)).  
Analyzing the line of the EU judiciary, the Advocate General J. Kokott, in her Opinion in C 226/11 
Expedia Inc., stated that "the requirement of perceptivity is the rule both in the case of intentional and 
actual restriction of competition" (47), and argued that if "the agreement is intended to infringe the 
competition rules it is sufficient to demonstrate that the agreement is specifically capable of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition within the internal market."  
 In the same case, the Court of Justice, on the other hand, was of the opinion that "101 sec. Article 1 
TFEU is subject to agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the perceived 
restriction of competition in the internal market and which may affect trade between Member States 
(Case C 70/93 Bayerische Motorenwerke [1995] I 3439, Paragraph 18; Case C 306/96 Javico [1998] 
ECR I 1983, Paragraph 12, and Case C 260/07 Pedro IV Servicios [2009] See p. 2437, point 68). " 
By presenting the line of the EU judiciary in the present case, it should be noted that the lack of an 
identification of the relevant markets, and the position of the parties of agreements on them, make it 
impossible to determine whether the agreements in question were "able to prevent, reduce or distort 
competition." Had it turned out that the parties to the agreements in question had only trace shares in 
the relevant markets, it would have been impossible for them to have a noticeable effect on competition. 
The Competition Authority lodged a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
not yet appointed a time for the trial, so, unfortunately, we do not know the final judgment. 
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Comment 
In my personal opinion, the approach chosen by the Court of Appeal is more suitable, because the Court 
of Appeal gave a wider and less formal perspective on the issue.  
The Court of Appeal took into consideration many other factors, not just analyzing the contract 
clause. 
The arguments given by the Court of Appeal in its decision are more convincing for me.  
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6.3. Dzintra Amerika (Latvia Supreme Court) 
FMS Software and FMS v. Competition Council  
Judgment of the Supreme Court (Department of the Administrative Cases), 16th June 2017, Case 
No. SKA-61/2017 
Facts of the Case 
FMS Software produces accounting software. FMS Software concluded product distribution contracts 
with several dealers. One of the provisions of the said contracts required dealers to register their potential 
deals in a database that was developed by FMS Software at the beginning of the sales process (in 
practice, the dealers fulfilled this condition by sending FMS Software an e-mail, informing it about the 
potential customer). A priority to run the sales process of the potential deal with the concrete customer 
is assigned to the dealer who has first registered the potential deal in the database, as long as the customer 
does not oppose it. This advantage lasts for six months from the moment of the registration of the 
potential deal. The aforementioned conditions were in force for more than five years. 
The Findings and the Decision of the Competition Council 
The Competition Council, in its decision of 9th December 2013, found the contracts concluded between 
FMS Software and its dealers to be prohibited by competition law, since the said agreements provided 
certain dealers with an advantage, and, as a result, they – restricted competition between dealers. 
In the decision, it was found that the product – accounting software – is distributed through a network 
of dealers that are located throughout Latvia. However, in this decision how the dealers perform their 
sales activities (with active or passive sales), was not analysed. 
In analysing the provisions in question, the Competition Council acknowledged that the use of the 
database, and the process of the informing itself, are not aimed at restricting competition, and therefore 
are not prohibited by competition law. However, as a consequence that arises from logging potential 
clients into the database, certain dealers were given an advantage in the sales process. This advantage 
points to the regulation of the relationships between dealers, and the only dealer who can advance the 
sales process is the one who first informed the manufacturer. This procedure is aimed at reducing 
competition between dealers in the field of accounting software sales. Since the registration process is 
applied to potential customers who have not yet bought the product, it is impossible for dealers to 
compete with the dealer, who has the advantage, by offering the customer more favourable terms of 
sale. As a result, the client cannot benefit from competition between dealers. The Competition Council 
examined, whether the intention to restrict competition between dealers manifests itself in the behaviour 
of market participants. By the checking of electronic correspondence between FMS Software and 
dealers, it was established that the disputable provision of the contract was realised in practice by client 
reservation. 
The Competition Council also concluded that the exemption stated, in Cabinet Regulation No.797, 
“Regulations Regarding Non-subjection of Certain Vertical Agreements to the Prohibition of the 
Agreement Specified in Section 11, Paragraph One of the Competition Law”, adopted on 29th 
September, 2008, (similar to Commission Regulation (EU) No.330/2010 of 20 April, 2010 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices Article 4, (b), (i), namely, the exemption provided for in 
Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in 
combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object: (b) the restriction 
of the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, a buyer party to the agreement, without 
prejudice to a restriction on its place of establishment, may sell the contract goods or services, except: 
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(i) the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group reserved 
to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another buyer, where such a restriction does not limit 
sales by the customers of the buyer) can’t be applied to the vertical agreement in question, because it 
restricts the circle of customers within which the dealer is entitled to sell contract goods. 
Taking into account that FMS Software and FMS were closely linked and formed an economic unit, 
both companies were recognised as being one market participant. The fine was therefore calculated from 
the turnover of these two companies during the last financial year. 
The fine imposed by the Competition Council were €64,000, while the case against the dealers was 
closed, because the dealers were not active in the agreement and their transactions’ power against the 
power of FMS Software was insignificant. 
During the inspection of the Competition Council. FMS Software argued that FMS Software had 
never informed the other dealers of competing dealer’s plans. Such evidence was not found in the 
relevant electronic correspondence. FMS Software had not threatened and applied sanctions against 
those dealers who had made the deal with the customer, which was registered by another dealer. The 
dealer’s communication with FMS Software did not guarantee that the dealer would run the sales process 
of the potential deal with the concrete customer, the dealer was dependent on customer’s choice. The 
Competition Council has not responded to this argument. 
The Appeal 
FMS Software and FMS (after a merger – Visma Enterprise Ltd.) appealed the decision to the 
Administrative Regional Court (the First Instance Court for decisions of the Competition Council). The 
Administrative Regional Court rejected the appeal (judgment of 8th May 2015). The argumentation of 
the Administrative Regional Court was generally based on reasons that are shown in the Competition 
Council’s decision (except the reasoning on how the fines were calculated). 
The Administrative Regional Court’s judgment was appealed by FMS Software, FMS and the 
Competition Council to the Supreme Court. 
FMS Software and FMS argued (in relation to the main argument) that the Competition Council and 
the Court has never substantiated why FMS Software’s relations with its dealers do not match the 
exemption which follows from the provisions of the regulations for Latvia (which are similar to the 
provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) No.330/2010 of 20th April 2010, which are mentioned 
above). The only exception, which excludes the application of the mentioned rules, is a restriction on 
passive sales. The Competition Council has never proved that the object of the provisions of contract 
between FMS Software and its dealers was to restrict the passive sales. The passive sales were fully 
respected, if the customer turned to another dealer. 
The argument of the Competition Council’s appeal concerned the fines. 
The Judgment of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court concluded that, to be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 11 (1) of 
Competition Law (which is similar to Article 101 (1) TFEU), an agreement must have, as its object or 
effect, the hindrance, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. When assessing 
the possible restriction of competition “by object”, it is necessary to examine the content of the 
provisions of the agreement, its objectives and its economic context. During such examination, the Court 
must be convinced that an agreement by its very nature can be considered to be harmful to the proper 
functioning of normal competition. 
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The Supreme Court pointed out that, according to the content of the agreement, the dealer has the 
advantage in the sales process only in that case, where the customer does not oppose it, but the Regional 
Court did not pay attention to this part of the agreement, and didn’t evaluate the impact of such a 
provision on competition, although this part of the content of the agreement indicates that the dealer’s 
advantage depends on customer’s behavior or choice, and this could compensate for a deficit in 
competition.  
The Supreme Court emphasized that, in this case, it is important to understand whether the dealers 
perform their sales activities in an active or a passive form. The Supreme Court also drew attention to 
the fact that, at the moment, when the customer has once chosen the dealer, the competition has already 
decreased, which, of course, doesn’t exclude further competition between dealers. However, it is a 
reason to look differently at the following conditions of the competition. It must be taken into account 
that the customer has already chosen the dealer, and the dealer, under normal circumstances, has the 
right to do everything possible to hold the customer and to make the deal with him/her. It is important, 
in this case, that the product needs to be adapted to the necessities of the customer, and that this 
customization process requires a significant period of time, which could affect the customer's decision 
to contact another dealer. Accordingly, it is important to ascertain whether the competition over that 
period is not reduced or limited for natural and legitimate reasons, and the role the disputed clauses of 
the agreement play in the mentioned circumstances must be verified. 
Taking into account what has been previously mentioned, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment 
of the Administrative Regional Court, and it forwarded the matter to be adjudicated upon de novo in a 
Court of Appellate Instance. 
Personal comment 
The case law of the Courts of Latvia in the field of the restriction of competition “by object” isn’t 
developed; there are only a few judgments in this field. Additionally, after the preliminary ruling of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (see the Judgment of 26th November 2015, Maxima Latvia v. 
Competition Council, C-345/14) an understanding of how deeply the assessment of the restriction of 
competition should be developed in decisions and judgments has changed. This judgment of the 
Supreme Court strengthens the changes in the previous case law, since it is only the second judgment 
after the mentioned preliminary ruling. Namely, the economic context in which the agreement has to be 
applied is essential in order to conclude that the agreement restricts the competition “by object”. 
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6.4. Daniel Panocha (District Court of Tarnow) 
Decision of the Polish Competition Authority: 29th December 2011 (DOK 13/2011) 
Final judgment: 16th June 2016 - Court of Appeal in Warsaw (VI ACa 215/15) 
Case: Roland Polska sp. z o.o. (private limited company) in Warsaw v. the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection 
National law 
Art.6 of the Act of 16th February 2007, on Competition and Consumer Protection, states that they are 
prohibited agreements, whose purpose or effect is to eliminate, limit, or otherwise distort, competition 
in the relevant market, and agreements may, in particular, specify the determination, either directly or 
indirectly, of prices and other conditions for the purchase or sale of goods. 
Facts 
Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw is, on the basis of an agreement concluded with Roland Eastern 
European Ltd. (registered in Hungary), the official distributor for this company in Poland. Roland 
Eastern European Ltd. Is, in Central and Eastern Europe, a distributor of all the products manufactured 
by Roland Corporation in Japan. These products include a wide range of Roland, Boss, Rodgers and 
Cakewalk musical equipment and music accessories.  
Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw works on the basis of a selective distribution agreement with 
entrepreneurs that creates a retail distribution network for hardware and music accessories, which are 
distributed at the wholesale level by Roland. Roland Polska sent to these entrepreneurs the prices for the 
resale of products, which are referred to as the "suggested online prices" and the "dealer prices". 
Decision 
On 29th December, 2011 (DOK 13/2011), the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection adopted a decision and recognised as a practice that restricts competition and violates the 
prohibition referred to in Art. 6 Sec. 1 Point 1 of the Act of 16th February, 2007, on competition and 
consumer protection which is included in the wholesale market for the sale of equipment and musical 
accessories by Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw, with distributors having an agreement restricting 
competition on the domestic retail market for the sale of musical equipment and accessories by setting 
minimum retail resale prices for these products on the Internet by the distributors, and ordered the 
retailers to refrain from using them. 
The Polish Competition Authority fined Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw in the amount of PLN 
216.380 PLN (about €49,089).  
In the Polish Competition Authority’s view, the "suggested online prices" that are placed on Roland's 
retail price lists - even though they were on the price lists under the official title "retail price" or 
"suggested online price" – were, in fact, the minimum retail resale prices that they agreed to use. In the 
light of the findings set out below, the relationship between Roland Polska and the distributors included 
permanent control of prices and the reception of signals from other distributors about distributors not 
using the agreed minimum prices. As a result, Roland Polska urged entrepreneurs who were creating 
Roland's retail distribution network to raise prices to a level that corresponds to at least a fixed minimum 
price. As has been shown in the proceedings, Roland's influence on the level of resale prices was real, 
as did the negative consequences that were encountered by those distributors who tried to sell products 
below the minimal price.  
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That mechanism which is used to keep prices at a minimum has been functioning since at least May 
2008, but evidence may show that even earlier prices were set at a minimum level, and pressure was put 
on distributors who did not maintain those prices. For example, distributors who did not use the fixed 
minimum prices were threatened with non-renewal of the distribution contract with Roland and 
difficulties in relation to ordering goods, or even the loss of profits.  
The President of the Office considered that the condition of the violation of the public interest was 
fulfilled in the factual situation that was discussed in the present case. In the light of the foregoing, it is 
appropriate to point out that the conclusion by a sole wholesale distributor of certain products, from 
entrepreneurs, to resell these products under a resale price agreement, is in the nature of such 
competition. At the same time, it must be emphasized that price agreements between competitors 
(horizontal) and between counterparties at different levels of trading (vertical) are among the most 
serious distortions of competition, and they undermine the market, distort it, and limit or eliminate 
competition on it. These actions therefore infringe on the public interest, irrespective of the size of the 
market shares of the undertakings participating in the agreement. Moreover, in the light of the evidence 
gathered, the President of the Office considered that the agreement in question was actually 
implemented, and it thus had a real and direct impact on the economic interests of a broad spectrum of 
market participants - not only on the parties themselves, but also on their competitors, and, as a result, 
on a wide range of final recipients. 
Restrictive practices reveal themselves in a specific market. The product market encompasses all of 
the goods that serve the same needs of buyers, that have similar properties, and similar prices, and that 
represent a similar level of quality. An essential element of the relevant market is also its geographical 
dimension, indicating the need to designate an area where the conditions of competition that are 
applicable to certain goods are the same for all competitors. To determine the relevant market, therefore, 
specific activity is analysed, both from the product’s and from the geographical point of view.  
In the opinion of the President of the Office, the market in which the transaction took place is, in the 
present case, the national wholesale market for hardware and musical accessories. In turn, the market in 
which the agreement is affected is the domestic market for the retail sale of musical equipment and 
accessories. 
What is important, the President of the Office stated in the light of the evidence, is that this was not 
due to the existence of a separate resale market for music equipment and accessories on the Internet. 
Such an arrangement for the agreement was rather to facilitate the possibility of Roland's monitoring of 
observable pricing. It was possible only through the creation of a system by Roland that allowed the 
company to systematically control distributors' use of fixed retail resale prices - which distributors 
agreed to follow as part of the rules of the system. The effective and systematic control of a large number 
of retail distributors who were selling Roland's various forms of equipment was possible through 
Roland's monitoring of resale prices by distributors on the Internet. However, setting prices on the 
Internet, had, for the above reasons, an influence on prices throughout the retail market for sales of 
musical equipment and accessories in Poland. 
Consequently, the President of the Office stated that Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw had entered 
into agreements with its distributors within the meaning of the Law on Competition and Consumer 
Protection. It follows from the above-mentioned circumstances that specific business activities may also 
be treated as a restrictive agreement if, despite the absence of a formal distribution agreement, the other 
circumstances of the case indicate that such an obligation actually existed. The circumstance above, in 
the present case, occurred. Entrepreneurs who joined the distribution agreement and who did not apply 
for a minimum resale price, were threatened with a number of consequences, such as the loss of rebates, 
a reduction in supplies, and even the termination of their contract. In practice, the obligation to adjust 
distributors to the minimum price level that was determined by Roland Polska is, in fact, equivalent to 
the obligation that would result from the conclusion of a formal contractual agreement. 
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Court 
Roland Polska sp. z o.o. in Warsaw lodged an appeal with the Competition Court in Warsaw. 
On 8th December 2014, the Regional Court in Warsaw - the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (1st Instance) dismissed the appeal (XVII AmA 94/12).  
Art. 6 Sec. 1 Point 1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (national competition law) 
prohibits agreements whose purpose or effect is to eliminate, restrict, or otherwise distort, competition 
in the relevant market, consisting, in particular, of determining, either directly or indirectly, prices and 
other conditions for the purchase or sale of goods. It is clear from the wording of the above that it is not 
necessary for an anti-competitive object to be achieved (either wholly or in part). The application of this 
provision is not dependent on whether the agreement was only concluded by the entrepreneurs (or their 
unions), or whether the parties actually implemented them in practice. For the qualification of the 
agreement as being illegal, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the purpose of the undertakings' actions 
was to undermine the competition rules in the market, and there is no doubt that the pricing provisions 
are in contradiction to the competition rules. 
According to the Regional Court in Warsaw, all the above-mentioned contractual provisions 
regarding fixed minimum prices deprived distributors of the freedom to set prices for the products. The 
logical consequence of the above was the lack of price competition in the relevant market.  
Art. 106 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection provides that the Antitrust Authority 
may impose on the enterprise, by way of a decision, a penalty of no more than 10% of the revenue 
earned in the accounting year preceding the year of the imposition of the penalty, if the entrepreneur, 
even if not negligent, breaches the prohibition that is specified in Art. 6 of this law. In determining the 
amounts of penalties, the period, grade and circumstances of the breach of the provisions of the Act 
must be taken into account, as well as prior violations of the provisions of the Act. 
In the Court’s view, the financial penalty imposed by the decision of the Polish Competition 
Authority was set at an appropriate level, considering the degree of the violation. 
On 16th June 2016, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw (2nd Instance) dismissed the Appeal. 
Comment 
The decision of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, issued in December 
2011 (DOK 13/2011), was important, because how the relevant market (product, geographical point of 
view) is determined in a case in which products are offered and sold on the Internet, is meticulously 
presented. It was also highlighted that to recognise an agreement as violating the prohibition, it is 
sufficient only to demonstrate that the parties to the agreement were setting a goal to restrict competition, 
and it does not matter whether that objective was achieved. 
  
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
90 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
6.5. Stefan Schlotter (German Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection) 
Court: Oberlandesgericht (Regional Court of Appeal)  
Date: December 22nd, 2015  
File number: 11 U 84/14 
Type of decision: Appeal judgment (revision pending) 
1st. instance: LG (Regional Court) Frankfurt, June 8th, 2014, 2-3 O 158/13. 
Next instance: BGH (Federal Civil Court), KZR 3/16 
The Regional Court of Appeal (“OLG”) had to decide as to whether, the Defendant, Deuter, a 
manufacturer of high-quality functional backpacks, was allowed to prohibit online sales via market 
places by the Claimant, an authorized dealer. 
The Court of First Instance held, that such prohibition had no lawful qualitative selection criteria and 
hence was a hard-core restraint (Art. 4 lit. c Vertical Block Exemption Regulation) that was not covered 
by the exemption of Art. 101 (3) TFEU. This opinion of the First Instance was shared by the Federal 
Cartel Office, which also acted as amicus curiae before the OLG. 
The OLG, nevertheless, overruled the decision by the Landgericht. According to the OLG, the market 
place ban does not infringe competition law. The Court emphasized the Defendant’s wide discretion to 
organize its distribution system. It applied the conditions formulated in “Metro I” (ECJ, Judgment of 
October 25th, 1977, C-26/76) to the selection criteria used by Deuter and saw them fulfilled: The quality 
of sales and services required by the high quality of Defendant’s products could not be guaranteed in 
the case of sales via a market place. Furthermore, given that consumers, according to the Court’s view, 
tend to mistake the platform (Amazon) for the authorized dealer as the seller, Deuter would, without the 
platform ban, in the general perception of the public, be connected to amazon.de, without having a 
contractual relationship with them.  
This decision enhances the possibilities to implement online restrictions in (selective) distribution 
agreements. Its interest derives from its combination with the Coty case (C 230/06 – submitted by the 
same court to the ECJ, which is still pending, and which deals, inter alia, with the question of whether 
an online platform ban constitutes a restriction to competition “by object,” in the sense of Art. 101 (1) 
TFEU. 
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6.6. Agostinho Soares Torres (Court of Appeal of Lisbon) 
Case 102/15.9YUSTR. 
Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa (TRL)  
Court of Appeal of Lisbon (2nd Instance) (CAL);  
Tribunal da Concorrência, Regulação e Supervisão de Santarém- TCRS (1st Instance);  
Autoridade de Concorrência (AdC- National Competition Authority) 
A) Facts 
1- Petrogal is a wholly-owned company that is owned by Galp Energia, and it is active in the area of 
crude oil and its by-products, at the level of: (...) (ii) the transportation, distribution and 
commercialization of oil, crude oil, its byproducts and natural gas; (iii) the exploration and exploitation 
of crude oil and natural gas; and, (iv) any other related industrial, commercial and research activities 
and services. 
2 - Galp Açores and Galp Madeira undertakings are 100% owned by Petrogal and they are active in 
the area of distribution and storage, transportation and sale of liquid and gaseous fuels, lubricants and 
other petroleum products, respectively in the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and the Madeira 
islands. 
3 –Written agreements (contracts) between the above-mentioned undertakings and their first line 
distributors (in the first stage of the chain, i.e., at the wholesale level) say that the latter are assigned a 
sale limited territory and the sale of LOG (liquid oil gas) in compressed bottles by each distributor 
outside its territory is forbidden. 
4- In September/October, 2015, as part of a process to update the bottled gas distribution network, 
the Defendant (Petrogal, Galp Açoes and Galp Madeira) began the reviewing of all contracts signed 
since 2000 with first-line distributors, natural and legal persons, that referred only to active sales in the 
clause prohibiting sales outside the assigned territorial area. 
5 It has been proven that for (i) Petrogal, in a universe of 240 contracts, passive sales outside the 
contractual area are prohibited in 199 of the contracts that are in force; (ii) for Galp Açores, in a universe 
of 9 contracts, passive sales outside the contractual area are prohibited in all of the contracts that are in 
force; (iii) for Galp Madeira, in a universe of 3 contracts, passive sales outside the contractual area are 
prohibited in all of the contracts that are in force. 
6 - It was proven, in the Decision of the Adc (Competition Authority), and confirmed by the First 
Instance Court Judgment, that, by preventing a distributor from competing freely in different territories, 
and by artificially maintaining a single distributor in each territory, and not allowing him to implement 
passive sales to customers from, or placed outside, its territory, the freedom of choice of customers and 
consumers, such as competition between so-called intra-brand competition, is limited. 
7 – It was also proven that the three Defendants were not careful enough, or at least had not been 
since January 1st, 2000, to promote the amendment of the existing written contracts, excluding the 
prohibition of sales clauses outside the assigned area, or at least limiting the prohibition, in the wording 
of the clause, only to those relating to active sales, and, in the new written contracts that were concluded 
after January 1st, 2000, to continue to proceed in the same careful way. 
8 - According to the wording of the clauses, and considering the commercial context in which they 
were in force, it emerged that the prohibition clauses must be regarded per se as being restrictions to 
competition by object, since they are liable to prevent, in fact, distributors from responding to requests 
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from clients who are located in territories assigned to the other distributors for the Defendants, and thus 
from being able to compete with them. 
9 - The applicants have never clearly stated, or acted, in order that that such limiting clauses should 
be understood or be applicable, in the sense of having the effect of preventing only active sales. 
B) The Case-Law (Administrative and Court File decisions) 
1) By the Administrative Decision of the Competition Authority of January 29th, 2015 (i) it was declared 
that the 3 Defendants, in these written bottle distribution agreements (Vertical trade agreements), which 
include clauses restricting passive sales outside the territory established in the contract, have committed 
intentional infringements of Article 9 (1) (c) of Law No 19/2012 and Article 101 TFEU, and (ii) the 
Decision imposed a total administrative fine of €9,290,000. 00. 
2) These undertakings (the 3 Defendants) appealed to the Court of Competition, Regulation and 
Supervision of Santarém (1st Instance), and this Court, by a judgment of January 4th, 2016, decided 
partially in favor of them, but convicted them for the practice, in material co-authorship by negligence, 
under the infringement of Articles 9.º, §§ 1 and Artº68º, § 1, a) and 3, both of Law no. 19/2012 (LdC), 
with the following fines:  
a) Petrogal, S.A., €3,000,900;  
b) Galp Azores, €150,000.00;  
c) Galp Madeira - €40,000.00 
The above-mentioned Competition Court ruled that Article 101 of the TFEU was not infringed. 
3) The Public Prosecutor's Office, the Competition Authority and the companies concerned then 
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Lisbon (Tribunal da relação de Lisboa) which decided, on 10th 
January, 2017, to confirm the 1st Instance Court. 
II- The Legal Framework 
2.1- Portuguese Law no. 19/2012, of 18.05 (LdC- Competition Law) provides: 
Article 9: Agreements, concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings 
1. Agreements between undertakings, concerted practices between undertakings and decisions by 
associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect to prevent, distort or cause an 
appreciable restriction of competition, in whole or in part of the national market, consisting of: 
(...) (c) Sharing markets or sources of supply; 
are prohibited. 
Article 68: 
1 - It constitutes of an administrative infringement punishable with a fine: 
 a) The infringement of the provisions of Articles 9, 11 and 12; (...) 
3 - Negligence is punishable. 
2.2.- Under the current legislation that is in force in relation to sales outside the territory, active sales 
(active sales promotion through, e.g., sales or marketing forces) may be restricted in certain 
circumstances, while passive sales (the mere response of a distributor to a spontaneous request for supply 
from outside its territory) cannot be prohibited, such as forming a breakdown of territory (sharing the 
market) and this is considered a serious (hardcore) infringement, prohibited by its object, regardless of 
the actual effects or consequences for competition. 
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III- The case law (decision and jurisprudence) 
3.1 The judgment of the Portuguese Competition Court (1st Instance Court) did not recognize as proven 
that the infringement was committed intentionally, but, rather, it concluded that there was negligence. 
It also considered that there was an infringement in Portugal, in the light of national rules, but did not 
accept the infringement of Article 101 (1) (c) of the TFEU, since there was no susceptibility to affect 
trade among Member States. 
3.2- This decision was criticized for recognizing that the offence on national territory would require 
a demonstration of "effective disruption" of trade between Member States with the view that "(...) what 
matters, for the assertion of the existence of an agreement, is not to ascertain whether or not it influenced 
the behavior of the interveners (effects of the agreement) but their susceptibility to influence their 
behavior "(see p. 159 of the sentence). Under the case-law of the European Union courts (JCB judgment- 
General Court of the ECJ) it was examined that it was insufficient for an agreement to have established 
(proven) that the supplier had recommended prices to its distributors and that the prices charged to them 
were likely to influence the prices of retailers. 
3.3- Other problems that came out continually during the appeal was the meaning of the expression 
"susceptible (or likely) to affect the trade among Member States" and the concept of “agreement”. It 
was discussed whether the object and anti-competitive effects of an agreement that was covered by 
Article 9. of the LdC and Article 101 TFEU should not be considered as cumulative conditions, but as 
alternative conditions. The same matter had already been analyzed in the Judgment of the Court of 
Appeal of Lisbon of January 7th, 2014 (Case No. 938/10.7PYLSB.L1), concerning a regulation from 
the Order of Official Accountants, but which had been considered to be an infringement of both the 
national competition law and the TFEU, with arguments similar to those followed by the Competition 
Authority in this Petrogal/Galp case: seeking to determine the likelihood of affecting trade relations in 
comparison to the position adopted in the judgment that required effective influencing. It was mentioned 
that the decision was in contradiction to the ECJ's Bayer judgment, which would give special emphasis 
to the contractors´ real determination (will) to figure out to what the concurrence of wishes corresponds. 
3.4- The judgment under consideration (a quo. 1st Instance) analyzed the position of the European 
Commission on the serious distortions of competition that are mentioned in Article 4 of the Block 
Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints (VBER), which are, in general, restrictions of competition 
by object, 4 and it is settled case-law of the European Union that passive sales prohibitions are, by their 
nature, contrary to Article 101 TFEU, whose objects are to limit supplies and allocate (share) markets, 
and to constitute a "hardcore" restriction on competition (Article 4 (b) of the VBER. 
3.5 - It considered that the fulfilment of the objective worded legal provision in question is 
independent of the implementation of the agreement by the contractors concerned, and is not decisive 
for the purposes of filling the typicity that is provided for in Article 9 (1) (c) (1) of the Competition Law 
and Article 101 of the TFEU, the greater or lesser extent of the impact (implementation) of the restriction 
of passive sales, existing and continuing the infringement while the clause prohibiting passive sales is 
in force between the contractors and is not revoked. The 1st Instance Court further decided that the 
prohibition of passive sales "corresponds literally to common understanding and therefore the meaning 
of clauses which, by not making any distinction as to the type of sales, necessarily include all" (see p. 
162 for the verdict). " 
3.6 – In relating to the interpretation given to the concept of "agreement", the applicants refer to the 
European case-law established in Bayer AG v. Commission, Case T-41/96V of the Court of First 
Instance of October 26th, 2000, with a different interpretation being followed by the national court; "... 
the form of expressing the will of the contractors, in particular when it is a declared will, does not 
                                                     
4 Guidelines, 2010, § 23 and 50, and de Minimis comunication, Pt. 13  
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overlap with that which may be determined to be the real and effective will of them. What matters is that 
the faithful expression of the will of them, which corresponds, for sure, to their real will is ascertained." 
3.7 The Court of Appeal found that: 
(A) On the basis of the European case-law relied upon by the applicants, the Bayer v. Commission Case 
T-41/96: "in order to the existence of an agreement within the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, 
it is sufficient that the undertakings concerned have expressed their joint intention to behave on the 
market in a certain way " [Citing the judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma 
v Commission [July 15,1970] olct, 1969-1970, p. 447, n.º 112, and Van Landewyck and Others v 
Commission [October 29th, 1980] 209/78 to 215/78, 218/78 [1980] 3125, no. 86, Recueil, p.3125, nº 
86 ; Judgment of the Court of First Instance in December 17th, 1991, in Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals 
v Commission [1991] p. II - 1711, Para. 256], as follows: "[related to the wording of expressing that 
common intention, it is sufficient that the clause is an expression of the willingness of the interveners to 
behave on the market in accordance with it (see, namely, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, Paragraph 
112, and Van Landewyck v Commission, cited above), without it being necessary for it to constitute a 
binding and valid contract under the law (Sandoz, Paragraph 13).  
This interpretation has already been adopted in national case law, namely, in the judgment of the 2nd 
Section of the Lisbon Commercial Court in February 15th, 2007, Case no. 766/06.4 TYLSB (Baxter and 
Glintt), p. 59: 
(B) The interpretation of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Bayer AG v. Commission T-
41/96 and Sandoz v. Commission must be moderated and cautious, if once the cases which were the 
basis for discussion in those decisions there were no contractual written clauses between suppliers and 
distributors in force, unlike, in the present case, when they are therefore always capable of influencing 
the behavior of undertakings on the market itself, as they express the wishes of the applicants and 
distributors to prohibit the sales of the latter from outside the territory that is contracted in them. These 
clauses appeared in 199 out of the 240 Petrogal contracts, and in all of the written contracts in force with 
Galp Açores and Galp Madeira, which have never been changed or which are left in force. They should, 
in and of themselves, be regarded as restrictions to competition by object, since they are, in fact, capable 
of impeding distributors from responding to requests from customers who are located in territories/areas 
that are allocated to other distributors of the Defendants, and thus competing with them. 
(C) As to the non-application et al. (c) of Article 101 TFEU refers to the judgment under appeal as 
follows:  
"It is settled case-law that for an agreement between undertakings to be capable of affecting trade 
between Member States, it must be possible to predict with a sufficient degree of probability, on the 
basis of a set of objective legal or factual elements which have a direct or indirect, actual or potential 
influence on trade flows between Member States in order to jeopardize the achievement of the 
objectives of a single market between Member States (5.)  
Furthermore: 
”it is necessary to note that this influence should not be insignificant (6) and that the influence which 
an agreement may have on trade between Member States is assessed in particular by taking account 
of the position and importance of quotas on the market for the products in question. (7) 
                                                     
5 AEPI a. Comission, C-425/07 P, § 51, 
6 Javico, cit, § 16. 
7 Javico, cit, § 17.  
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Community case law has also taken the view, since the judgment in Remia and Others v. Commission, 
Case 42/84, that an agreement extending to the whole territory of a Member State is by its very nature 
to consolidate national barriers, thus hindering the economic interpenetration sought by the Treaty. 
The European Commission Guidelines on the concept of effect on trade between Member States 
which is provided for in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, published in OJ 2004/C 101/07, are not 
binding, but it follows from them that the concept of susceptibility to influencing/ jeopardizing trade 
between Member States is divided into three concepts: (i) the concept of 'trade between Member States'; 
(ii) the notion of “ likely to affect/ influencing”'; (iii) and the concept of 'sensitive character'. 
(D) The Portuguese Court of First Instance (on Competition and Regulation) sought to ascertain 
whether there was a "sufficient likelihood," in the Commission Guidelines and in the European case-
law, from which it stated and concluded that the agreements at issue in the case-file are not liable to 
affect or influence trade between Member States and proof of a genuine "demonstration of effective 
effect on trade between Member States" was not required, stating that, in this respect alone, there was 
no sufficient likelihood of such a finding. 
In the light of Para. 21 of the Guidelines on the concept of an effect on trade between Member States, 
which is provided for in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, in the Official Journal of the European Union 
C 101/81 of 27.4.2004 (...) the factual situation brought to the Court's attention may be characterized as 
being typically referred to therein in the last two sub-paragraphs, and it would, as a minimum, require 
proof that it is 'making it difficult for undertakings in other Member States to penetrate the national 
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7. Enforcement of State Aid Law 
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7.1. Marie Baker (Irish High Court) 
Dellway Investments Limited & Ors v. NAMA & Ors 
Judgment of the Irish Supreme Court delivered on 3rd February, 2011. 
1. The principle of sincere cooperation that is contained in Article 40.3 of the Treaty informs the 
approach of the Irish courts when dealing with complaints of alleged illegal State aid. It is well 
established as a matter of Irish and European Law that the domestic court may make a determination 
that a particular payment, allowance, or tax provision constitutes State aid, but the domestic court 
may not make a determination that aid is incompatible with the internal market of the EU. That 
competence is vested in the Commission or the ECJ.  
2. Questions of whether State aid has been afforded to a party have arisen in domestic cases, although 
the statistics would suggest that there are relatively few such cases. Ireland is regarded as having a 
good, but not perfect, record of compliance with EU State aid law and the Irish courts are willing 
and able to enforce the repayment of State aid when it has been declared to be incompatible. 
Domestic law, of course, governs the mode by which illegal State aid is to be repaid. 
3. The judgment I wish to address is probably one of the most influential judgments of the Irish 
Supreme Court in the last ten years, and it arose in the context of the financial crisis. The Irish 
banking sector was probably the first to suffer a catastrophic collapse, and between 2009 and 2011 
the Irish Government “bailed out” various commercial banks, some of which were nationalised, and 
also established a so called “Bad Bank” to deal with the non-performing loans of the nationalised 
commercial banks. The Bad Bank, the National Asset Management Agency, or NAMA, was 
established to acquire from identified banks certain eligible assets consisting of substantial loans 
made by commercial banks and the security for those loans. NAMA then proceeded to sell, usually 
in bundles, these bad loans. The aim of the legislative scheme was to dispose of all of the loans and 
security in an orderly fashion, taking account of the likely impact on the market of the sale of large 
numbers of properties, and, in some cases, to make a decision to hold back on certain sales in order 
not to distort the market. The ultimate aim is that NAMA will be wound down when all of the loans 
and securities have been disposed of. That process, it seems, is almost complete.  
4. The Act establishing NAMA came into force on 21st December 2009, and NAMA was established 
the following day, 22nd December 2009. 
5. The appellants were fifteen companies and partnerships incorporated in Ireland, the United 
Kingdom and France, and Patrick McKillen, one of the applicants, had either the entire beneficial 
ownership or 50% of the beneficial ownership in those entities. Mr. McKillen was a businessman 
and property developer and he and his companies and entities had extensive loan credit facilities 
with Anglo Irish Bank and the Bank of Ireland.  
6. The commercial entities had significant loans with Anglo, a large player in Irish commercial 
lending, which had become insolvent. The government became aware in September 2008, of the 
extent and scale of the insolvency of Anglo, and the State guaranteed the loans of that and other 
commercial banks. Anglo was ultimately put into liquidation and wound down.  
7. The McKillen entities owed approximately €2.1b to commercial Irish banks, which were compelled 
to participate in the scheme that was established under the NAMA legislation. The assets securing 
these loans were valued at between €1.7b and €2.28b and generated an annual income in the order 
of €150m.  
8. There was a dispute as to whether the McKillen loans could be regarded as being “impaired,” as 
there had been no breach of the loan facilities. Indeed, the McKillen portfolio was unusual in that 
96% of the properties were let, the majority to blue chip tenants on long leases. The income stream 
was between 1.7 and 1.8 times that payable at the loans’ current interest rates, and the interest was 
being kept up to date. The loans were of a short-term duration, although they had been successfully 
negotiated from time to time. NAMA took the general approach to the loans that because the 
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borrower was, to an extent, at the mercy of its banks in renegotiating the terms of the short-term 
facility, that the McKillen entities were exposed to the market and that the loan facilities were 
therefore somewhat vulnerable to market forces. 
9. Proceedings were commenced by the applicants against NAMA, and the Attorney General, as 
representative of the State, sought to quash the decision by NAMA to acquire the loans.  
10. The primary argument of the applicants was the contention that there had been a breach of their 
constitutional right to fair procedure by reason of the failure and express refusal of NAMA to receive 
submissions made on their behalf prior to taking a decision to acquire the bank loans as eligible 
assets.  
11. The litigation had an unusual history, in that the application came to be heard first by a divisional 
court of the High Court, which rejected all claims of the applicants. On appeal to a seven judge 
Supreme Court, the decision of the divisional High Court was set aside and, ultimately, a 
determination was made in a lengthy, and often quoted, judgment, that NAMA’s decision to acquire 
the McKillen loans was not one that could be made without affording those entities the opportunity 
to be heard, and that the attempt to do so was a breach of constitutional and natural procedural rights. 
Ultimately, the business entities acquired the loans directly from NAMA, and the matter was thereby 
concluded. 
12. The case is relevant to the approach of the Irish courts to State aid, since one argument raised by the 
appellants concerning the NAMA Act scheme generally related to the scope of NAMA to acquire 
assets, and whether the decision to acquire the McKillen loans was in breach of a Decision of the 
European Commission by which the NAMA legislation, and the scheme by which assets were 
acquired, was deemed not to be an unlawful State measure and not to be incompatible with European 
law.  
The Commission Decision 
13. It was common case that the NAMA scheme did entail the grant of State aid, within the meanings 
of Articles 107 and 108, and, in that context, the State notified the Commission. The Commission 
gave a decision on 26th February 2010 (Case N 725/2009) and determined that the NAMA scheme 
would constitute aid provided from State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1). 
14. Article 107(1) provides as follows: 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings over the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between 
Member States, but that is incompatible with the internal market.” 
15. The Commission considered that while the NAMA scheme did constitute State aid, in that it 
envisaged the use of State resources to prop up insolvent banks, it was still compatible with the 
internal market, since it fell within Article 102(3)(b): 
“Aid to prompt the execution of an important project of common European interest social remedy 
is serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.” 
16. The Commission determined that the notified measures would, if implemented, constitute aid by 
reason of the fact that, through the NAMA scheme, the State provides State guaranteed bonds that 
are designed to help NAMA to finance an asset release scheme by the purchase of assets from 
financial institutions at a price that is above market value, and that this distorts competition by 
conferring benefits on the participating financial institutions. 
17. The Commission, however, was satisfied that the scheme was designed to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the Irish economy and that it therefore had no objection to NAMA, as a scheme. 
18. Later, the Commission gave its interpretation of this decision, in a letter to a member of Seanad 
Éireann of 8th September 2010. 
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The arguments of Mr. McKillen 
19. The argument of the McKillen entities was that the Decision of the Commission was given in the 
context of a description of the NAMA scheme as restricting it solely to the acquiring of “impaired 
loans”. 
20. The McKillen entities sought a declaration that NAMA had failed to exercise its powers, in 
accordance with the Commission’s Decision, by purporting to acquire credit facilities when the 
borrowers were not impaired.  
21. The High Court determined, following an analysis of the Commission’s Decision, that the 
Commission did not confine its approval of the NAMA scheme to the acquisition of impaired assets. 
22. The Supreme Court noted the separate role of the Commission, which has the exclusive function of 
ruling on the compatibility of aid, whether existing or new, with the internal market, but noted that 
the courts of the Member States are obliged to support the Commission in the exercise of its 
functions. In that context it is imperative that the national courts would: 
“… give effect to the standstill provision of Article 108(3), and are obliged to make orders, where 
appropriate, restraining the State from implementing any to where the State in question has failed 
to notify the Commission or, where notice has been given, without awaiting the Commission decision 
on compatibility.” 
The court went on to point out that: 
“The National Court may also be obliged to make orders for the recovery of unlawful aid.” 
23. It was noted, by the Supreme Court, that the powers of NAMA included the power to acquire from 
participating institutions performing or non-performing eligible bank assets, and nothing in the Act 
could therefore be said to restrict NAMA only to the acquisition of impaired and non-performing 
loans or credit facilities. 
24. The High Court considered that impairment, either at borrower or asset level, was not made a 
condition for eligibility under the Act, nor was it made so by the Decision of the Commission, and 
that the Commission understood that the category of eligible bank assets comprised loans in the land 
and development category.  
The Commission letter 
25. The Commission letter, sent in reply to a query that was raised by a member of Seanad Éireann, was 
to the effect that the expectation of the Irish government was that loans transferred to NAMA would 
be concentrated on a small number of very large real estate developers, whose loans were either 
impaired at asset level or were otherwise impaired.  
26. The High Court determined that it would not, and could not as a matter of law, take into account the 
contents of the letter, and that: 
“The Decision has to be construed by reference to itself and cannot be amended or altered save by 
a subsequent decision of the Commission. Neither can subsequent correspondence emanating from 
a Commission official, regardless of status or distinction, be utilised to construe the terms of the 
Decision itself.” 
27. It was argued in the Supreme Court, by the McKillen entities, that the principle of sincere 
cooperation, and the fact that the Court of Justice frequently referred to external material and travaux 
preparatoires in the course of its decision making, meant that this was not the correct interpretive 
approach. 
28. The Supreme Court considered that the letter from the Commission was not admissible, insofar as 
it “might be used” in order to make a key and important change or addition to the Commission’s 
Decision itself. (Para. 48). The letter was therefore not admitted for the purpose of interpretation. 
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Direct effect 
29. A matter that was for decision in the Supreme Court was whether the Commission’s Decision had 
a direct effect, and whether the Court could grant an injunction restraining NAMA from acquiring 
the loans.  
30. The Supreme Court considered that decisions of the institutions of the EU were capable of having 
direct effect and of being invoked by individuals before the courts of the Member States, and that 
this is long since established, in, e.g., the Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein Case C-9/70, [1970] ECR 
825. The High Court did not consider the question in any great detail, and it proceeded on the 
hypothesis that the Commission’s Decision did have direct effect.  
31. The Supreme Court did, however, consider the question of whether the Commission’s Decision did 
have, or was capable of having, direct effect. It came to its determination in the context of 
fundamental principles. The first of these is that the national court has no power to pronounce on 
the compatibility of state aid with treaty obligations: Costa v. ENEL Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. 
Second, the question of an application to enforce the standstill provision, in Article 108(3), did not 
arise, as the NAMA scheme had been fully notified to the Commission, and the Commission had 
delivered its Decision. Third, the Commission did not open the formal investigation procedure under 
Article 108(2), but made a decision not to raise objections, which meant that the state aid would be 
implemented. Fourth, as a result of the process engaged by the Commission, it was clear that the 
Commission had no power to impose conditions on the State and did not purport to do so. 
32. The view of the Supreme Court was that the State proposed to implement a state aid scheme which, 
as a matter of European law, was permissible. It was true that the Decision could have been 
challenged in the General Court, but this had not happened. It was also the case that, as no conditions 
had been imposed by the Commission, there could be no argument made by the applicant that, while 
the Commission’s Decision meant that the state aid was permissible, certain conditions had not been 
met in this individual case.  
33. The Court then went on to find that the Decision was not one which was unconditional and precise, 
in regard to the test that was necessary for it to have direct effect. It came to this decision as the 
Commission’s conclusions were open to several different interpretations, and that direct effect was 
therefore not possible. It also took the view that the Decision was not one which was unconditional, 
clear and precise. 
34. Ultimately, the Supreme Court took the view that the Decision of the Commission did not confine 
NAMA to acquiring impaired credit facilities, and that, accordingly, the McKillen entities were not 
entitled to any declaration to the effect that NAMA was attempting to exercise its powers in breach 
of Articles 107 and 108, or of the Decision of the Commission. 
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7.2. Maria Gkana (Greek Council of State) 
Judgment 533/2016 of the Council of State (extended composition) 
1. According to EU legislation and the EU courts’ settled case-law, the Commission has the power to 
declare certain state aid either compatible or incompatible with the internal market. If the latter is the 
case, any aid that is declared unlawful and incompatible must be recovered by the Member States, so 
that a level-playing field for competition is restituted in full. Although it seems that, after the 
Commission has done all the dirty work, the Member States’ job is easy, experience and extensive case-
law have proven otherwise. In the judgment upon which we are commenting, the issue raised during the 
recovery of state aid only seemingly refers to the choice between simple or compound interest; in reality, 
it touches upon the extent of the binding effect of the Commission’s actions on national courts.  
2. Turning to the background of the case, back in the 1980’s, the Greek cement market was essentially 
ruled by four large companies with equally important names: Heracles (Hercules), Titan, Halkis and 
Halyps (Steel). As often happens with powerful competitors, their legal battles were soon transferred to 
the European law field, in what could, somewhat freely, be described as a “clash of the Titans”. A 
competitive advantage worth €86.2 million (DR 27,755 million), in the form of the converting into 
capital of Heracles’s debts to Greek institutions, as part of several structural measures that were designed 
to remedy serious disturbances in the country's economy, which triggered a Commission decision 
declaring the aid compatible.  
3. This decision was challenged by competitors in the UK, Italy and Greece before the Court of First 
Instance (CFI). On 6th July, 1995, the CFI held that the Commission had failed to fully assess the effects 
of the aid on trade and competition, as laid down in Article 92 of the Treaty, and annulled the 
Commission's decision. Having carried out a full examination, as required by the Court, the Commission 
decided, on 17.3.1999, that the conversion of Heracles' debt into capital in the amount of €86.2 million 
(DR 27,755 million) is aid, in the sense that it distorted competition and affected trade between Member 
States. Part of the aid, amounting to €78.5 million (DR 25,267 million), was considered compatible with 
the common market under Article 92(3)(b) of the Treaty, in the sense that it was intended to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the Greek economy. The remaining part of the aid, amounting to €7.7 million (DR 
2,488 million), was not limited to the minimum necessary, it unduly placed the company in a more 
favorable position vis-à-vis its competitors, and had to be recovered in order to establish the status quo 
of competition. It was further stated, in the Commission’s decision, that the sum to be recovered should 
bear interest from the date on which it was made available to Heracles until the date of its actual 
recovery.  
4. According to the judgment that is commented upon, the recovery decision followed a letter from 
the Commission (dated 2.5.1999) in which the interest reference rate was set at 18%, and the total 
amount to be recovered was calculated using the compound interest method. The competent tax 
authority issued a payment order, calculating the amount in the same way as the Commission had in its 
letter. Heracles paid the sum, but, nonetheless, contested the legality of the order before the Athens 
Administrative Court of First Instance. The motion was partially accepted. More specifically, the First 
Instance Court found that the method used for the calculation of the fine (compound interest) was illegal. 
Both Heracles and the tax authority appealed. After some back-and-forth for procedural reasons, the 
Court of Appeal ruled that, in view of the fact that the national courts are bound by the Commission’s 
decision regarding the recovery of unlawful aid, and given that the latter had not been contested before 
the competent court, the Court of First Instance had no power to examine the legality of the 
Commission’s decision of 17.3.1999, nor the legality of the calculation of the amount to be recovered, 
nor the interest rate and the method used. It subsequently quashed the appealed judgment and dismissed 
the original motion. Heracles brought an appeal on points of law before the Council of State (CoS), i.e., 
the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece. 
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5. In the judgment that is being commented upon, the CoS, in an extended composition (7 judges 
instead of the standard composition of 5), quoted the relevant law governing the dispute. In short, before 
Regulation 794/2004, it was rather unclear whether the amount to be recovered should be calculated on 
a simple or compound interest basis. The Commission and the Members States’ practices varied. It must 
be noted, at this point, that the choice between one of these methods is extremely important, because, 
according to the method of compound interest, the interest is calculated on the initial capital amount and 
also on the accumulated interest from previous periods. This means that the total amount to be recovered 
ends up being significantly higher than the amount calculated on a simple interest basis. In the case 
commented upon, the difference is striking: €69.7 million (DR 23,771 million) instead of €25.6 million 
(DR 8,731 million). 
6. In 2003, the Commission issued a Communication on the interest rates to be applied when aid 
granted unlawfully is being recovered (2003/C 110/08), taking the view that the effects of unlawful aid 
are to provide funding to the beneficiary on similar conditions to a medium-term non-interest-bearing 
loan. It therefore concluded that the use of compound interest appears necessary to ensure that the 
financial advantages resulting from this situation are fully neutralized. Accordingly, the Commission 
informed the Member States, and interested parties, that in any future decisions it may adopt the ordering 
of the recovery of aid that is unlawfully granted, and it will apply the reference rate that is used for 
calculating the net grant equivalent of regional aids on a compound basis. In accordance with normal 
market practice, compounding should take place on an annual basis. Likewise, according to the said 
Communication, the Commission expected the Member States to apply compound interest in the 
execution of pending recovery decisions, unless this would be contrary to a general principle of 
Community law. The method of compound interest was eventually made compulsory, pursuant to 
Article 11 of R. 794/2004, which applies in relation to any recovery decision notified after the date of 
the entry into force of the Regulation (Article 13). 
7. As a bridge between the law and the case-law, CoS, in its judgment, also referred to 
Communication 2007/C 272/05 of the Commission, in order to reiterate the purpose of recovery as the 
re-establishment of the situation that existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid, so that the 
maintenance of a level-playing field in the internal market is ensured, and to underline the nature of 
recovery as being the logical consequence of the finding that certain state aid is unlawful, and not as a 
penalty. Furthermore, citing the said Communication, as well as the relevant case-law, the CoS pointed 
out that the amount to be recovered should reflect any financial advantages that are incidental to 
unlawful aid and, thus, the interest - equivalent to the financial advantage arising from the availability 
of the funds in question - is to be recovered.  
8. Subsequently, the CoS referred extensively to the Département du Loiret case (T-369/00 and C-
295/07), in which the issue of the appropriate method of calculating interest in state-aid cases before 
2003 was dealt with. According to this case-law, an obligation is imposed upon the Commission to 
justify the use of the compound interest method for the recovery of any aid declared incompatible with 
the common market before the 2003 Communication. In that point, reference is made to an internal 
manual of procedures, issued by DG Competition, regarding the application of Art. 107-108 TFEU 
(Edition 2013), in which it is stated that the simple interest method is acceptable under three cumulative 
conditions: a. the decision was adopted before the 2003 Communication; b. the decision does not 
explicitly impose the calculation of recovery interests on a compound basis; and, c. the Member State 
shows that, in similar situations, the calculation of interest is done in a simple manner.  
9. Furthermore, in the judgment commented upon, the CoS also referred extensively to the Mediaset 
case (C-69/13) and the case-law cited therein, regarding the binding effect of letters sent by the 
Commission to the Member States as part of the exchanges to ensure the immediate and effective 
execution of recovery decisions. According to that case-law, such letters do not constitute decisions 
within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Art. 288 TFEU, and therefore cannot be regarded as being 
binding on the national court. However, under the principle of cooperation in good faith that is laid down 
in Art. 4(3) TEU, the national court must take the Commission’s statements of position into account as 
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a factor in the assessment of the dispute before it. The nature of these statements of position is confirmed 
by settled case-law, which is also cited in the judgment which is commented upon here.  
10. Turning to the case at hand, the CoS held that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that, just 
because the Court of First Instance was bound by the recovery decision, it followed that it had no power 
to examine the legality of the method used by the Greek tax authority to calculate the interest. More 
specifically, the CoS held that the Court of Appeal failed to ascertain: 1) whether the recovery decision 
of 17.3.1999 explicitly imposed the calculation of recovery interests on a compound basis, justifying it 
according to the Département du Loiret case, or that it followed indirectly from the Commission’s letter 
of 2.5.1999 that such a calculation was imposed by the recovery decision and, in that case, the letter was 
considered to be complementary to the decision, constituting a whole with it, and therefore was binding 
on the national court, or, 2) whether it constituted a separate act, in which case the legality of the 
calculation could be examined. Furthermore, the CoS held that the Court of Appeal should have 
examined whether, under Greek law (at the time of the facts of the case),a legal basis existed for applying 
the method of compound interest, as well as whether the tax authority had justified the method used 
with reference to the restitution of a level-playing field of competition by neutralizing any financial 
advantages that are/were incidental to unlawful aid and, thus, interest equivalent to the financial 
advantage arising from the availability of the funds in question. Finally, the CoS held that, as far as the 
binding effect of the Commission’s letter was concerned, the relevant EU courts’ case-law was clear 
enough, so there was no need to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) for a 
preliminary ruling.  
11. Consequently, and given that, pursuant to the Greek rules of procedure, the CoS exercises a 
review on points of law and cannot itself assess original documents, the Supreme Administrative Court 
set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordered the latter to re-examine the case accordingly. 
Comment  
12. The judgment that is commented upon may not seem to solve the dispute in a straightforward 
manner, but this is merely because of procedural law restraints. However, the CoS fulfills its mission as 
a Supreme Court, giving the Court of Appeal very detailed guidance on how it should assess the case. 
Beside the fact that the Court extensively refers to previous EU courts’ case-law, and it does so in a 
comprehensive way, what is particularly interesting in this case is actually the reference made to 
Communication 2007/C 272/05 and the internal manual of procedures issued by DG Competition 
regarding the application of Art. 107-108 TFEU (Edition 2013). Indeed, CoS, on not one but two 
occasions, took into consideration, posterior-to-the-facts-of-the-case, non-binding Commission 
documents, acknowledging them as such, in order to put both law and case-law into context. What is 
more, it used them as a yardstick for dictating to the Court of Appeal which elements should be examined 
when revisiting the case. Whether such documents must, or even may, serve as interpretative tools, is 
open to discussion. Is there an inherent obligation for the national judge, under the principle of 
cooperation in good faith, which is enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, to take into account any document issued 
by the Commission, even those summarizing case-law or those that are intended for internal use? On 
the other hand, is the judge allowed to bypass a personal interpretation of both the law and the case-law 
in favor of the Commission, or does that mean that he/she waives his/her authority and independence?  
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7.3. Merit Helm (County Court of Harju) 
Tallinn Circuit Court Civil Chamber. Decision no 3-13-1497 of 26. August 2014 
Facts of the case 
On 24.03.2010 Hansa Biodisel OÜ (HB) applied for state aid. On 13.07.2010 the Estonian state aid 
authority (EAS) made a decision to grant HB state aid in the sum of €971,648. The purpose of the aid 
was to subsidise HB’s project, the aim of which was to recycle old car tires into fuel by pyrolysis. 
The Estonian State Aid Authority (EAS) performed a follow up inspection on the project in 2012 
and discovered that HB had started the project before applying for state aid. EAS concluded that the 
rules of Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 06.08.2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption Regulation) were thus violated. Specifically, Article 8 Section 2 - because the aid did not 
have an incentive effect on the project. 
On 12.04.2013, EAS made a decision with which it nullified its former decision to grant aid 
retroactively (ex tunc), claiming back the aid that had already been paid to HB (in the sum on 
€240,099.18). HB submitted an appeal. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Courts of the First and Second Instance, all 
found that EAS’s decision to nullify its former decision and to claim the aid back was both lawful and 
valid.  
Tallinn Circuit Court Civil Chamber decision 
The main question of the dispute lay in establishing whether, on 19.11.2009 (i.e., before the aid was 
granted), HB had concluded a binding or non-binding contract with the Jinan Eco-Energy Technology 
Co., Ltd., to buy pyrolysis equipment to carry out the project.  
Both Instances of the Courts concluded that the contract had been concluded as a binding contract 
(and not as a preliminary contract). The Court of Second Instance explained that evaluation of whether 
state aid is in compliance with the common market is regulated by European Commission, which is the 
sole authority able to make such rules. EC Regulation 800/2008 Article 8 Section 2 and European 
Commission ”Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013” (2006/C 4/08) Section 38 must be 
applied. 
EC Regulation 800/2008 Article 8 Section 2 provides that aid granted to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which is covered by this Regulation, shall be considered to have an incentive effect 
if, before work on the project or activity has started, the beneficiary has submitted an application for the 
aid to the Member State concerned. EC „Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013” (2006/C 
54/08) section 38 and its Footnote no 40 also provide unequivocally, that an application for the aid must 
be submitted before start of work on the project. ‘Start of work’ means either the start of construction 
work or the first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies. 
It was proven, in this case, that HB had started work before applying for the aid and thus it did not 
have the mandatory incentive effect. As a result of the above, the aid was granted unlawfully and must 
be recovered from the beneficiary as unlawful aid. The Court explained that the member state is obliged 
to recover unlawful state aid from the beneficiary according to both – domestic and EC law. The Court 
also referred to European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions in similar matters and explained that in 
accordance with ECJ decisions - revocation of unlawful state aid must be dealt with by recovering it 
from the beneficiary (ECJ 21.03.1990 Decision C-142/87: Belgium vs Commission, Section 66; 
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08.12.2011 Decision C-275/10: Residex Capital IV, Section 29; 24.01.2013 Decision C-529/09: 
Commission vs Spain, Section 90).  
The Court found that the fact that the beneficiary did not conceal (lie) to the authority that it had 
concluded the contract on 19.11.2009, when applying for the state aid, did not give the beneficiary 
legitimate expectation that the aid would not be recovered from the beneficiary. A beneficiary can only 
rely on legitimate expectation of keeping the aid, if that beneficiary has, with due diligence, audited that 
while deciding upon granting state aid, and the state has met the requirements set forth in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. The court referred to ECJ case law: (20.09.1990 Decision C-
5/89: Commission vs Germany, Section 14; 08.12.2011 Decision C-81/10 P: France Télécom vs 
Commission, Section 59) in which similar views were expressed.  
HB found that the case should not be decided without having turned to the ECJ or the European 
Commission for a preliminary ruling. The Court denied the application and explained to the ECJ cannot 
evaluate the factual circumstances and evidence submitted to the National Court but can only interpret 
EC law or decide upon its validity. The Court found that European law is univocal and clear in the 
matters that are relevant to the case, and there is enough ECJ case law on similar disputes. There the 
court thus found that there are no grounds for turning to the ECJ or the European Commission for a 
preliminary ruling. 
Significance of the case 
The significances of the case lies mainly in two things.  
The first is that, besides domestic law, the Court applied several EC legal acts in order to substantiate 
its decision. The Court also referred to several ECJ cases relating to similar disputes (usually the Court 
only refers to domestic case law).  
The second important point is that the Court explained the beneficiary’s duties in the procedure of 
granting state aid. The Court established that the beneficiary itself is also responsible for auditing if the 
procedure of granting state aid has been duly carried out and is in accordance with the provision set out 
by EC law. The Court also established that once it is proven that the aid was granted unlawfully, the aid 
must be recovered, and there is no other appropriate remedy in such circumstances. 
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7.4. Seamus Noonan (Irish High Court) 
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council v. West Wood Club Limited [2105] IEHC 800 
Introduction 
1. The Plaintiff was a local authority tasked with collecting local property taxes known as commercial 
rates. Rates were levied on business premises within its functional area. The claim was brought in 
the Circuit Court, a Court of local and limited jurisdiction. 
2. The factual background in these proceedings arose from a claim by the Plaintiff for arrears of 
commercial rates in respect of leisure premises that are operated by the Defendant. In response to 
the claim, the Defendant pleaded in their defence and counterclaimed, inter alia, that as the Plaintiff 
was operating similar leisure facilities in competition with it, funding received from commercial 
rates and other State sources would amount to unlawful State aid. Therefore, it was argued that the 
rates were unenforceable where the funds raised by these rates were being used by the Plaintiff to 
fund its own competing leisure facilities. The Defendant also suggested that the exemption granted 
by the Plaintiff to its own leisure centre from rates, when they were in competition with the 
Defendant’s leisure centres, was a breach of the competition rules of the Treaties under Article 4(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Defendant also pleaded that 
the collection of the rates breached Articles 102, 106, 107-109 TFEU. 
3. In their counterclaim, the Defendant sought damages in the same amount as the rates levied. 
4. Before the Circuit Court, the Plaintiff was successful in raising a preliminary objection on the basis 
that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in relation to State aid 
by the Defendant’s defence. The Defendant appealed to the High Court. 
5. Judgment was delivered by O’Malley, J.in the High Court on 17th December 2015. 
Submission of the parties in the High Court 
6. The Defendant’s submissions are set out in the judgment of O’Malley, J. between Paragraphs 27 – 
42. She notes that they set out the principles that the Circuit Court is obliged to give effect to EU 
law and that Articles 107 and 108 have direct effect. The Defendant submitted that National Courts 
are under an obligation to provide remedies for breaches of EU rules, and that national laws must 
be set aside should they prevent the awarding of such remedies. The Defendant relied on the 
decisions of the Court of Justice in Case C-213/89 R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex. parte 
Factortame Limited (Factortame I) [1990] ECR 2433, Case C-6/90 and Case C-9/90 Francovich v. 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 and passages from Bellamy & Child, European Community 
Law of Competition, at pages 1589-1591, to demonstrate the development of this principle and the 
scope of its application.  
7. At Paragraph 37 of her judgment, O’Malley, J. notes: 
“[37.] The defendant accepts that if the national court is satisfied that the aid in question is a 
State aid, it has no jurisdiction to decide whether or not the aid is compatible with the Treaty. That 
is the exclusive function of the European Commission. However, if the aid has not been notified to 
the Commission, the court must, it is submitted, devise whatever remedy is necessary to nullify the 
effect of the breach.” 
8. The Defendant submitted that the correct remedy would be an order of the Court for restitution of 
the rates levied on the Defendant and relies on Case C-53/00 Ferring v. ACOSS [2001] ECR I-9067 
and the approach of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-126/01 Ministre de l’économie, des 
finances et de l’industrie v. Gemo, 30th April 2002, in support of this position. 
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9. O’Malley, J. summarises the submissions of the Plaintiff between Paragraphs 43-55. The Plaintiff 
submitted that the Defendant should have sought a ruling from the Commission in relation to 
whether the rates amounted to State aid, since they asserted that the Commission has the exclusive 
power to determine what amounts to State aid. They relied on a passage from Dunleavy’s 
Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide (Bloomsbury, 2010), at p.773 of that publication, in 
support of this proposition. The Plaintiff also suggested that the correct method of challenging the 
lawfulness of the rates would be by judicial review and relied on the decision of Charleton J. in The 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor v The Director of the Equality Tribunal 
[2009] IEHC 72 in support of their position that claims made under EU law must be made in the 
appropriate forum under national law. 
10. In relation to the Defendant’s counterclaim, the Plaintiff submitted that as Article 108(3) does create 
obligations for recipients of State aid, no right could arise under EU law for damages against a 
recipient. The Plaintiff relied on the findings of the Court of Justice in Case C-39/94 SFEI v. La 
Poste [1996] ECR I-3547 in this respect. 
Decision of O’Malley J. 
11. In analysing the principles applicable in the determination of the issues in this case, O’Malley J. 
considers in detail the guidance set out in the handbook on the enforcement of EU State aid law by 
National Courts, published by the European Commission in 2010. This supports the view that 
National Courts have the power to interpret issues relating to State aid. At Paragraph 58 she quotes 
the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Justice in C-368/04 Transalpine Ölleitung 
in Österreich [2006] ECR I-9957: 
“37. It is common ground that, as regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their 
obligations under Articles 87 EC and 88 EC [Now Articles 107 and 108], the national courts and 
the Commission fulfil complementary and separate roles (see Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others [1996] 
ECR I-3547, Paragraph 41, and van Calster and Others, cited above, Paragraph 74). 
38. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the 
exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Community Courts, it is for the 
national courts to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded where the obligation to give 
prior notification of State aid to the Commission pursuant to Article 88(3) [Now Article 108(3)]of 
the Treaty is infringed (van Calster and Others, Paragraph 75). 
39. A national court may have cause to interpret the concept of aid contained in Article 87(1) [Now 
Article 107(1)] of the Treaty in order to determine whether a State measure has been introduced in 
disregard of Article 88(3) [Now Article 108(3)] (Case C-345/02 Pearle and Others [2004] ECR I-
7139, Paragraph 31). Thus, it is for that court to verify, inter alia, whether the measure at issue 
constitutes an advantage and whether it is selective, that is to say, whether it favours certain 
undertakings or certain producers within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC [Now Article 107(1)]. 
40. Secondly, it must be pointed out that an aid measure within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC 
[Now Article 107(1)] which is put into effect in infringement of the obligations arising from Article 
88(3) EC [Now Article 108(3)] is unlawful (see Case C-354/90 Fédération Nationale du Commerce 
Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des Négociants et Transformateurs de 
Saumon v French State [1991] ECR I-5505, Paragraph 17, and Joined Cases C-266/04 to C-270/04, 
C-276/04 and C-321/04 to C-325/04 Distribution Casino France and Others [2005] ECR I-9481, 
Paragraph 30. See also the definition of unlawful aid in Article 1(f) of Regulation No 659/1999… 
45. In that regard, and since there is no Community legislation on the subject, it is for the domestic 
legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the 
detailed procedural rules governing actions at law intended to safeguard the rights which 
individuals derive from Community law, provided, firstly, that those rules are not less favourable 
than those governing rights which originate in domestic law (principle of equivalence) and, 
secondly, that they do not render impossible or excessively difficult in practice the exercise of rights 
conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see Case C-300/04 Eman and 
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Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055, Paragraph 67, and Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 
Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I-8559,Paragraph 57)... 
51. In addition, it should be noted that, in the cases in the main proceedings, the applications for 
grant of the unlawful aid measure, namely the partial rebate on energy taxes, may be likened to 
applications for partial exemption from those taxes. As is clear from case-law, businesses liable to 
pay an obligatory contribution cannot rely on the argument that the exemption enjoyed by other 
businesses constitutes State aid in order to avoid payment of that contribution (see Case C-390/98 
Banks [2001] ECR I-6117, paragraph 80; Joined Cases C-430/99 and C-431/99 Sea-Land Service 
and Nedlloyd Lijnen [2002] ECR I-5235, paragraph 47; Distribution Casino France and Others, 
paragraph 42, and Air Liquide Industries Belgium, paragraph 43). 
52. Having been called upon to analyse the disputed measure in order to ascertain whether it 
corresponded to the definition of aid referred to in Article 87(1) EC [Now Article 107(1)], the 
national court should, in principle, have available to it all the facts enabling it to assess whether the 
measure which it proposes to adopt ensures that the rights of individuals are safeguarded by 
neutralising the effects of the aid on competitors of the recipient undertakings, while taking 
Community law fully into consideration and avoiding adoption of a measure which would have the 
sole effect of extending the circle of recipients of that aid.” 
12. She goes on to note that the handbook provides that National Courts may request an opinion from 
the Commission if in doubt as to the qualification of State aid. She also considers the position of the 
handbook in respect of the application of national procedure in cases where the National Courts are 
obliged to enforce State aid rules, and in relation to standing issues in tax cases. 
13. In determining the issue, O’Malley, J. notes, at Paragraph 65, that, in general, any party defending 
a civil claim is entitled to challenge the lawfulness of the Plaintiff’s claim. While this is subject to 
limitations, she notes “a Defendant who says that the specific claim brought against them amounts 
to a breach of their rights must be entitled to make that case.” Accordingly, she dismisses the 
Plaintiff’s suggestion that there is an issue as to whether this is the correct forum to bring 
proceedings and notes at Paragraph 67: 
“A Defendant would be entitled to rely upon Constitutional principles or upon national legislation, 
if applicable, to defeat a claim of any nature made against it in any forum. Having regard to the 
authorities, the right to invoke the protection of EU law cannot be made subject to more restrictive 
rules, and the Defendant cannot be compelled to institute separate proceedings to vindicate any 
applicable rights. The Defendant is, therefore, entitled to make the argument that the rates sought 
to be collected from it are a species of unlawful State aid which affects its interests.” 
14. In conclusion, O’Malley sets out the following principles from the authorities: 
“a. The Circuit Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the rates amount to State aid. 
b. The Circuit Court does not, however, have jurisdiction to determine the compatibility of the aid 
(if it is found to be such) with the internal market. 
c. As a matter of fact, it seems to be common case that if it is State aid, it has not been notified to 
the Commission and, to that extent, a finding of a breach of Article 108(3) of the Treaty would 
follow. 
d. However, the Court must bear in mind that where the issue relates to the payment of a tax, the 
obligation to notify the Commission can only be relied upon by the taxpayer if their own tax payment 
forms an integral part of the unlawful aid. 
e. If the exemption of the Plaintiff’s own enterprises is established, and was unlawful, it is not a 
remedy for that particular illegality to grant exemption to the Defendant - that would only compound 
the breach of the rules. 
f. Separate considerations seem to apply to the counterclaim, as framed in these proceedings. EU 
law does not require that damages be available against the recipient of unlawful State aid. Thehe 
question of damages is therefore governed by national law, including national rules, as to the 
monetary jurisdiction of different courts. It may be that the counterclaim could, at least to some 
extent, be described as being against the Plaintiff in its capacity as collector of the rates, rather than 
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as recipient, but the Defendant has not particularised its general claim that the rates, combined with 
other State funding, amount to State aid. The obligation on National Courts to provide a remedy for 
a breach of EU law does not, it seems to me, extend to breaching national procedural rules (here, 
rules relating to jurisdiction) where that is not necessary under the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness. 
g. The Defendant’s claim exceeds the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in relation to damages. While 
an argument may be open that, under national rules, the monetary limit does not apply to a 
counterclaim, this issue was not addressed before me and I am proceeding on the basis that, in the 
normal course of events, the limit does apply. My view, therefore, would be that the Circuit Court 
does not have jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim.” 
The Court allowed the appeal on the basis that the Circuit Court had incorrectly reached the conclusion 
that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the defence raised by the Defendant and remitted the case to 
that Court for further consideration in the light of the judgment of the High Court. 
Postscript 
Since the above was written, the Court of Appeal delivered judgment, on the 25th July 2017, on a case, 
and O’Malley J. stated that, on the issues before her. The judgment of the Court delivered by Hogan, J., 
essentially agreed with the views of the High Court, and she held that it was clear that the Circuit Court 
did not have jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of the rate, since it had no judicial review 
jurisdiction. 
The Circuit Court could, however, rule on the issue raised by way of defence between the parties to 
the proceedings, but only on the basis that such determination would have no general erga omnes effect, 
and it would thus not bind anyone outside the proceedings. The Court also rules that the defence could 
only be availed of where there was a clear error on the face of proceedings, or where there no doubt 
about the illegality of the decision that was sought to be enforced. The Circuit Court thus had jurisdiction 
to decide if there had been illegal state aid, but only where this was manifest and clear. 
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8.1. Arunas Dirvonas (Lithuania Supreme Administrative Court) 
Lithuania aims to reduce its dependence on its sole gas supplier Gazprom and to create a competitive 
gas market by connecting Lithuania to the EU gas market, thereby increasing the security of its energy 
supply. It therefore seeks the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal (hereinafter, 
the “LNG Terminal”) and its connection to the natural gas transmission system of Lithuania. The start 
of operation of the LNG Terminal was planned for 3rd December 2014. 
On 21st July 2010, the Lithuanian Government appointed by decree AB Klaipedos Nafta (hereinafter 
“KN”) as the project development company for the LNG terminal. KN is a state-owned company with 
the Lithuanian State holding 72.3% of the shares. The remainder of the shares are owned by private 
investors. KN will not be engaged in the trade in, and supply of, gas. UAB LITGAS, initially a 100% 
subsidiary of KN, but since 15th October 2013, under the control of Lietuvos Energija, UAB (which 
holds 2/3 of the shares), will engage in the supply of liquefied natural gas through the LNG Terminal. 
KN is thus in charge of implementing the development and construction of the LNG Terminal 
infrastructure until the LNG Terminal is connected to the natural gas transmission system and its 
operation starts. For reasons of security of supply, Lithuania also intends to designate KN as the operator 
of the terminal. 
On 15th February 2012, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania adopted Resolution No 199 
whereby it requested from (i) KN that it develop the LNG Terminal, and (ii) that the Ministry of Energy 
adopt all decisions to ensure that KN shall be provided with all securities necessary to the financing of 
the project, including, inter alia, a state guarantee. 
In order to secure the development of the LNG Terminal, as well as its prospective functioning, 
Lithuania enacted the LNG Terminal Law on 22nd June 2012. Article 5(2) of the LNG Terminal Law 
institutes the "LNG Supplement", a special levy that will be imposed on users of the transmission 
system. It will be collected by the transmission system operator for natural gas (“TSO”) and transferred 
to KN after the approval of the regulator, i.e., the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy 
(hereinafter the “NRA”), in order to finance part of the costs of constructing and operating the terminal 
and the related infrastructure. Article 11 of the LNG Terminal Law stipulates an obligation on certain 
energy producers (electricity or heat producers who have been assigned public service obligations, or 
whose price for produced energy is regulated) for each to buy minimal allocated quantities of natural 
gas imported through the LNG Terminal (hereinafter the “Purchase obligation”).  
Based on the calculations and justifications provided by KN, the NRA approved investment costs 
into the LNG Terminal amounting to 113.8 m LTL (€33 million) on 19th October 2012. Those 
investment costs were therefore used as a basis for the LNG Supplement of 2013. 
On 28th October 2013, Lithuania notified aid measures related to the construction and operation of 
the LNG Terminal to the European Commission.  
Prior to this notification, the Lithuanian Gas Association filed a complaint on 28th November 2012, 
arguing that the LNG Terminal would be receiving illegal and incompatible State aid. In its complaint, 
the Lithuanian Gas Association objects to the LNG Supplement, the State guarantee, and the possible 
use of the land and port facilities of the Klaipeda State Seaport without paying a market-based price, as 
constituting illegal and incompatible aid. The complainant argues, in particular, that those various 
advantages that have been granted, without notification to the Commission, cannot be viewed as 
fulfilling the Altmark conditions established by the Court of Justice, and it seems difficult to justify 
them under Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU). 
Lithuania admits that, in any event, even if the LNG Supplement and the purchase obligation had to 
be regarded as State aid, it would have been compatible under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU or, alternatively, 
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would comply with the Service of General Economic Interest (hereinafter SGEI) rules that are laid down 
in the SGEI Framework. 
On the basis of the examined elements, the Commission, in the Decision of 20th November 2013, in 
case State Aid SA.36740 (2013/NN), concludes that the state guarantees, the disbursement of the LNG 
Supplement, and the revenues resulting from the purchase obligation, constitute State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
The Commission has decided to consider the aid to be compatible with the internal market, pursuant 
to Articles 107(3) (c) as regards the investment aid, and pursuant to 106(2) TFEU as regards the 
operating aid. 
However, The Commission regretted that Lithuania has put the section of the aid measures related 
to the investment (i.e., the LNG Supplement for 2013-2014) into effect, which is in breach of Article 
108(3) TFEU. 
The Commission has noted that Article 5(2) of the LNG Terminal Law that establishes the possibility 
for the LNG Terminal developer to obtain the LNG Supplement to cover investment costs, which cannot 
be financed by other resources that are available, is already in force and provides KN with enforceable 
rights, given that KN has already been designated as the project developer. This part of the aid measures 
has thus been granted in breach of the standstill obligation that are enshrined in Article 108 TFEU. 
AB Achema is one of the producers assigned with public service obligations. AB Achema has 
approached the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court with a complaint concerning the compensation 
for damage, in which it has indicated that the Lithuanian State has, by also infringing the European 
Union law, inter alia Article 108(3) TFEU, applied State aid for the financing of the project of the LNG 
Terminal in the period 1st January, 2013, to 20th November, 2013, without notification to the 
Commission, thus causing financial damage of €15,329,728.69 to the applicant. State aid was provided 
on the basis of the LNG Terminal Law of 12th June 2012, according to which the applicant was obliged 
to pay the LNG Supplement from 1st January 2013, whose amount for 2013 was calculated by the NRA 
by Decision No. 03-317 of 19th October 2012, and by Decision No 03-330 of 26th October 2012. In the 
applicant’s opinion, the LNG Supplement determined by the LNG Terminal Law could only be 
calculated following the Decision of the Commission of 20th November 2013, in case State Aid 
SA.36740 (2013/NN), in which it was stated that such State aid is justifiable and may be applied. The 
total amount of the LNG Supplement (€15,329,728.69) paid by the applicant for the overall period in 
dispute shall be considered material damage, which shall be awarded to the applicant from the 
Lithuanian State.  
The representative of the Defendant Lithuanian State asked for the application of the limitation 
period in the response, and for the rejection of the complaint. It is indicated that the potential 
infringement of its rights became apparent to the applicant on 19th November, 2012, at the latest, when 
the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court received a complaint, thus asking to recognise its obligation 
to pay the LNG Supplement as being unlawful by, inter alia, basing its argument on the infringement 
of Article 108(3) TFEU; therefore, the limitation period of 3 years, in order to compensate for damages, 
was due on 19th November, 2015, at the latest. The Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation have 
commented in their Ruling of 5th February, 2016, and the Ruling of 8th June, 2016, on whether the 
infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU determined by the Commission by the Decision of 20th November, 
2013, for the period in dispute, by obliging the applicant to pay the LNG Supplement, is sufficiently 
significant in order for the applicant to be deprived of the obligation that is imposed by the LNG 
Terminal Law, as well as by the Decision of 19th October, 2012, and the Decision of 26th October, 
2012, by the NRA. It was therefore confirmed by the final decisions from the Courts that, regardless of 
the infringement of EU law determined by the Commission by the Decision of 20th November 2013, 
the applicant shall pay the LNG Supplement calculated for the period in dispute. 
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Third parties concerned who were supporting the position set out in the Defendant’s statement in 
their responses have requested the application of the limitation period and the rejection of the complaint.  
The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court has rejected the complaint by its Decision of 15th March, 
2017, by also specifying that the applicant associates the infringement of its rights, from which the 
requested compensation of damage is derived, with the moment when the Lithuanian State (institutions) 
obliged the applicant to pay the LNG Supplement: from 1st January, 2013, by the LNG Terminal Law 
that was adopted on 12th June, 2012, as well as the Decision of 19th October, 2012, and the Decision 
of 26th October, 2012, without notification to the Commission, thus infringing EU law (Article 108(3) 
TFEU). The written evidence contained in the case proves that the applicant became familiar with the 
said obligation and interpreted it as an infringement of its rights on 19th November 2012, at the latest, 
following the complaint submitted by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. In its complaint of 
19th November, 2012, the applicant requested the annulment of the Decision of 19th October, 2012, and 
the Decision of 26th October, 2012, by the NRA, and it clearly stated that, in its opinion, upon the 
establishment of the LNG Supplement, EU law (inter alia Article 108(3) TFEU) was infringed, because 
State aid to AB Klaipedos Nafta is hereby provided without prior reconciliation of such aid with the 
Commission. On this basis, it has been stated that the complaint concerning the compensation for 
damage, which the applicant derives from the potential infringement by the Lithuanian State 
(institutions), which occurred as a result of the LNG Terminal Law of 12th June, 2012, as well as the 
Decision of 19th October, 2012, and the Decision of 26th October, 2012, by the NRA, in the present 
case, by obliging it to pay the LNG Supplement from 1st January, 2013, could have been submitted by 
the applicant on 19th November, 2015, at the latest. The complaint was submitted to the Court by the 
applicant on 6th October 2016, i.e., upon an obvious failure to consider the limitation period that is 
determined in Article 1.125(8) CC for such complaints to be submitted.  
Comment:  
This is basically the first case in Lithuania where the occurrence of damage that it is requested be covered 
is associated with the submission of State aid which was not notified to the EC before it was granted. It 
should be noted that part of the LNG Supplement amount (€5,329,728.69) which is referred to by AB 
Achema as its damages, is awarded by a final court Decision. The Court of Cassation based its Decision 
to retain the Decisions of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, by which the amount of 
the LNG Supplement was awarded on, inter alia, the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12th 
February, 2008, Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) and Ministre de la Culture et de la 
Communication v Société internationale de diffusion et d’édition (SIDE), C-199/06, where the ECJ has, 
by interpreting Article 88(3) EC, clarified that the “last sentence of Article 88(3) EC is to be interpreted 
as meaning that the national court is not bound to order the recovery of aid implemented contrary to the 
provision where the Commission has adopted a final decision declaring that aid to be compatible with 
the common market, within the meaning of Article 87 EC. Within the framework of its domestic law, it 
may, if appropriate, also order the recovery of the unlawful aid, without prejudice to the Member State’s 
right to re-implement it, subsequently”. On the other hand, it is also important, in the context of the case 
for the compensation for damages, which has not yet been examined by the Court of Appeal, that “It 
may also be required to uphold claims for compensation for damage caused by reason of the unlawful 
nature of the aid”, and this was noted by the ECJ in the above-mentioned Decision. 
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8.2. Visan Doina (Court of Appeal of Bucharest) 
State aid scheme for partial exemption of electro-intensive industrial consumers from the payment 
for green certificates related to the mandatory quota, according to Law no. 220/2008, as amended 
and supplemented 
European Commission Decision C (2014) 7287 of October 15th, 2014. 
1. PROCEDURE 
(1) By an electronic notification validated on 2nd July 2014, registered at the Commission on the same 
date, the Romanian authorities notified the Commission of planned aid, in the form of reduced funding 
of support for electricity from renewable sources for energy-intensive users (EIUs). 
(2) Further to requests from the Commission, the Romanian authorities provided additional 
information on 14th August 2014, and 24th September 2014. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES CONCERNED 
The support system for promoting the production of electricity from renewable sources 
Law 220/2008 established a system for promoting the production of electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES), and this was approved by the Commission's decision on 13th July 2011, in Case 
SA.33134 (2011/N) (the "RES support scheme")1. The RES support scheme is a green certificate 
support system, under which eligible producers of electricity from RES (E-RES producers) receive a 
specific number of green certificates, depending on the technology used, for each MWh that is produced 
and delivered to the grid. An obligation is imposed on the electricity suppliers to purchase a mandatory 
quota of green certificates. 
Green certificates are granted monthly to E-RES producers by the Transmission System Operator 
(TSO). They can be traded on the green certificates market, and the validity of the green certificates 
granted to the producers is 12 months. The trading value of green certificates is determined by 
competitive mechanisms and can vary between the limits set out by the law: a) a minimum trading value 
of €27 per green certificate, and b) a maximum trading value of €55 per green certificate, which has 
been indexed annually since 2011. 
The Romanian Authority of Regulation in the field of Energy ("ANRE") issued the Methodology for 
the setting of the annual quota for green certificates acquisition (approved by ANRE Order No 45/2011) 
in accordance with Article 8(8) of Law 220/2008 republished. According to this methodology, the 
estimated annual mandatory green certificate quota represents the number of green certificates that a 
supplier is required to purchase for each MWh of electricity that he sells to end consumers (including 
that used for their own final consumption beyond their own technological consumption), and this is 
determined as the ratio between the total number of green certificates issued and the final electricity 
consumption in the year of analysis. 
Businesses wishing to receive the aid must submit an application for exemption approval for the aid 
scheme to the authority responsible (the Ministry of the Economy). The application must be 
accompanied by the documents on the basis of which it can be proved that all eligibility conditions are 
met, in accordance with the Annexe to the Government Decision. 
After evaluating the applications, which is to be completed within 30 working days from the date of 
filing the application, the Ministry of the Economy sends the applicants either the approval of the 
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exemption, or a notification stating that the application for exemption is incomplete, or else a letter 
rejecting the application. 
The Government of Romania issued Government Decision no. 495/2014 ("the Government 
Decision") for the establishment of a state aid scheme for the exemption of certain categories of final 
consumers from the application of Law no. 220/2008, thus establishing the system for the promotion of 
energy from renewable energy sources (the "notified measure"). 
Subject to judgment 
The complainant has sued the national authority in the field, namely, the Romanian Authority of 
Regulation for Energy (ANRE), for the annulment of ANRE Order no. 5 of February 26th, 2016, 
regarding the establishment of the mandatory quota for the acquisition of green certificates for the year 
2015, the obligation of the Defendant to pay damages (2,246,905.43 Lei) for non-payment of the state 
aid for January 2015, - May 2015. 
ANRE Order no. 5 of February 26th, 2016, was issued based on Government Decision no. 495/2014, 
subsequently amended by Government Decision no. 113/2016. 
The Claims of the complainant: 
The complainant is the beneficiary of Exemption Agreement no. 4 of June 3rd, 2015. 
According to this exemption agreement, the applicant is exempted from paying 85% of the number 
of green certificates that are related to the mandatory quota. 
Since the agreement was issued in early June 2015, between January and May 2015, the complainant 
paid the full amount for the green certificates. 
In relation to the provisions of Art. 8 Par. 6 of Law no. 220/2008, corroborated with the provisions 
of Government Decision no. 495/2014, /in the form approved prior to the amendment by Government 
Decision no. 113/2016, and the applicant was to regularize the value of the green certificates for 2015 
under this exemption until September 1st, 2016. 
Following the approval of Government Decision no. 113/2016 and the issuance of Order Authority 
of Regulation in the field of Energy (ANRE) no. 5/2016, the complainant was unable to carry out this 
adjustment. In this context, the material damages are in the amount of 2,246,905.43 Li. e 
Grounds of law: 
- The complainant sustains that the Order Authority for Regulation in the field of Energy No. 5/2016 
violates the rules of the domestic law: the Romanian Constitution of 2003. 
According to Art. 15 Par. 2 of the Romanian Constitution "The law only provides for the future, with 
the exception of the more favourable criminal or contravention law". 
It is obvious that any report/legal act born on the basis of the legal provisions that were in force in 
2015 cannot be subject to the new legal regulations that were adopted in 2016. In the present case, the 
Authority of Regulation in the field of Energy (ANRE) applied to legal relations that came into force in 
2015. 
- Applying the measures by a date other than December 1st, 2014, is contrary to Commission 
Decision C (2014) 7287 of October 15th, 2014: 
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On July 2nd, 2014, the Romanian authorities notified the European Commission that the state aid 
scheme for the partial exemption of electro-intensive industrial consumers from the green certificates 
related to the mandatory quota. As stated in the notification, the Romanian State mentions that it had 
planned the implementation of the measure as of August 1st, 2014 but confirmed that the measure would 
not be implemented before it was approved by the European Commission. 
Furthermore, the European Commission's decision expressly states that the draft Government 
Decision, transmitted on 24th September 2014, indicates that the measure would be implemented from 
December 1st, 2014.  
As early as 2014, the Romanian authorities were thus aware that the measure would be applied as 
from December 2014, and all the statistical calculations were submitted to the European Commission 
with a deadline of December 2014. Moreover, the European Commission's decision aims to approve the 
scheme for 10 years application, until December 3, 2024, which argues that the Romanian authorities 
were aware of the application of the aid scheme throughout 2015, and not from June 2015, when the 
first exemption agreements were issued. 
Against this background, the complainant considers that ANRE, in bad faith, did not take into 
account the estimated mandatory quota for the acquisition of green certificates for 2015, the aid scheme 
notified by the Romanian authorities and approved by the European Commission Decision C (2014) 
7287 of October 15, 2014, in their calculations. 
The amendment approved by GD no. 113/2016 obviously contradicts the Decision of the European 
Commission - which is directly and immediately applicable on the territory of Romania and it is not 
necessary to implement it), the state aid scheme being applicable for a period of 10 years starting on 
January 1st, 2015, and no later than this date. 
Claims of the Defendant: 
The state aid scheme that was approved by the European Commission, European Commission Decision 
C (2014) 7287 final of 15.10.2014, was drawn up in accordance with the criteria set out in the European 
Commission Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy for the Period 2014-
2020 (EEAG). 
In accordance with Art. 2 Par 1 of the Annexe to Government Decision no. 495/2014, in order to 
obtain the exemption agreement, the state aid applicant sends to the Ministry of the Economy a request 
for the issuing of the exemption agreement, together with a series of supporting documents. After 
obtaining the exemption agreement, according to Art. 3 Par. 2 of Government Decision no. 494/2014, 
the beneficiary of the state aid shall notify the exemption agreement to ANRE, as well as to its electricity 
supplier, with which it has concluded, or concludes, a sale purchase contract for electricity. 
Under the exemption agreement received from its client, the supplier is also exempt from the 
obligation to purchase a number of green certificates that is related to the amount of electricity delivered 
to its customers. who are the beneficiaries of the aid scheme covered by the government decision? 
Article 3, Par. 1 of Government Decision no. 495/2014, in its original form, provided that "the 
exemption provided for in Art. 1 Par. 1 of the Decision shall apply to the mandatory quota of green 
certificates that apply to energy suppliers notified by ANRE starting with the year in which the 
exemption agreement was obtained." 
As this provision leaves room for interpretation as to the moment when excuse arrangements begin 
to take effect, Art. 3 Par. 1 of Government Decision no. 495/2014 was modified by Government 
Decision no. 113/2016, for the purpose of deleting the phrase "from the year in which the exemption 
agreement was obtained," and the introduction of a clarification that the exemption measure provided 
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for in Art. 8 par. 2 of Law no. 220/2008, shall apply from the date of issue of the exemption agreement 
obtained by the beneficiaries of the state aid.” 
This amendment gives further clarification on the application of the state aid scheme that was 
established by Government Decision no. 495/2014, does not contravene State aid rules and does not 
alter the Commission's decision. 
In support of this statement, it is stated GEO no. 77/2014 that the date of granting of State aid is the 
date on which the statutory right to receive State aid is conferred on the beneficiary in accordance with 
the applicable national legal system, irrespective of the date on which the aid is paid to that company. 
Under a State aid scheme that is in force on a given date, aid applicants will be selected to benefit from 
State aid only after verification by the supplier authority of the fulfilment of all the eligibility conditions 
that are required by the scheme and certified/confirmed by the financing agreement (in the case under 
consideration, the exemption agreement). The financing agreement is the act that confers on the 
beneficiary the legal right to receive state aid and this can be invoked before the National Courts. 
Conclusions: 
The Romanian authorities have known since 2014 the measure that was to be applied, beginning in 
December, 2014, as all the statistical calculations submitted to the European Commission had, as their 
deadline for beginning the month of December, 2014. Moreover, the decision of the European 
Commission aims to approve the plan with an application for 10 years, until December 31st, 2024, which 
indicates that the Romanian authorities knew about the application of the aid plan throughout 2015, and 
not only from June, 2015, when the first exception agreements were issued. 
In this context, ANRE (the Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority) considered, in the calculation 
of the mandatory estimated share of the purchase of green certificates for 2015, the aid plan notified by 
the Romanian authorities, and approved by Decision of the European Commission C (2014) 7287 of 
October 15th, 2014. 
According to the Decision of the European Commission C (2014) 7287 of October 15th, 2014, in the 
draft government’s decision submitted by Romania on September 24th, 2014, it was stated that the 
measure would be applied from December 1st, 2014. Romania thus bound itself before the European 
Commission to apply the measures that the Romanian state itself notified.  
Following the decision of the European Commission not to raise any objections concerning the aid, 
considering that it is compatible with, and justified in, the domestic market, and on December 1st, 2014, 
Government Decision no. 495/2014 entered into force, instituting a State aid plan concerning the 
exception of certain categories of final consumers from applying the Law no. 220/2008, establishing the 
system that promotes the generation of energy from renewable sources. According to the provisions of 
this decision, the exception applies from January 1st of the year when the exception agreement was 
issued.  
Immediately after adopting Government Decision 495/2014, on December 3rd, 2014, the Plaintiff 
TMK-RESITA filed the petition of exception. 
In reference to the provisions of Art. 3 Para. (5) of the Procedure for the issuance of the exception 
agreement of June 11th, 2014, annexed to Government Decision no. 495/2014, the unit implementing 
the State aid plan had the obligation to complete the process of evaluation of the exception petition 
within a maximum of 30 working days after its registration. This obligation has not been observed by 
the implementation unit which is constituted at the level of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Tourism. The exception agreement of the Plaintiff, TMK-Resita no. 4, was issued on June 3rd, 2015, 
approximately 5 months after the date when it was supposed to be issued (namely, January 3rd, 2015), 
failing to satisfy the 30-days deadline, which is stipulated in the Decision of the European Commission, 
the Plaintiff could thus not be held liable.  
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The exception agreement was issued to the Plaintiff on June 3rd, 2015, when Government Decision 
no. 495/2014 was in force. 
According to the legal provisions that were in force on that date, respectively, the provisions of Art. 
3 of Government Decision no. 495/2014 (in the previous form, before the amendment that was approved 
by Government Decision no. 113/2016): 
“The exception stipulated in Art. 1 Para. (1) applies to the mandatory purchase share of green 
certificates that applies to energy providers, communicated by The Romanian Authority of Regulation 
in the field of Energy (ANRE), beginning from the year when the exception agreement was obtained. 
The said exception does not affect the calculation relating to the satisfaction of the national goal 
stipulated in Art. 5 Para. (1) of Law no. 220/2008, republished, with the subsequent amendments and 
additions, for the gross final consumption of energy in the year 2020.” 
The exception thus had to be applied from January 1, 2015, (when the agreement should have been 
issued anyway, the date when we consider it to have been issued following the application of the tacit 
approval procedure) and not from the date when the exception agreement was obtained.  
However, on February 24th, 2016, the Government of Romania approved Government Decision no. 
113/2016, modifying paragraph (1) of Art. 3 of Government Decision no. 495/2014, as follows: 
“The exception from the provisions of Art. 8 Para. (2) of Law no. 220/2008, republished, with the 
subsequent amendments and additions, applies from the issuance date of the exception agreement 
obtained by State aid beneficiaries. The said exception does not affect the calculation related to the 
reaching of the national goal that is stipulated in Art. 5 Para. (1) of Law no. 220/2008, republished, 
with the subsequent amendments and additions, in the final gross consumption of energy in 2020.” 
In reference to the principles of law established and approved by the Constitution of Romania, and by 
the Civil Code, this amendment must not apply retroactively to exception agreements that were issued 
before the publishing and enforcement of this amendment. 
By the Civil Decision no. 2558/23.06.2017 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, the action was 
admitted, the cancellation of ANRE Order no. 5, of February 26th, 2016, was admitted, concerning the 
determination of the mandatory share of green certificate purchasing, relative to 2015, issued based on 
Government Decision no. 495/2014, as amended by Government Decision 113/2015); the respondent 
was ordered to pay material damages of 2,246,905.43 Lei. The decision is subject to appeal at the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice. 
Considerations: 
- The principle of the non-retroactivity of the law was breached. 
Order 5 breaches the provisions of the 2003 Constitution of Romania. 
Article 15 Para. (2) of the 2003 Constitution of Romania orders, without any doubt, that: 
“The law orders only for the future, except in relation to the more favourable criminal or 
contravention law.” 
These provisions represent the principle of the non-retroactivity of the law, which is essential to protect 
the citizens/taxpayers’ rights before the law, and any potential abuses of the lawmaker. There would be 
no security if, as long as a law is in force, and they comply with its provisions, the acts concluded in 
compliance with the legal provisions may be discussed after its repealing. 
The Plaintiff should have been subject to the application of the provisions of GD no. 495/2014, 
unchanged, which was in force on the issuance of the exception agreement, namely, that the exception 
should have been granted beginning from the year when the exception agreement was obtained, and not 
from the provisions of Government Decision no. 495/2014, amended by Government Decision no. 
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113/2016, upon which the Order of the Respondent, The Romanian Authority of Regulation in the field 
of Energy (ANRE), no. 5/26.02.2016 was issued, stipulating that the granting of the exception applies 
beginning from the issuing of the exception agreement obtained by State aid beneficiaries, respectively, 
June 3rd, 2015, as regards the Plaintiff.  
- The application of measures beginning with another date, and not with December 1st, 2014, 
breaches the decision of the European Commission C (2014) 7287 of October 15th, 2014:  
On July 2nd, 2014, the Romanian authorities notified the European Commission about the State aid 
plan relating to the partial exception of electrically-intensive industrial consumers from the payment for 
green certificates related to the mandatory share. According to the specifications in this notice, the 
Romanian state mentions having planned to apply the measure beginning from August 1st, 2014, but it 
confirmed that the measure would not be applied before being approved by the European Commission. 
Moreover, the decision of the European Commission expressly stipulates that the draft government’s 
decision, sent on September 24th, 2014, indicates the measure that should be applied starting from 
December 1st, 2014. 
The Romanian authorities had thus known since 2014 the measure that was to be applied starting 
from December, 2014, as all the statistical calculations submitted to the European Commission had as 
their starting date the month of December, 2014. Moreover, the decision of the European Commission 
aims to approve the plan with application for 10 years, until December 31st, 2024, which indicates that 
the Romanian authorities knew about the application of the aid plan throughout 2015, and not starting 
from June, 2015, when the first exception agreements were issued. 
As regards the Decisions ordering the member States to grant certain rights to their citizens, the CJEU 
admits, with direct effects, that: ”it would be incompatible with the mandatory effect given to decisions, 
according to Art. 189 TCEE, to be excluded – in principle – that the affected persons may claim the 
obligation set by the Decision. Particularly, in the events when, for instance, the community authorities 
– by decision – order a member state, or all member states, to have a certain behaviour, the useful effect 
of such a measure would be reduced if members of that State could not claim it before the Court and if 
the State Courts could not consider them part of the community law”. 
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9.1. Stefania Grasselli (Court of Cremona) 
AIR COMPETITION 
A) JURISPRUDENCE 
Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, Decrees 2009, n. 223, 224 e 225; 
Constitutional Court, judgment 22nd July 2010, n. 270 
Commission Decision 2009/155/EC of 12th November 2008, No C 26/08 
C-287/12 P - Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) 28th March 2012 - Case T-123/09 
B) THE FACTS OF THE DISPUTE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
By three 2009 decrees the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio raised the question of constitutional 
legitimacy in relation to Art. 4, Par. 4 quinquies of the decree-law 23rd December, 2003, n. 347, which 
was converted by the law of the 18th February, 2004, n. 39, which was introduced by Art. 1, Par. 10, of 
the decree-law of the 28th August, 2008, n. 134 (“Urgent measures for the restructuring of large 
undertakings in crisis”), according to Arts. 3 and 41 of the Italian Constitution. 
According to Art. 4, Para. 4 quinquies, the procedures of business concentration in the field of 
essential public services, made before 30th July, 2009, that are connected or concomitant, or that are 
planned in the programme authorized by the Art. 2, Par. 2, legislative decree n. 347/2003, or in the 
authorization by Art. 5, Par. 1, of the same legislative decree, pursuing the prevalent general interests, 
don’t need authorization by the law of the 10th October, 1990, n. 287. Furthermore, the parties must 
notify the National Competition Authority which business concentrations fall within their competence, 
together with the proposed measures of appropriate conduct to prevent the risk of price imposition or of 
other unjustifiable burdensome conditions for consumers. The Authority, acting on its own motion, 
within 30 days of the communication, shall prescribe the abovementioned measures, with the 
modifications and additions deemed necessary, establishing a term, not less than three years, within 
which any monopoly positions, which may have been determined, must cease.  
Actually, the rule is applicable only to the case of the Alitalia - Air One concentration, which is 
provided for by a derogation from the rules contained in Arts. 6 and 16 of Law no. 287 of 1990 on 
business concentrations. According to this rule, if the concentration operation is higher than certain 
thresholds, then this must be notified in advance to that Authority; the Authority has the power to 
prohibit them (or to authorize them by imposing the requisite provisions) if their effect is creating or 
strengthening a dominant position on the national market. 
In application of this regulation, following the notification by Alitalia concerning the acquisition of 
certain branches of Alitalia and Air One, the Competition Authority adopted measures to prevent the 
imposition of price rises or of other unjustifiable burdensome conditions for consumers, and fixed for 
3rd December 2011, the deadline within which any monopoly positions that are possibly determined 
would have to cease. 
This measure was challenged before the Regional Administrative Court (T.A.R.) of Lazio by two 
airline companies (Eurofly s.p.a. and Meridiana s.p.a.), as well as by the Federconsumatori-National 
Federation of Consumers and Users, who had pleaded, inter alia, for its unlawfulness, which resulted 
from the constitutional illegitimacy of the aforementioned Art. 4, Paragraph 4-quinquies, which, in their 
view, conflicted with Arts. 3 and 41 Cost. 
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The T.A.R. of Lazio had raised the question of legality, first of all indicating that it is a “normative 
measure”, since it has limited scope and was issued with reference to the Alitalia case, so that the decree 
containing the rule is commonly known as the "Alitalia decree".  
The Court considered the issue to be unfounded. 
C) THE RULING OF THE COURT 
C.1 By Judgment no. 270/2010, the Constitutional Court argues that the regulation censured is a 
“normative measure”, because it regulates only the main proceedings, as evidenced by both the temporal 
limit and the conditions of its applicability, and the time coincidence between its approval and its entry 
into force. The Court has therefore recalled its case-law, according to which the nature of a “normative 
measure” does not affect the legitimacy of the rule in itself, since ordinary law may attract into its sphere 
of discipline objects or subjects that/who are normally entrusted to the administrative authority, but it 
implies that the rule is subject to a close scrutiny of constitutionality, with particular reference to respect 
for the principles of reasonability and non-arbitrariness. 
The Court then reiterated its guidelines on the freedom of competition, recalling that it was regarded 
as a manifestation of the freedom of the private economic initiative - which, according to the second 
and third paragraphs of Article .41 Cost, is susceptible to limitations that are justified for reasons of 
“social utility” and “social ends”. Freedom of the economic initiative and competition do not receive 
"absolute" protection from Art. 41 Cost, subject to the limitations that are necessary to allow the 
contextual satisfaction of other constitutionally relevant interests. More specifically, it stated that Art. 
41 Cost,  
"by stating that private economic initiative cannot contradict the “social utility” and lead to harm 
to human security, freedom and dignity, and foresee that public and private economic activity can 
be addressed and coordinated to "social ends", it allows for instrumental regulation to ensure the 
protection of interests other than those related to the competitive position of the guaranteed market."  
Although that regulation is derogatory and exceptional in relation to the rule laid down by the 
fundamental Community principles, so that 'the internal market within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Treaty of the European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted '(Protocol No 
27 on the internal market and competition annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1st 
December, 2009, confirming the (3) (g) of the EC Treaty). 
According to those principles and to the relevant regulatory framework, the Court held that Article. 
4, Paragraph 4-quinquies is constitutionally legitimate. 
The Court stated, in that regard, that the rules of concentration control established by Law no. 287 
of 1990 constitutes the application of Art. 41 Cost but is not constitutionally constrained and the 
legislator can provide for the possibility of authorizing business concentration operations to be 
reconciled with other constitutionally relevant interests, other than those relating to the competitive 
position of the market. 
In the present case, the legislature intervened with a measure of law, but, in the Court's view, there 
are identifiable pre-eminent interests that are capable of justifying it and that express a proportionate 
and appropriate choice. In fact, the legislature intended to cope with the crisis in a company with an 
essential public service whose continuity, in the air transport sector, was of strategic importance for the 
national economy. It is therefore justified in the interests of the protection of pre-eminent general 
interests such as the need to ensure the continuity of the air transport service on all national routes 
(including those which are not economically feasible) and the need to avoid the dissolution of an 
undertaking of significant size and the dispersal of business value, with a risk of a serious employment 
crisis. 
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Having thus identified the general interests arising from the broad spectrum of clauses on "social 
utility" and "social ends" of Art. 41 Costs, which justify the legislative choice, the Court noted that the 
solution that was designed to guarantee them was proportionate. In particular, it found it particularly 
significant that the aforementioned Art. 4, Para. 4-quinquies has kept the Arts. 2 and 3 of the Antitrust 
Law and, hence, the Authority's power to strike, ex post, the possible abuse of a dominant position 
following concentration. Above all – according to the guidelines of the European Commission - the 
Court considered the attention of the legislator to the interest of consumers extremely important, while 
maintaining the power of the Authority to establish the appropriate behavioral measures to guarantee it, 
exercising continuous control, adopting them at different times, modulating them in a variety of ways, 
even temporarily, and taking into account the evolution of the market and its impact on consumer 
interests. Finally, the Court pointed out that Art. 4, Para. 4-quinquies, has attributed to the Authority the 
power to define "the term, however not less than three years, within which any monopoly positions 
which may have been determined must cease" and that the transitional nature of the derogation from the 
power of the authority to imposing certain measures is to exclude the unreasonability of the rule and the 
breach of Arts. 3 and 41, Cost. 
C.2 The European Commission also dealt with the issue of State aid to Alitalia before, and by, the 
CGUE, then, with regard to the funding granted by the Italian Republic of € 300,000.000 to ensure that 
the public service element of air transport continues. 
On 29th April 2008, the applicant, Ryanair Ltd., lodged a complaint with the Commission under 
Article 20(2) of Regulation No 659/1999, concerning the existence of state aid for Alitalia in the form 
of a loan granted by the Italian authorities to the latter. 
By the Commission Decision 2009/155/EC of 12th November, 2008, on the loan of €300 million 
granted by Italy to Alitalia, No C 26/08 (ex NN 31/08) (OJ 2009 L 52, p. 3: ‘the first contested decision’), 
which was adopted at the conclusion of the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC, the 
Commission stated that the said loan, the amount of which could be counted as Alitalia’s own capital, 
constituted unlawful state aid that was incompatible with the Common Market, and ordered its recovery 
from the beneficiary. 
By Decision C(2008) 6745 final, of 12th November, 2008, concerning state aid N 510/2008 — Italy 
— the sale of assets of the airline Alitalia (‘the second contested decision’), was adopted at the 
conclusion of a preliminary examination phase, and, pursuant to Article 88(3) EC, the Commission 
stated that the notified measure, as amended by the undertakings given by the Italian authorities and 
defined in that decision, did not involve the granting of state aid to the buyers, subject to full compliance 
with those undertakings by the Italian Republic, according to which the sale of the assets of the Alitalia 
group would be carried out at their market value. 
Finally, the Commission decided that the notified measure, as amended by the undertakings given 
by the Italian authorities, did not constitute aid, to the extent that those undertakings were complied with 
in full. 
By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 28th March, 2009, the applicant, 
Ryanair Ltd., brought the action against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 28th 
March, 2012, in Case T-123/09 Ryanair v Commission, by which the General Court dismissed an action 
seeking, first, the annulment in part of Commission Decision C(2008) 6743 of 12th November, 2008, 
on the loan of €300 million granted by Italy to Alitalia (Aid No C 26/08) (ex NN 31/08) (OJ 2009 L 52, 
p. 3), in so far as that decision did not order the recovery of the aid from Alitalia’s successors, and, 
second, the annulment of Commission Decision C(2008) 6745 final of 12th November, 2008, declaring 
that the procedure for selling off the assets of the Alitalia airline company, in the context of the 
extraordinary administrative procedure that was set up to lead to the liquidation of that airline, did not 
constitute State aid, provided that the Italian authorities respected their commitments to ensure that the 
transactions would be carried out at the market price (Aid N 510/2008). 
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D) COMMENT 
In my opinion, the most important aspect of the Alitalia-case is that even though there is a regulation, 
either national or European, which seems to be very restrictive of competition freedom, it has to apply 
to the specific case-law, according to the general clauses of social utility and social ends. 
The preeminent general interests have to guide the specific choice of the national legislator, under 
the major rules established by the European Union. 
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9.2. Josef Franz Weinzierl (District Court of Regensburg) 
District Court Kiel – Partial Judgment of 28th July, 2006 - 14 O Kart 176/04 
Higher Regional Court Schleswig - Judgment of 20th May, 2008 - 6 U 54/06 
Federal Court of Justice - Judgment of 10th February, 2011 - I ZR 213/08  
ECJ – Order of 4th April, 2014 - C-27/13 
Higher Regional Court Schleswig – Judgment of 8th April, 2015 - 6 U 54/06 
Federal Court of Justice – Judgment of 9th February, 2017 – I ZR 91/15 – Airport Lübeck 
Background 
A long judicial battle in a state aid case involving the German regional airport at Lübeck found an – 
albeit preliminary – end in the highlighted judgment by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), dating from 
9th February, 2017. A brief glance at the above list of the individual procedural stages in this case would 
suffice to cause us to guess the complexity surrounding this dispute. However, one has to add that, in 
parallel, the European Commission has been investigating this case since July, 2007, as well, failing to 
arrive at a decision to close the formal investigation procedure according to Art. 9 Regulation (EU) 
2015/1589 (final decision) until the very week in which the judgment was handed down (in a press 
release from 7th February, 2017, the European Commission stated that the measures concerned did not 
constitute state aid). This combination of national and European procedures is responsible for the 
importance of the case at hand, since it adds yet another layer to the interplay between the European and 
the national regulatory level, which the specific structure of Art. 107 et seqq. TFEU exemplifies in so 
many ways. Furthermore, due to the involvement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) via the 
preliminary reference procedure, according to Art. 267 TFEU, this case serves as an illuminating 
example of how national courts can deal with answers from Luxembourg, and thus enable a fruitful 
judicial dialogue. 
From a factual point of view, the present proceedings do not constitute an isolated case. On the 
contrary, the present dispute, in which an airline sued the regional airport of Lübeck for violating state 
aid rules by favoring a competing airline through offering benefits to attract the airline to its airport, has 
been a prominent scenario in recent years (see, for example, ECJ, C-284/12, EU:C:2013:755, 
Lufthansa/Ryanair, or, in another interesting scenario, ECJ, C-164/15 P, EU:C:2016:990, European 
Commission/AerLingus). The economic reason for this is that most of the small regional airports can 
only be sustained with considerable financial support from local state governments, who see them as a 
prestige project and, more importantly, as a valuable employer in traditionally less prosperous areas. 
Both airports and the respective local state governments therefore have an incentive to attract important 
airlines. 
The facts of the dispute 
The core substantive issue in these proceedings is whether the regional airport of Lübeck, Northern 
Germany, granted illegal state aid to Ryanair. According to the Plaintiff, the German airline, Air Berlin, 
the airport entered into an agreement with Ryanair, dating from 29th May, 2000, which included state 
aid measures through payments, discounts, and other benefits, in order to attract the airline to the 
regional airport. The airport was operated by the private company Flughafen Lübeck GmbH” which, 
in fact, was fully controlled by the City of Lübeck at the time. Hence, the alleged benefits would 
constitute state resources. The Plaintiff sought information about the concrete benefits, as well as their 
recovery and future refraining from such benefits, once their scope was known. 
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Summary of the Judicial Proceedings 
The Plaintiff was granted the right to information by the Regional Court Kiel in 2006, which was 
followed by the initiation of a formal state aid procedure by the European Commission in 2007. The 
Higher Regional Court Schleswig subsequently annulled the First instance Judgment, arguing that there 
was no legal basis for such a claim to information. Following the appeal, the BGH, in 2011, annulled 
the judgment and referred the case back. The Higher Regional Court Schleswig subsequently decided 
to ask the European Commission for a statement under what would now be Art. 29 Para. 1 Reg. (EU) 
2015/1589, regarding its decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure (initial decision), where 
the European Commission held that – prima facie – the agreement at hand contained state aid elements. 
The Higher Regional Court Schleswig, in 2013, stayed its proceedings and asked the ECJ for guidance 
via the preliminary reference procedure under Art. 267 TFEU. The ECJ’s answer came by way of an 
order in 2014 and, consequently, in 2015, the Higher Regional Court Schleswig rejected the Defendant’s 
appeal. The present judgment, prompted by the intervenor’s (Ryanair) appeal, was issued on 9th 
February, 2017, and referred the case back to the Regional Court Kiel, however, not without giving 
interesting and important guidance with regard to the procedural state aid issues at stake. 
Ruling of the BGH 
As indicated above, the relevant point to be drawn from this BGH judgment, from a state aid law 
perspective, does not stem from a final substantive decision on the legality of the alleged aid, or the 
possible private enforcement measures granted to the competitor, but from the Court’s comments on the 
interplay between national and European procedural law. 
The following answers were given by the ECJ to the Higher Regional Court Schleswig with regard 
to the procedural questions, and it seems necessary, for a sound understanding of the BGH’s comments, 
to highlight them here: 
“Where, by application of Article 108(3) TFEU, the European Commission has opened the formal 
investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU with regard to a non-notified measure 
currently being implemented, a national court, hearing an application for the cessation of the 
implementation of that measure and the recovery of the sums already paid, is required to adopt all 
the measures necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions from any breach of the obligation to 
suspend the implementation of that measure. 
To that end, the national court may decide either to suspend the implementation of the measure at 
issue and order the recovery of the sums already paid or to order interim measures in order to 
safeguard, firstly, the interests of the parties concerned and, secondly, the effectiveness of the 
Commission’s decision to open the formal investigation procedure. 
A national court cannot, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, stay the 
proceedings until the closure of the formal investigation procedure.” 
Reacting to this, the BGH stated that according to the ECJ, the National Court would not be allowed to 
take the view that a measure does not constitute state aid once the European Commission, in its initial 
decision, has come to the conclusion that the measure contained state aid elements. Based on this, the 
BGH then clarified its previous case law, ruling that National Courts are bound by the initial decision 
of the European Commission and are not free to interpret the state aid rules themselves until a final 
decision is reached by the European Commission (Para. 40 of the judgment). 
However, contrary to the Higher Regional Court Schleswig, the BGH did not accept this outcome 
unconditionally – arguably deviating from the ECJ’s ruling – but reasoned: 
- It would presumably be contrary to the judicial independence of the national judge to hold that he 
or she is bound by a preliminary decision by an administrative authority like the European 
Commission (Paras. 38, 41) 
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- The national court may ask the European Commission for further clarification (Art. 29 (1) Reg. 
(EU) 2015/1589) or file a preliminary reference to the ECJ under Art. 267 TFEU (para. 40) 
- There can be changes to the situation in the national proceedings after the European Commission’s 
initial decision, for example, caused by new submissions by the parties which have to be taken into 
account due to the guarantees of inter alia Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Para. 42) 
- The ordering of a recovery has to be in accordance with the principle of proportionality, Art. 5 
TEU (Para. 50), which would be doubtful in a case where the national judge orders recovery of the 
alleged aid with nothing but an initial European Commission decision being available (Paras. 50-
55). 
Comment 
The relevance of the case is obvious if one draws attention to the BGH’s struggles to comply with the 
requirements set by the ECJ, on the one hand, and not to give up the judicial independence of the national 
judge, on the other. It thus serves as yet another example of the vast implications of a European 
Commission decision to initiate state aid proceedings (without yet having any substantive assessment) 
for National Courts which might even cause friction with vital principles such as judicial independence. 
The ECJ’s reasoning is rather straight forward and follows a logic like that of the seminal Foto-Frost 
case (ECJ, C-314/85, ECLI: EU: C:1987:452): once a National Court doubts the compatibility of a 
national measure with EU law – in our case, the state aid rules – it is bound by virtue of EU law and 
especially the duty of sincere cooperation that is now enshrined in Art. 4 (3) TEU, to do anything in 
order to ensure compliance with EU law, especially to ask the competent EU bodies, like the European 
Commission and the ECJ, for guidance. Furthermore, it must not allow an infringement of EU law to 
materialize, let alone to be perpetuated. 
The BGH, however, sees the practical difficulties with such an abstract statement from Luxembourg. 
The Court reasons that the duty of sincere cooperation is mutual (Art. 4 (3) TEU: “…the Union and the 
Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties”) and cannot hide its irritation about the length of the European Commission’s state aid 
procedure, where no final decision has been reached after almost ten years. It made quite clear that a 
National Court must be allowed some leeway to deal with unusual cases, in order not to violate 
fundamental principles of law, such as proportionality (although, in my opinion, wrongly quoting Art. 
5 TEU, which is only relevant to vertical competence delimitation) for example, if the only measure 
available to the national judge were immediate recovery of the aid. The Court rightly notes that, under 
certain circumstances, such a recovery may lead to nothing other than the insolvency of the undertaking 
concerned. It has also to be noted again that, at this stage, as opposed to the situation after the European 
Commission’s final decision on the aid measure, it is not clear whether the measure constitutes state aid 
at all. From a pragmatic perspective, the BGH’s reasoning is convincing, as the Court pointed out in 
great detail the conditions under which deviations from an initial assessment by the European 
Commission might occur at later stages and provided some options for National Courts who might be 
confronted with such a scenario in future state aid cases. The judgment should thus neither be seen as 
an attack on the ECJ’s position, nor on the uniform application of EU law, but, rather, as an 
argumentative approach that is keen to reconcile all the legal requirements and principals involved. 
Overall, this judgment shows the intricacies and procedural difficulties of the seemingly clear 
separation of tasks between the European Commission and the National Courts when it comes to 
implementing the European state aid law regime. The preliminary reference procedure to the ECJ, 
according to Art. 267 TFEU, once more in the European integration, seems to be a useful tool to help in 
organizing smooth cooperation between the European and the national judiciary, and to further develop 
this sensitive area of law.  
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9.3. Gianmario Palligiano (Regional Administrative Court of Campania) 
Introduction 
The case concerns the matter of state aid law. The issue was addressed by the Regional Administrative 
Court of Lazio, Rome, with Judgment no. 4442 of April 11th, 2017 (Lgv S.r.l vs Ministero delle 
Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti) 
The case 
1.- The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (Decree no. 307 of July, 2014) provided a substantial 
sum of money to the car industry. The purpose was to encourage the modernization of the fleet of road 
haulage companies in accordance with the requirements for registration with the National Electronic 
Register and the Carrier Roads Act on behalf of third parties according to the regulations in force. 
2.- On February 2nd, 2014, the Claimant, L.G.V. Company, asked the Italian Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport for admission to the incentives referred to in the D.M. 3rd July, 2014, n. 
307, with the relevant documentation, for the purchase of 12 semitrailers.  
On 15th July, 2015, the Department of Transport observed that L.G.V. had initiated the investment 
prior to the publication of the notice, as a result of the "purchase order containing binding commitments 
for the seller and buyer no. 4 of 4th September, 2014 ". 
This circumstance seemed to contradict Article 2, Paragraph 4, D.M. 307/2014, according to which: 
"investments may be funded as long as they are launched from the date of publication of this decree (D. 
307/2014 was published in the Official Journal - General Series 218 of 19th September, 2014)." 
On 16th July, 2015, L.G.V. Company, by certified mail, replied that the investment would take place 
on 18th November, 2014, with the subscription of the leasing contracts that were necessary for the 
purchase of the 12 semi-trailers.  
The LGV Issue 
Against the decision of the Ministry, LGV appealed to the Administrative Court of First Instance in 
Rome. 
The company argued that the Ministry was wrong to hold that document n. 4 of 4th September, 2014, 
was a purchase order, as it would be a quotation, which would have no legal value. 
The estimated cost was insufficient to force the client, as in the contract proposals, to be legally 
effective and binding it, must be accepted by the customer who requested it. Only after acceptance of 
the contract proposal by the customer can the contract be concluded between the parties 
The quote attached to the application for admission will indicate the subscription only of the seller 
and not also that of the buyer, so the start of the investment will coincide with subscription to the 
individual leasing contracts on 18th November, 2014, subsequent to the publication of the notice. 
The department issue 
The Ministry replied that the D.M. was published on 19th September, 2014, and the applicant's 
investment was launched on 4th September, 2014, as can be seen from the document annexed by the 
Administration. 
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This act constitutes a real contract and not merely a proposal, as the applicant claims, by presenting 
all the criteria of a sales contract:  
- the contract must be signed by both the seller and the buyer.  
- the subject matter is explicitly referred to as a sales contract, the same has a certain date and 
describes the goods that are being traded (semi-trailers) as well as the purchase price.  
The decision of the Administrative Court 
The subsequent payment by means of a financial lease (contrary to the applicant's claim) is irrelevant, 
since the investment had already been agreed upon in all its essential elements before the expiration of 
the ministerial decree in question. 
The leasing contract is an instrument for the execution of contractual commitments as an alternative 
to direct payment by the buyer, as such, it is a non-incident on the determination of the investment by 
the company. At the time of the submission of the application for the contribution, the Ministerial decree 
requires a simple indication of payment methods (direct acquisition or financial leasing). 
European Union reference framework 
Article 107 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU- ex Art. 87 TCE) lays 
down conditions in order to permit state aid in the sense given by European Union law at that time.  
The four required conditions are as follows: 
- State aid origin (state aid or state resources); 
- The existence of an advantage in favor of certain undertakings or productions; 
- The existence of an impact on competition; 
- The ability to affect trade between Member States. 
Relationship between entrepreneurial initiative and state aid 
According to the European Union state aid rules, the Member States of the Union have to first check the 
existence of the INCENTIVE EFFECT. 
Economic operators must therefore be required to make the investments themselves in order to obtain 
the financial benefits provided for in the Decree, without which they would not have decided to carry 
out the investments themselves. 
In order to verify the incentive effect, the date on which the aid scheme was published becomes 
relevant, so that only in relation to the publication date is it possible to verify that the interested parties 
are aware of the existence of the incentive measure. The date on which the economic operation was 
carried out, and hence whether the investment would be made irrespective of the possibility of receiving 
a financial contribution.  
If the decision to make a particular investment were taken before the measure was made known (in 
this case, before the publication of the Minister’s Decree in the Official Journal), the prospect of 
receiving a contribution cannot be considered to be a decisive factor in the entrepreneurial initiative, 
which therefore does not seem deserving of being promoted from the Community perspective. 
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10.1. Guido Federico (Italian Supreme Court) 
Cass. civile 10.8.2016 n.16871, Marras v. Regione Sardegna. 
I. The facts of the dispute 
Saverio Marras was an “agricultural entrepreneur” and in this quality he took out a mortgage with an 
Italian bank, the Banco di Sardegna. The mortgage’s interest rate was partly subsidized by the Regione 
Sardegna. 
The European Commission found that these kinds of mortgages, with cut rates granted by Regione 
Sardegna breached Art. 107, 108 TFEU. 
The Regione Sardegna, giving effect to the Commission’s decision, suspended the subsidy pro futuro 
and ordered the recovery of the grant aid already given. 
As a consequence, Mr. Marras had to renegotiate the debt with the bank and they stipulated a new 
mortgage to return the capital and the interest paid. 
II. The judicial proceedings 
Mr. Marras sued the Regione Sardegna before the Italian judiciary for non-contractual liability. 
Allegedly, he had relied on the lawfulness of the Regione Sardegna’s behaviour. He added that he 
would have not taken on the mortgage without the possibility of relying on the subsidized interest rate. 
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal rejected Marras’ claim. 
He turned to the Supreme Court of Italy, presenting his appeal on points of law only. The Court 
confirmed the upholding of the Lower Courts’ findings.  
III. Ruling of the Court 
The two grounds for the appeal are 1) the liability of the Member State under the Francovich/Brasserie 
du Pecheur Doctrine and 2) Art. 2043 
1) The Supreme Court started by recalling that it is well established in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice that the breach of European law by a Member State may entail liability in the domestic 
legal system.  
The National Court must check that: 
There is a breach of a European law provision, the latter being established to protect the rights of the 
party claiming compensation; 
That the breach is evident and serious; 
That there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage. 
The Supreme Court ruled that, in the case at hand, the condition under a) was missing. 
Arts. 107 and 108 TFEU are consistently interpreted as means to protect the competitive conditions 
in the market, and not those of the beneficiaries. 
It is abstractly possible to identify a damaged third party, but this could be the competitor of the 
beneficiary, and not the beneficiary themselves. 
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2) As far as Art. 2043 c.c. is concerned, the provision which governs tort liability under Italian law 
(the principle of “neminen laedere”), the claim was not upheld. 
The claim was based on the breach of the beneficiary’s legitimate interests because he had relied on 
lawful state conduct. 
The Court rejected the Claimant’s appeal on two grounds. 
First, the principle of legitimate expectations lies in the procedural part of the state aid control regime 
and not in the substantive one. This entails that the undertaking cannot generally rely on a Member 
State’s lawful conduct, rather, it can rely on the respect of the procedure ex Art. 108 TFEU and, in 
particular, the duty to notify The Commission.  
Secondly, the doctrine of contributory negligence was recalled. 
The diligent economic operator is bound to self-assess that Arts. 107/108 TFEU are not breached 
when conducting business.  
IV. Comment 
I think that The Court’s holding is legally sound and compatible, both when it is applied to European 
law and the Italian one, since:  
a) As far as the Francovich doctrine is concerned, it is hard to see how Arts. 107 and 108 could be 
interpreted as means of protection for the beneficiary. It is the market and the competitors which are 
relevant. 
b) As far as Art. 2043 c.c. is concerned, it is necessary that the damage is “unjust”, meaning that there 
must be a right, in relation to the damaged party, that has been violated. 
c) Clearly, in this case, there was no right that could be relied upon by the beneficiary. 
Finally, the undertaking cannot overlook its duty to self-assess its behaviour in light of all the 
applicable legislation, including European law. It is reasonable to ask businesses to act in an 
informed way. 
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10.2. Sarolta Huszárné Czap (Hungarian National Office of the Judiciary) 
Case note on judgment of the Hungarian Curia (Supreme Court) No. Kfv.III.37.202/2013/10. 
Subject: qualification of the “marketing authorization contribution” on wine distribution – application 
of the case law of CJEU relating to Arts. 107, 108 and 110 TFEU  
Parties:  
 
Claimant a Hungarian Company for wine distribution ( Company) 
Defendant National Food Safety Authority (Authority) 
Facts and dispute: 
The Authority obliged the Company to pay HUF 5.583.252 (€18.000) as a marketing authorization 
contribution and the same amount as a default penalty, since there was a difference between the data of 
the customs authority and the amount of wine distributed by the Company between 01.08.2008 and 
31.07.2009. 
The Company turned to the Court and asked the Court to lay down that the payment of the marketing 
authorization contribution do not conform to Arts. 28, 30, 107, 108 and 110 TFEU.  
Legal background: 
Hungarian Act No. XVIII. of 2004 defines the “marketing authorization contribution” (the Wine Act) 
§ 24/A (3) “On the territory of Hungary the producer shall be obliged to pay a marketing 
authorization contribution forr each litre of wine distributed for public consumption. […]” 
According to Art. § 24/A (7)-(8) 60% of the income shall be expended in development and the fulfilment 
of Community wine marketing programs and the national co-financing of EU wine commercial wine 
marketing programs. The other 40% shall be used for financing quality control inspections and other 
consumer protection actions.  
Regulation No. 70/2007 (VII.27) FVM (the Regulation) regulates in detail the process of payment 
and the usage of the contribution. 
The Company argumentation: 
- the contribution serves only for the improvement of the position of the Hungarian grape and wine 
sector, and the contribution will be used only for that purpose  
- The Wine Act and the Regulation do not conform with Arts. 107 (1), 108 (3), and they conflict with 
decisions C-17/91, C-144/91, C-2061/2001 and C-192/95 CJEU 
- The Hungarian legal regulation is selective. The using of the contribution for financing wine 
marketing programmes in EU (for Hungarian wines) and consumer protection examinations of 
wines, serves only the interests of the Hungarian producers and not those of every market operator. 
The Hungarian producers are released from payment of the contribution, but, on the other hand, for 
other market operators this means the contribution is a clear financial load. 
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- The contribution is incompatible state aid according to Act. 107 TFEU, and it means that there is an 
advantage for a special group of market operators.  
- Hungary did not perform its obligation according to Art. 108 (3) TFEU and did not notify that the 
contribution was notified aid. In this way it is not enforceable. 
Procedure before the Hungarian courts: 
The Company asked the First Instance Administrative Court to review the decision of the Authority 
regarding the payment obligation for the marketing authorization contribution that the Company should 
have been paid. The Company asked for an initiation of the preliminary ruling by the CJEU about the 
compatibility of the Hungarian regulation relating to the market authorization contribution.  
The judgment of the First Instance Court rejected the request of the Company, the judgment was 
final. According to Hungarian procedural law, a motion for the review of a final judgment – judicial 
review - may be submitted to the Curia (the Supreme Court) on the grounds of infringement. 
A judicial review was initiated by the Company at the Curia based on the above argumentation and 
it again requested the initiation of the preliminary ruling of the CJEU. 
Decision and ruling of the Curia (the Supreme Court) - 2015 
The Curia extensively referred to the previous case law of the CJEU and explained the change of 
approach in the ruling of the CJEU in recent years. 
1. The Curia laid down that the Hungarian “marketing authorization contribution” may not be 
defined as a tax but only as a parafiscal charge, according to the case law of CJEU. "Parafiscal" 
charges are charges levied by public or private agencies on the production or marketing of 
agricultural products, with a view to financing activities for the benefit of the sector as a whole. 
Its aims will be determined, but the aims have to be objective and they may not be 
discriminatory.  
The CJEU has changed its approach regarding parafiscal charges since the decisions referred to by the 
Company. In its latest case law, the CJEU applies the principle of “hypothecation”.  
In case No. C-174/02 Section 26, the CJEU said:  
“For a tax, or part of a tax, to be regarded as forming an integral part of an aid measure, it must 
be hypothecated to the aid measure under the relevant national rules, in the sense that the revenue 
from the tax is necessarily allocated for the financing of the aid. In the event of such hypothecation, 
the revenue from the tax has a direct impact on the amount of the aid and, consequently, on the 
assessment of the compatibility of the aid with the common market.” 
In Joint Case Nos. C-393/04 and C-41/05, the CJEU summarizes its recent case law. Section 46-47 says: 
“It would be otherwise if the tax and the envisaged exemption were an integral part of an aid 
measure. For a tax to be regarded as forming an integral part of an aid measure, it must be 
hypothecated to the aid measure under the relevant national rules, in the sense that the revenue from 
the tax is necessarily allocated for the financing of the aid and has a direct impact on the amount 
thereof and, consequently, on the assessment of the compatibility of that aid with the common 
market. However, a tax cannot be hypothecated to an exemption from payment of that same tax for 
a category of businesses. Application of a tax exemption and its extent do not depend on the tax 
revenue. It is common ground that, in the main proceedings, it has not been established that the tax 
on motive force is hypothecated to the envisaged exemptions therefrom.” 
Besides the above, the CJEU maintained, in its case law, the examination of other elements relating to 
state aid. In a case where the determination of the subject of the contribution is selective, the exemption 
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of certain operators from a charge itself amounted to an aid measure, against competing operators who 
are obliged to make payments. [C-526/04 Section 32-35.]  
In its judgment, the Curia concluded that the jurisdiction of the CJEU, in the case of a parafiscal 
charge, evolves differently in regard to the aim of the usage of the income. Besides, and instead of, the 
examination of the aim for the usage, the CJEU has started to determine the objective criteria.  
In Joined Cases C-266/04 to C-270/04, C-276/04 and C-321/04 to C-325/04, the CJEU appointed 
that if the usage of the aid is within the discretionary power of a minister, hypothecation cannot be 
established in any way. [Section 55] 
The Curia concluded that the establishment of hypothecation is questionable in cases where the usage 
of the income from the charge falls within the discretion of a minister or an authority; or the aim is only 
partly financed from the charge; or the income is not only used for the aid to a certain market sector.  
The Curia concluded that, in the case of the usage of the “market authorization contribution”, the 
hypothecation was missing. 
According to the Regulation, 60% of the income from the contribution shall be used for a wine 
marketing strategy. The “Agricultural Marketing Centrum” gives recommendations for tenders and 
projects yearly. The recommendations of the Centrum will be signed by the competent minister. The 
decision does not directly influence the amount of the aid, but it determines its frames. The other 40% 
of the income will be used for consumer protection administrative procedures. The CJEU, in its case 
law, acknowledged consumer protection as being an acceptable aim of the restriction of fundamental 
rights. The income from the contribution serves the interests of every operator in the market – including 
the Company - with usage for consumer protection actions and wine marketing financing. 
The Curia concluded that selectivity cannot be established between the Hungarian and non-
Hungarian distributors. The related rules neutrally regulate the aims of the usage of the contribution. 
The wine marketing program serves the whole Hungarian wine distribution sector, in which the 
Company also operates. 
The Curia also ignored the request of the Company to turn to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, 
since the interpretation of the extensive relevant case law of the CJEU raised no doubts.  
Based on the above circumstances, the Curia rejected the application of the Company. Its payment 
obligation was maintained. 
Personal comments: 
The Hungarian wine sector appears several times in the procedures of the CJEU and the Commission. 
In its ruling, the Curia analyses a special compatible form of state aid, the parafiscal charge. The ruling 
gives an extensive summary of the recent case law of the CJEU and of the change in approach in its 
decisions.  
This case demonstrates that Arts. 107 and 108 have close connections to Art. 110. The extensive case 
law of the CJEU gave a clear guideline to the National Court for their decision. In my opinion, the Curia 
properly interpreted the case law of the CJEU. The procedure shows the importance of an awareness of 
the up to date case law of the CJEU. For a national judge, it is very important to recognize the validity 
of a request for a preliminary ruling. At the same time, based on the previous case law, the national 
judge should be able to take a grounded decision on questions that have already been answered by the 
CJEU and also in the absence of a preliminary ruling in the ongoing case.  
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10.3. Sofia Maravelaki (Athens Administrative Court) 
Decision no. 433/2017 of the Greek Council of State (CoS) -Department B. 
Preamble 
The television stations who were licensed before Law 2328/1995- and according to the yearly 
extension of their operation’s license, which is administered by this law, they -are subject to a payment 
of duties for the use of radio channels. The same applies to further indefinite extensions of these licenses, 
which are granted by Article 17 Para.3 of Law 2644/1998.  
The exemption from the disputed duties for state television does not violate the principle of equality 
and/orof Community Law. 
The radio spectrum is a public good, and the duties for its use considers no tax or administrative 
charges. The imposition of the obligation to pay such duties is a legitimate restriction of economic 
freedom, while the determination of the amount at 2% of gross revenue is not contrary to the principle 
of proportionality. 
The Directive 97/13/EC is not applicable in this case.  
The application before the Council of State was rejected and Decision no. 2993/2008of the 
Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens was validated. 
Facts 
The applicant is a company that is the owner of a television station, requested the cassation of Decision 
no.2993/2008 of the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens, which dismissed its appeal against 
Decision no. 2133/2007 of the Administrative Court of the First Instance of Athens. This latter Decision 
had rejected its application against Act no. 21078/ E1/4222/19-09- 2002 of the Minister for Media and 
Communications, which imposed - with reference to Article 17 Para. 3 of Law 2644/1998, - the payment 
of the amount of €2.494.310,40, as duties for the state, in order to use the radio channels from its TV 
station, during the period from 01-01-2002 to 31-12-2002. 
The yearly extension of the validity of the licenses of the television stations, which were granted 
under the previous legal regime, was granted under the conditions and criteria of Articles 1 and 2 of 
Law 2328/1995, i.e., the payment of 2% of duties per year on the gross revenue of the television station. 
The further, indefinite extension of these licenses, which was granted by Article 17, Para.3 of Law 
2644/1998, is under the same conditions of payment as the said annual duties, in order to use the channel 
radio frequencies. 
In this case, the applicant owned and operated a private television station, for the establishment and 
operation of which a license was granted in 1993, by joint decision from the Ministers of the Interior, 
Finance and Communications, subject to the provisions of Article 4, Para. 1 of Law 1866/1989.The 
license remained in effect until, in the present case, the critical time under the provisions of Articles 5, 
Para. 1 of Law 2328/1995, Para. 4 of Law 2438/1996, 17 Para. 3 of Law 2644/1998 and 7 of Law 
3021/2002. 
According to Act 21078/E1/4222/19-09-2002 of the Minister for Media and Communications (by 
invoking the provisions of Articles 1 of Law 2328/1995 and 17 Para. 3 of Law 2644/1998), an amount 
of €2,494,310.40, equivalent to 2% of the gross income for the year 2001, was imposed on the applicant, 
as duties, i.e., as an annual return for the use of the radio channels relating to the applicant’s television 
station, in the period from 01-01-2002 to 31-12-2002. Against this measure, the applicant brought an 
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action before the Administrative Court of First Instance of Athens, but the action was dismissed by 
Decision no. 2133/2007 of that Court. 
The applicant lodged an appeal against the above Decision, which was again dismissed by the already 
contested Decision no.2993/2008 of the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens. 
After that, there was an application for the cassation of the latter Decision before the Council of State. 
The application was again rejected as being unfounded, with the following reasoning. 
1. The radio spectrum is a scarce resource (Article 2 of Law 2867/ 2000), the management of which 
constitutes a sovereign right of the State (Article 3, Para.8 of Law 2246/1994).It is therefore a public 
good and has considerable economic value, since the granting of a license gives the holder thereof the 
ability to reap significant economic benefits and provides advantages over other operators who would 
also like to use and exploit this resource. This justifies the imposition of duties which reflect, inter alia, 
the value of the use of that scarce resource. The duties in question therefore constitute, as is explicitly 
predicted by law, duties in exchange for the use of a public good, namely, the radio channels, for the 
broadcasting of television programmes to a wide number of recipients-viewers and has neither a tax 
character nor a contribution fee character, imposed to cover costs for the public service that is 
specifically rendered (see CoS 2594/2015, 2595/2015). The pleas of the applicant, in reliance on Article 
4 Para. 5 and Article 78 of the Constitution, which affected thoughts on the contested judgment, which 
were based on the incorrect assumption that the above-mentioned duties are a tax or administrative 
charge, so they were rejected as being unfounded in law. 
2. The activity of television stations is indeed a manifestation of economic freedom and of the right 
to broadcast information and ideas. However, the exercise of these rights is linked to the use of a public 
good (an asset), and of a scarce resource. The imposition of the payment of duties on the broadcasters 
of radio frequencies, in order to ensure the optimal use of this scarce resource, namely, to serve a public 
purpose, is legitimate in principle, as far as economic freedom is concerned, in view of Article 106, 
Para. 1, of the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that the State ‘shall take the necessary measures 
for the exploitation of sources of national wealth, from the atmosphere to the underground water’. 
3. The provision of Article 4 of Law 2438/1996 develops the previous provision of Article 1 para. 
21 of Law 2328/1995 and explicitly and clearly states that the gross income of the last fiscal year of 
every television station is taken into account, as the basis for calculating the duties for that television 
station (2%), and they include all the station's revenue which comes, directly or indirectly, from its 
operation (see CoS 2594/2015, 2595/2015).  
In the present case, the duties have therefore been legally calculated on the gross income of the 
applicant, namely, on the income that is derived from the disposal of audiovisual and film material at 
home and abroad, from the exploitation of production facilities (studios) and from various related 
activities associated with television programmes, ,as well as from advertising revenues and the amounts 
paid to reward advertisers .This is not contrary to the entrepreneurial freedom guaranteed by Article 5 
Para. 1 of the Constitution, since it is within the limits set by the constitutional principle of 
proportionality. 
The applicant argued that the Decision of the Court of Appeal was incorrect, because it rejected its 
argument that the imposition of the disputed duties, which are placed only on private television stations, 
with an exemption for state television, is contrary to the provisions of the EEC Treaty (Articles 85 and 
86),namely, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (formerly 81 and 82 TEU), as well as to the provisions for fair 
competition favoring public sector enterprises to the detriment of private sector entrepreneurs, namely, 
Article 107 TFEU (formerly 92 TEU). 
The above arguments were rejected as being unfounded for the following reasons: 
1. The violation of the provisions of TFEU are not applied in this case, given its facts. 
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a. The provisions of Article 101 TFEU (formerly 81 TEU) concern agreements 
between enterprises, which is not the case here.  
b. The provisions of Article 102 TFEU (formerly 82 TEU) declare as 
incompatible with the Common Market the abuse of a dominant position within 
this Market, when it is able to affect the trade among Member States, which is 
also not the case here (see CoS 2594/2015), and,  
c. The present dispute has nothing to do with the concession of exclusive rights 
of television broadcasting, which would be contrary to the provisions of Article 
106 TFEU (formerly 86 TEU). 
2. The argument of the applicant that the imposition of the disputed duties is forbidden by the 
primary EU law (Article 87 of the EEC Treaty, later Article 92 TEU, now 107 TFEU) consisting 
of state aid, since it is imposed only on private television enterprises and does not concern the 
public television station, was rejected for the following reasons: Enterprises like the the applicant’ 
s , which are subject to an obligatory economic burden, cannot argue in front of their National 
Courts that the exemption from this burden for other enterprises consists of state aid, so that they 
can also be exempted. This can be done only if the said burden consists inevitably of part of a 
state aid measure, in the sense that the outcome of the imposition of this economic burden is 
necessarily destined to finance this Aid and affects its amount (see CJEU of 15-06-2006, C-
393/04, C-41/05 Air Liquide, Paras.43-48, of 27-10-2005, C-266/04 to C-270/04, C-276/04 and 
C-321/04 to C-325/04 Casino France , Para.40,of 20-09-2001, C-390/98 Banks, Para.80), which 
is not the case here. 
So, even if the exemption of the public television station consists of state aid, the applicant is not 
entitled to invoke the possible illegality of the said exemption, in order to also be able to be exempted 
from the imposition of the disputed duties (see CoS 2594/2015). 
Comments 
The possible state aid to rivals should not only be detected by the enterprise concerned, but it should 
also be possible to legally invoke, according to CJEU case- law. 
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10.4. Fernando Tainhas (Commerce Court of Lisbon) 
Court: Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal 
Court Case: 029/13 
Date of the Judgment: 23rd April 2013 
Brief summary of the facts in dispute 
Since 1995, in Portugal, a parafiscal charge has been, and continues to be, imposed on wine producers8 
by the “Instituto do Vinho e da Vinha, IP”9 (Vine and Wine Institute, hereinafter “IVV”).  
The proceeds of this charge, which is designed to promote wine, represents over 62% of the IVV's 
operational budget. The charge is imposed not only on wine products that are produced and marketed in 
Portugal, but also on products from Portugal that are marketed either in other Member States or in third 
countries, and on wine products originating in other Member States or third countries that are marketed 
in Portugal. 
A Portuguese wine undertaking claimed for the refund or annulment of the charge, stating that it is 
an illegal state aid, essentially saying that this was as a result of the lack of prior notification of the 
European Commission contrary to Article 108, n. º 3 TFEU. 
The judicial proceedings 
2. “A…, Lda.”, a Portuguese company, presented to a First Instance Administrative Court a judicial 
appeal against the administrative rejection of an application for the reimbursement or annulment of a 
parafiscal charge to promote wine, relating to September 2007, in the amount of €10 401,95. This 
parafiscal charge was collected by IVV. 
A judgment was given which dismissed the action. 
Disagreeing, the petitioner entered an appeal, asking to see the judgment repealed. 
In support of its application the appellant put forward the following pleas in law: 
- The parafiscal charge is illegal as a result of the lack of prior notification of the European 
Commission, contrary to Article 108, n. º 3 TFEU; 
- Regardless of a judgment of compatibility or incompatibility with the common market, the 
Portuguese State could not have implemented the charge, given the lack of prior notification and the 
effect of suspension that is provided for in Paragraph 3 of Article 108. of the EC Treaty; 
                                                     
8 Charge established by Decree-Law 137/95 of 14th June, 1995 (DR 136 I-A of 14/6/95) and amended by Decree-Law 119/97 
of 15th May, 1997 (DR 112 I-A of 15/5/97). 
9 Part of the IVV's work is to manage the general coordination of the wine producing sector, including the development of 
the following activities: those relating mainly to wines and wine products produced in Portugal, i.e., wine registration and 
heritage, auditing the control and certification systems for quality wines produced in specified regions (Quality Wines PSR) 
and regional wines; activities relating, in general terms, to wine and wine products originating in Portugal and those 
originating in other Member States and/or third countries and marketed in Portugal, i.e., the management and coordination 
of the wine market, control and monitoring of the wine producing sector in line with national and community legislation 
(these activities command almost the entire IVV budget).The IVV also provides certain services to third parties in areas 
such as: the storage of wine and wine products; laboratory services, and training its own staff and other specialists who are 
working in the viticulture sector (financed to a large extent by Community and national support programmes). 
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- The reimbursement or annulment of the charge does not derive from its adoption by the Commission 
for recovery measures, it derives only, and directly, from the violation of the obligation of prior 
notification and the prohibition of the implementation of the charge; 
- The State could not collect the parafiscal charge without having previously notified the Commission 
of the same, and until the Commission gave a final decision about the compatibility of such a fee 
with European Law; 
- It is irrelevant whether the measure at issue is, or is not, compatible with European law, or if it is 
just partially compatible, or which aspects of it are under investigation by the Commission by raising 
doubts as to its compatibility with the Common Market, because the charge is the sole source of 
financing for aid in the promotion and publicity of IVV; 
- The product of this charge, as a consequence, thus influences directly the importance of the aid, so 
that a reduction in the revenue from the levy implies a reduction in the resources for financing the 
measures for the promotion of, and training by, IVV. 
-  In addition, the appellant asked for a stay of proceedings and for referral of the case to the European 
Court of Justice, requesting answers to the following questions: 
- Whether the implementation of a charge, which represents the only source of funding for state aid 
that is not notified, must be notified to the Commission, pursuant to the terms of Article 108. TFEU? 
- Is the answer to the previous question affected in some measure by the fact that the product of this 
fee is financed equally, the percentage remaining, another set of services and activities (which may 
have, therefore, perhaps, a protective effect that goes beyond the aid itself which finances)? 
- Did Article 108., n. º 3 TFEU allow a Member State to collect such a charge, which represents the 
only source of funding for state aid that is not notified, before the decision of the Commission 
regarding compatibility with the Common Market became res judicata?  
- If not, can a national undertaking, citing the violation of the obligation for prior notification and the 
prohibition of the implementation of such a measure, petition in the National Courts for the refund 
or cancellation of the charge collected in violation of that provision? 
3. The Defendant – IVV – responded to the appeal, sustaining their previous positions and opposing the 
arguments putted forward by the appellant. 
In short, the Defendant stated that it has not yet been decided, with res judicata, if the IVV charge is 
state aid that is incompatible with the Common Market, and thus the adoption of that charge does not 
need to be notified to the European Commission, as provisioned in Article 108, nº 2 TFEU. 
Notwithstanding this, the Defendant argued that the Commission had already decided – in a Decision 
of 4th April, 2012 – that only the measures for the promotion and advertising of Portuguese wine in the 
markets of other Member States and third countries, and measures relating to its financing scheme, may 
constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107 of the TFEU, but not the measures relating to the 
financing of training, which does not constitute state aid, but which needs no prior notification in 
accordance with Article 108, nº 3 TFEU. 
Within the framework of the implementation of the Decision of 2010, as amended by a Council 
Decision of 2012, the Commission therefore expressed openness to Portugal demonstrating that support 
considered to be state aid within the procedural conclusions, in respect of the up to de minimis thresholds 
that apply, in which case, the Commission would consider the decision to be as executed. 
After confirming that the thresholds as de minimis rules have not been exceeded by any of the 
economic agents in the wine sector in Portugal, the IVV sent a letter to the Commission stating that the 
aid met the up to de minimis thresholds that were applicable, and that, for this reason, the state considers 
the Decision of 2010 to have been fully executed, without the need for any refund, which was accepted 
by the Commission.  
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In conclusion, the Defendant stated that the measures investigated by the Commission do not pose 
any problems of compatibility with Community Law with regard to the duty of prior notification 
imposed in Article 108, nº 3 TFEU, since they do not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 
107 of the TFEU. 
Facts of the dispute 
4. The following facts were considered to have been proven by the First Instance Court: 
i. On 30th October 2007, the Appellant payed IVV €10,401.95, regarding the promotion charge for 
September 2007; 
ii. On 22nd December 2008, the Appellant asked IVV for the refund or annulment of the parafiscal 
charge to promote wine, which was rejected on 12th January 2009; 
iii. On 9th February 2009, the company presented to a First Instance Administrative Court a judicial 
appeal against the administrative rejection. 
iv. On 1st December 2004, the European Commission notified the Portuguese Government of its 
decision to start the procedure that was provisioned in Article 108, nº 2 TFUE, in order to examine 
the compatibility of the mentioned fee with the Treaty’s rules on state aid. 
v. The European Commission closed the procedure through a Decision issued on 20-07-2010, 
establishing that: 
a) State aid for the generic promotion of wine and wine products in Portuguese territory, illegally 
executed by Portugal in violation of Article 108(3) TFEU by means of a levy established by Decree 
Law no. 137/95 of 14th June, are state aid that is compatible with the internal market within the 
meaning of Article 107. no.3(c) of the TFEU in relation to the period between its entry into force, 
and 31st December 2006; 
b) State aid for the promotion and advertising of wine and wine products of Portuguese origin in the 
territory of other Member States and of third countries, performed illegally by Portugal in violation 
of Article 108(3) of the TFEU, by means of a parafiscal charge established by Decree-Law no. 
137/95 of 14th June, are, without prejudice to the application of Article 2, state aid that is compatible 
with the internal market for Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU for the period between its entry into force and 
31st December, 2006. 
vi. Portugal appealed to the General Court of the European Union. 
Ruling of the Court 
5. The Supreme Administrative Court of Portugal held in favor of the Defendant and dismissed the suit, 
essentially basing its arguments on the de minimis rules.  
Firstly, the Court stated that, as a principle, the charge to promote wine was illegal because of the 
lack of notification of the Commission during the legislative procedure which culminated in the issuing 
of that decision. 
The judgment clearly establishes that if, during the procedure for the formation of a legislative act, 
its notification to the Commission has not taken place, or if the legislative act enters into force before 
the Commission has definitively and positively delivered a decision by means of a compatibility 
decision, this will be the verification of formal illegality, due to a procedural flaw. 
Nonetheless, evoking the CJEU Steinike and Saumon cases, the Court ruled, as the Commission also 
accepted, that, in this case, there was no obligation to give prior notification of the fee in question 
because it is a de minimis aid, which, according to Art. 2 of Regulation (EC) nº 1998/2006, is exempted 
from notification, and no approval or confirmation by the Commission is therefore required.  
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Hence, the Court concluded that the Commission proceeded automatically to the investigation 
procedure without first examining whether the alleged aid was below the thresholds defined as de 
minimis aid and which was therefore outside its scope for intervention, since its control falls under the 
responsibility of Member States. The judgment also stated that since it has been concluded that there is 
no obligation to notify in the present case, this does necessarily mean that there is no obligation to 
suspend the charge in question. 
Even if that were not the case, the Court claimed that the annulment of the whole of the promotion 
fee, as the appellant claims, by a formal procedural defect, which is the only defect alleged by it in the 
circumstances of the case, would be contrary to the principle of proportionality.  
Moreover, the Court pointed out the appellant’s burden of proof failed, because the assessment of 
the legality of the aid cannot fail to take account of the consequences which the applicant intends to 
draw from the alleged formal infringement of the 'standstill' rule, without having shown, or even argued, 
that, in this case it exceeded the de minimis thresholds, or that the levy applies to products imported 
from other Member States or third countries. 
Personal Comment 
6. From the research I undertook in Portugal not many judgments regarding state aid have been 
published, especially those that apply EU law.  
However, this case is a great example of the role of National Courts in assessing the existence of aid, 
and in checking compliance with the compatibility conditions.  
As the Commission pointed out in its Decision of 20th July 2010, "It is settled case-law that fees do 
not fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions relating to State aid unless they constitute the financing 
of an aid measure in such a way as to form an integral part of this measure ". This is the case only 
where there is a binding relationship between the rate and the aid, in the sense that the proceeds of the 
tax are necessarily intended to finance the aid.  
In the present case, its relevance derives from the conclusion that the wine promotion charge was an 
integral part of the aid for promotion only because a percentage of the proceeds of the promotion fees, 
which will never be less than 25%, will be used for measures to promote wine and wine products in 
general. The judgment therefore has a profusion of pertinent Court of Justice cases [v.g. CJEU 
STEINIKE of 1997/03/22, C-345/02 of 2004/07/15, C-126/01 of 2003/11/20] and doctrine citations, it 
makes also an adequate affirmation of the primacy of EU Law, without critically analyzing the role of 
the Commission’s Decisions regarding the case, especially the opening of an investigative procedure 
without first examining whether the alleged aid was below the thresholds that are defined as de minimis 
aid. 
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11.1. Nikolay Angelov (Administrative Court of Sofia) 
Tuna Fish Cans imitation case 
Bolton Alimentari PLC, Chermenate (Italy) v. Solid Co BG LTD Varna, Bulgaria 
Decision 12162/10.11.2016 /final Decision 3938/30.03.2017/ Supreme Administrative Court of 
Bulgaria 
Facts of the case:  
Bolton Alimentari PLC, Chermenate, Italy filled a petition to the Bulgarian Commission on the 
Protection of Competition on 31.03.2014 to determine, eventually, the violation of Art. 35 Para 1 of the 
Law on the Protection of Competition, made by Solid Co BG LTD Varna .The Italian company states 
that their commercial activities include the manufacturing, packing, import and export, selling and 
distribution of foodstuffs, mainly cans of tuna fish that have been well known for several decades on the 
European market as “RIO Mare”. It states also that, since 1998, the company imports into Bulgaria tuna 
fish cans using the distribution of another Bulgarian company- EOS-LD LTD. These tuna fish cans are 
put in very original and attractive packages. The fish is in an oval metal can, which is placed into a 
cardboard wrapper, the last are parallelepiped boxes, without two side parts, which helps the oval metal 
cans to be stable in the cardboard package, and these have specific images on them. The statement is 
that, since 1998, this type of cans, within a cardboard package, have become very popular on the 
Bulgarian market, and they are very well known and preferred by customers. On the other hand, Solid 
Co BG LTD., since January 2014, has put onto the Bulgarian market tuna fish cans that feature identical, 
or very similar, packages, as described above. These actions of the Defendant are anti-competitive, 
because the packages of the Defendant have such a visual effect, that some of the elements of the 
cardboard are the same, some are similar, and this thus leads to such a resemblance that the customer is 
easily mislead about which is the original product. It is possible that the customer will buy the 
Defendant’s product thinking that it is somehow new, or that the design is pointing to a new production 
of the well-known cans. The Italian company also states that the quality of the tuna fish in the 
Defendant’s cans is lower than that in the original ones. 
The Defendant doesn’t reject the above-mentioned facts, but states in his defense, that in the Patent 
Office of Bulgaria on 20.11.2006 an application for the registration of the trade mark RIO Mare was 
pending – a combined application for Classes 29 and 30, and the registration was agreed in February 
2013. The other points are that the tuna fish cans are only distributed on the territory of Bulgaria, and 
also that the design of the cans contains the image of a tuna fish fillet in its natural color, placed on a 
green leaf salad. 
Upon these facts the Commission on Protection of Competition gave Decision 1239/18.09.2014, 
which states that Solid Co BG LTD. has violated Art.35 Para 1 of the Law on the Protection of 
Competition and issued a penalty of 3% of the net incomes of the company for the previous (2013) fiscal 
year. Solid Co BG LTD appealed the decision in front of the Supreme Administrative Court, in which 
Decision 12162/10.11.2016/became final with Decision 3938/30.03.2017/, confirming the violation of 
Art.35 Para 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition. 
Comment 
The two companies in the proceedings are undertakings under Bulgarian Law, which deal with the 
production and distribution of tuna fish cans. The two companies are independent, so the Defendant is 
not in a partnership with the Plaintiff on the Bulgarian market for tuna fish cans. In Art.35 Para 1 of the 
Law on the Protection of Competition it is forbidden to offer or advertise goods or services with a design, 
packages, marks, names, or other signs, which mislead, or may lead to mislead customers in regard to 
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the origin of the goods, the manufacturer, seller, method and place of production, the source or way of 
acquiring the goods, or the use, quantity, quality, the real nature, or the customer effects and other 
essential characteristics of the goods or services. All forms of imitation, that are mentioned above are 
related to any unfair attack on the customers, when the original product has proven its quality and 
attractiveness to the customers, and its characteristics make, in the customer’s consciousness, positive 
associations, which make him/her prefer this product rather than other alternative products, and this is 
why it is obligatory to ascertain the first to date offering of the product on the market. The parties do not 
argue that the Italian product, RIO Mare tuna fish cans, has been on the Bulgarian market since 1998, 
and that the Defendant’s product has been on the market since December 2013. It is of primary 
importance to prove the real opportunity to mislead the customers by mistaking a product with another 
similar product, manufacturer or seller, so the aim of such a violation is to gain the use of an already 
well known and established product’s reputation on the market. In this case, the two competitive 
companies offer their tuna fish in oval metal cans, put into cardboard packages, which excludes the 
opportunity that the customer can see the product/tuna fish. He/she can only see the package. In 
ascertaining the violation, it needs to be mentioned that the tuna fish sold by the two companies is put 
into an oval, metal can, placed in a cardboard wrapper, the last are parallelepiped boxes, without two 
side parts, which helps the oval metal cans to be stable in the cardboard package, which has specific 
images. There is also the identity of the name that is used by Solid Co BG LTD on the tuna fish cans- 
RIO Mare, which is used by the Plaintiff. On the cans similar specific letters are used, positioned in the 
same place on the boxes, which inevitably could risk misleading the customer about the two products, 
in particular in relation to the origin and manufacturer of the fish. The existence of small and 
insignificant differences in the design of the imitating product does not exclude the liability given in 
Art. 35 Para 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, when, in their entirety, the single parts of 
the packaging of the goods have such a similarity to those of the products of their well-known and 
market established competitor, which offers a real opportunity for misleading the customers as to the 
goods or the manufacturer. The use of the similar packages by Solid Co BG LTD could lead to the 
stimulation of the customers to buy this kind of products, thinking that they are produced by a well-
known and market established manufacturer, and that this can lead to a real danger of abusing the 
interests of the competitors. This is why the liability of the Defendant of the imitation of the design of 
the tuna fish cans has been rightly established. 
As to the defence of the registered trade mark at the Patent Office of Bulgaria, it must be pointed out 
that the pending cases between the parties in the Sofia City Administrative Court about the validity of 
the registration of the trade mark RIO Mare are not in connection with the liability of Art.35 Para 1 of 
the Law on the Protection of Competition. There is no argument that the two parties have not registered 
an industrial design for the packages of the tuna fish cans discussed above. In the case between the 
parties now, the importance is to establish an unlawful use of the imitation of a design, package, mark, 
etc., but not of a registered trade mark which is a violation of Art.35 Para 2 of the Law on the Protection 
of Competition. Solid Co BG LTD does not independently use on its packages its registered trade mark, 
but uses a combination with images that are specific, and primarily, those of Bolton Alimentari PLC, by 
which the Italian company has been well known on the Bulgarian market since 1998, and that is how 
the Defendant does not present itself as independent and bona fide distributor of the tuna fish cans. So, 
the Defendant had violated the rule of Art.35 Para 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition.  
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11.2. Aleksandra Janas (Court of Appeal of Katowice) 
Początek formularza 
Resolution of the Supreme Court of 18th November 2015, III CZP 73/15 
Answer to the legal question of the Appeal Court in Katowice 
Facts 
The Claimant’s company, which is a producer of furnishing products (curtain rails, blinds and shutters), 
filed a lawsuit in which he requested that the Defendant, who owns the international DIY hypermarket 
chain, pay the amount of PLN 1,800,000 (€450,000) as the difference between the sum due on what was 
sold and what was actually paid. The difference was due to the fact that the Defendant charged an after-
sales discount (about PLN 1,700,000, i.e., about €400,000), and reduced its price commitment. The 
Defendant also charged for advertising the goods purchased from the Plaintiff, which were then sold in 
its chain stores (about PLN 100,000, i.e., €25,000). The advertising consisted of publishing 
advertisements in leaflets and catalogues available in stores and delivered to the local residents. 
The Claimant argued that both the accrued rebate, the amount of which increased with the increase 
in sales volume, as well as the advertising fees for the goods which were already the property of the 
Defendant, were so-called shelf charges ("other than merchant margin"), whose collection was banned 
by Article 15 (1) (4) of the Act of 16th April 1993, on Combatting Unfair Competition. It claimed that 
the discount was not associated with any equivalent service and did not bring any benefit to him. As for 
the advertising fee, the Claimant emphasized that other manufacturers' goods were also advertised in 
the same publications, and the amounts paid were not equivalent, and it was obliged to bear the cost of 
advertising the goods that were previously sold to the Defendant. 
The Defendant company demanded the dismissal of the claim and argued that the post-sale discount 
is an acceptable instrument that does not violate fair competition. The company claimed that its use is 
beneficial to both parties – since, with the increase in sales, the Claimant (seller) gains more profits but, 
at the same time, the unit price of the goods sold decreases, which, in turn, benefits the buyer (the 
Defendant) and motivates it to increase the scope of cooperation. On the cost of advertising, the 
Defendant, on the other hand, argued that the placement of the goods in the advertising leaflets and 
catalogues was beneficial to the seller, and, in addition, the amounts collected from all suppliers did not 
cover the costs of publishing advertising materials in any case. 
Początek formularza 
The District Court in Katowice upheld the claim in its entirety and the Defendant appealed against the 
verdict. The Court of Appeal in Katowice decided to apply to the Supreme Court with a juridical 
question regarding the nature of the post-sale discount, because the judgments of the Common Courts 
and the Supreme Court itself concerning this issue were completely divergent and contradictory. 
Content of the resolution: 
Commercial relationships between the buyer who runs the store chain and the supplier are not excluded 
from the recognition of a post-sales discount for a discount that does not constitute a charge that is 
provided for in Art. 15 Sec. 1 Pt. 4 of the Act of 16th April, 1993, on Combatting Unfair Competition 
(text: Journal of Laws 2003, No.153, item 1503, as amended, hereinafter: u.z.n.k.). 
The content of the resolution means that, in general, the monetary premium in the supplier-to-
network relationship should not be qualified as a fee beyond the commercial margin, because it shapes 
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the price at which the supplier sells the goods. However, it is not possible to exclude its apparent nature 
and the possibility of qualifying the after-sales discount paid to the buyer by the seller when a specific 
sales volume is reached for the fee that is provided for in Article. 15 Sec. 1 Pt. 4 u.z.n.k. It is then 
reasonable to investigate whether a margin lies within a hidden charge. There may be indications that 
the permitted discount can be distinguished from the situation where its reservation was merely apparent: 
1) Where there is a significant or gross disproportion between the discount and typical margins, 
2) Where there is a lack of conditions for granting a rebate or its amount - the parties in the agreement 
do not determine the amount or conditions of price reduction, leaving it to the unilateral buyer’s 
decision, 
3) Where the content of the contract - from the terms of the contract and the terms of its performance, 
may result in the rebate being a hidden shelf fee, 
4) Where there is a breach in the equality of the contractual parties – e.g., obvious misconduct of one 
of the contracting parties due to the use of an economic advantage by the contracting party. 
In the resolution adopted, the Supreme Court emphasized that the qualification of after-sales discounts 
as part of the price excludes the possibility of including, apart from the commercial margin, the charges 
for accepting the goods for sale. However, in the event of a dispute over the nature of the fee, other than 
the margin, the adjudicating tribunal must make an ad casu review, taking into consideration the 
circumstances of the conclusion of a specific agreement between the parties and the source of coverage 
of the reserved premium. The discount may, in specific circumstances, prove to be an illegal charge 
within the meaning of Art. 15 Sec. 1 Pt 4 u.z.n.k. which was "hidden" in the form of a margin. 
The conclusion of the resolution in question is that a monetary premium may be classified as a post-
sales discount (retroactive), or it may be in the form of an illicit shelf fee. The rebate must always be 
based on the circumstances of the case.  
My personal comment 
The resolution is a very important step towards understanding the nature of the post-sales discount and 
the resolution of disputes that arise. Especially important is the new, flexible approach to the problem, 
which allows the judge to evaluate the case individually. Previous case law lines did not meet this 
requirement, presuming in advance that either charging a rebate is, by its nature, an act of unfair 
competition, or perceiving the rebate, without any reservations, to be a market instrument which allows 
the optimization of the profits of both contractual parties. The first view is too radical and does not 
consider the principles of the free market, especially of economic freedom. On the other hand, the 
opposite stance does not prevent the risk of providing legal protection for conduct constituting an abuse 
of a dominant position and the acceptance of seemingly legitimate acts, thus, in fact, violating the 
principles of fair competition. 
Post Scriptum 
When settling the case, the Court of Appeal was bound by the aforementioned resolution. Having 
investigated the circumstances in which the rebate was accrued, by a judgment of 7th April, 2016, V 
ACa 814/14, the Court changed the judgment of the Court of First Instance in such a way as to award 
the Defendant only the costs incurred in connection with advertising. As for the rebate, the Court 
considered that there were no grounds for considering it to be unfair and therefore a forbidden shelf fee. 
Following this judgment, both parties filed a cassation complaint. The case is now awaiting resolution 
in the Supreme Court. 
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11.3. Kameliya Stoyanova (Administrative Court of Sofia) 
Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court (examined by a three-judge panel) 
8844/18.06.2013 in Case 15320/2012 
Ordinance of the Supreme Administrative Court from 09.04.2014 in Case 14402/2013 
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) in Case C-185/14 (the request was made in proceedings 
between EasyPay AD and Finance Engineering AD and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 
and the National Social Security Institute, seeking the annulment or repeal of certain articles of the Order 
on pensions and periods of insurance. This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation 
of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th December, 1997, on 
common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the 
improvement of the quality of service (OJ 1998 L 15, p. 14), as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20th February, 2008, and of Articles 106 TFEU and 107 
TFEU. 
Ordinance of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17.05.2016 
Facts 
Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court, examined by a three-judge panel  
The Court of First Instance (the Supreme Administrative Court), in the Judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court 8844/18.06.2013 in case 15320/2012, held that Article 106 of the Social Security 
Code allowed the Council of Ministers the discretion to select the company which best meets the public 
needs, and the Supreme Administrative Court deduced therefrom that the action brought by EasyPay 
AD and Finance Engineering AD must be dismissed as being unfounded.  
The parties then brought an appeal in cassation before the Court of Cassation (the Supreme 
Administrative Court, presented by a five-judge panel) 
Ordinance of the Supreme Administrative Court (presented by a five-judge panel) of 17.05.2016 
With the Ordinance of 17.05.2016, the Supreme Administrative Court demanded that the Bulgarian 
Council of Ministries, the National Social Security Institute and the Minister of Transport, Information 
Technology and Communications clarify some of the circumstances that are written in that ordinance, 
as follows: 
- whether the money order operations carried out by Bulgarian Post (EAD), that effect the payment 
of retirement pensions is involved in the functioning of the public social security service and, 
accordingly, whether it must, or must not, be regarded as an economic activity falling within the 
scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
- whether the parameters, on the basis of which the compensation to Bulgarian Post (EAD) is 
calculated, were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. 
- whether the level of compensation is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a 
typical undertaking, one that is well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred in 
discharging those obligations, considering the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for 
discharging the obligations. 
The court hearing is scheduled for October 2nd, 2017.  
Decision of the European Commission to launch a formal investigation against the Republic of 
Bulgaria in relation to alleged state aid granted by the government to Bulgarian Post (EAD). 
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According to an official letter from the Ministry of Transport, Information Technologies and 
Communication (on my request), in 2015 the European Commission decided to launch a formal 
investigation against Bulgaria. The number of the case is SA.39043 (Alleged state aid procedure pending 
to the Commission services). 
I have also made a request before the Ministry of Transport, Information Technologies and 
Communication to provide me with the official correspondence between the Ministry of Transport, 
Information Technologies and Communication and the Commission regarding the case. The Ministry 
of Transport, Information Technologies and Communication has requested the special permission of the 
Commission, and when this permission is granted, I will bring the content of the correspondence to your 
attention.  
Notes 
1. Bulgarian Post (EAD) considers the obligation imposed by the state to be a long-term, sustainable 
activity. Although there is no formal rule for reinvesting any surpluses arising from it, the operator is 
obliged to do this in order to provide a better service and to compensate for the initial-year losses from 
the performance of this obligation.  
2. Compensation for BP - the amount of the compensation is determined by the State Budget Law 
for the relevant year.  
3. Banks and payment of pensions: In fact, banks do not provide the same service for the payment of 
pensions that Bulgarian Post (EAD) does. The pensioners have the right to choose how they want to 
receive their pensions. Banks handle the payment of pensions as a non-cash standard bank service. The 
National Social Security Institute transfers the amounts to the already existing accounts of the 
pensioners, whose service at a flat rate is paid by the retired person. The rightful Claimant has at their 
disposal the amounts in the accounts and may use them to make transactions or can withdraw the 
amounts at the cash desk or with their bank cards. The expenses on servicing the debit cards (issuing, 
reissuing in case of loss) are also paid by the end users on general terms. Banks do not conduct additional 
handling of information, differently to the usual bank operations, they are not obliged to organize cash 
payments differently to the payments of their other clients, and they do not pay pensions to the homes 
of the pensioners. Pensioners can use their debit cards only in settlements with bank branches and ATMs, 
which are predominantly placed in bigger settlements. Banks and other commercial operators, as a 
whole, do not maintain such infrastructure in regions where they do not have economic interests, unlike 
the Bulgarian Post (EAD). Banks have at their disposal, and operate with, the amount in the accounts as 
stipulated by the regulations for banking activity. There are no special state regulations to determine the 
fees for bank services for the accounts of retired people, or about pension payments. Bulgarian Post 
(EAD) makes cash payments together with the other additional accompanying administrative expenses, 
transport and security to over 5000 settlements. Bulgarian Post (EAD) restores the amounts of the unpaid 
pensions back to the National Social Security Institute, which, again, is connected to the expenses named 
above. Bulgarian Post (EAD) does not burden the pensioners with any additional expenses and does not 
charge any fees to the persons for this service. Bulgarian Post (EAD) provides the payment of pensions 
on the territory of the whole country, including the most distant and smallest settlements where there 
are neither bank branches/ATMs nor commercial operators. Unlike the banks, Bulgarian Post (EAD) 
carries out the activity directly at the homes of the pensioners after they reach a certain age or have 
certain health conditions. Banks are not subject to compensation from the state, because it is a 
prerogative that every retired person may choose either to use a bank service, under the general 
conditions of the banks for receiving their pensions, or not. The choice of a payment method for the 
pension, either by post offices or by bank, pertains to every pensioner. 
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11.4. Veronika Antal (Hungarian National Office of the Judiciary) 
Gfv.VII.30.192/2015/11. Curia 
15.G.41.248/2006. Capital Regional Court 
14.Gf.40.025/2009/6. Court of Appeal of Budapest 
Gfv.X.30.284/2009/7. Supreme Court 
15.G.41.499/2010. Capital Regional Court 
14.Gf.40.487/2014/14/III. Court of Appeal of Budapest 
Final judgment: 9th February 2016. 
I. Brief summary of the facts of the dispute: 
In the invitation to tender that was launched by AVOP (Operative Program for Agricultural and Rural 
Development) for EU funding (SAPARD), the department of the Defendant ministry set the 
precondition that the applicants must compile a detailed budget for the construction works based on the 
construction standard corpus (CSC) that was developed by the non-litigant T-Ltd. 
The plaintiff also engages in the development of the construction standard corpus. In addition, no 
tender process was concluded before the use of the software was prescribed. 
II.Summary of the judicial proceedings: 
In its petition, the Plaintiff requested that it be established that, upon determination of the tendering 
conditions, the Defendant infringed the provisions of the Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Market 
Practices, and the Act on Equal Treatment, and gave the impression that the Plaintiff company’s 
software is inappropriate. 
The Plaintiff initiated a preliminary ruling procedure at the EU Court referencing Article 267 TFEU. 
The following question arises: “Is state aid to be deemed a state aid that is prohibited by Article 107 
TFEU where a company that is independent from the state, without a prior tendering process, is being 
favored in such a way that participation in a tendering process for funding is dependent on purchasing 
the given company’s product?” 
The Court of First Instance denied the petition. The court pointed out that the practice of a state 
agency prescribed by the law cannot be considered a market practice; even where such practice 
influences the market, as such state agency activities do not fall within the scope of the Act on the 
Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices. Infringement of the principle of equal treatment can only be 
cited by natural persons. No ruling was made regarding the petition for a preliminary ruling procedure. 
The Plaintiff’s appeal included the plea that, previously, the Plaintiff company and T-Ltd. The 
company that developed CSC, had practically equal market shares, but the tendering practice that served 
as the cause of the action created a distortion of the market shares to the Plaintiff’s disadvantage. 
The Appeal Court partially changed the ruling of the Court of First Instance. It ruled that the 
Defendant engaged in an unfair market practice when it required the use of CSC as a compulsory 
condition for the application for EU funding. The Appeal Court also found that the state, as party to 
property law relationships, can indeed apply practices that fall under Competition Law. By prescribing 
the application of T-Ltd.’s software for applicants who are involved in the tender procedures, who are 
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without experience of a prior tendering process, to ensure equal opportunities, the Defendant greatly 
influenced the positions of market participants, and infringed the rules of competition. 
With regard to indemnification, the Appeal Court ordered a new procedure. 
Upon the Plaintiff’s review request, the Supreme Court repealed the decision made by the Court of 
Appeal and ordered the Court of First Instance to conduct a new procedure regarding the claim for 
indemnification. According to the Curia’s ruling, the practices of state agencies can by no means be 
deemed market practices, even when such practices affect the market. These practices do not fall within 
the scope of the Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices. 
During the repeated trial, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to distort 
competition and constituted prohibited state aid, in accordance with Article 107. The legal basis 
indicated regarding indemnification as damage inflicted was within the scope of public administration. 
The Plaintiff initiated a preliminary ruling procedure at the EU Court about the meaning of the state 
aid. The Plaintiff also claimed that the Defendant is an independent, public budgetary entity, and the 
advantage granted by it is to be considered an advantage granted by a Member State. The Member State 
involvement can be established on the grounds of influencing the free movement of services. The Court 
of First Appeal denied the petition. According to the Court’s decision, T-Ltd. was not granted state 
funding; as such, state funding would mean funding granted from state funds that distorts competition 
and relates to funding related to trade between Member States. The decision also concluded that all 
Member States are entitled to interpret the concept of state aid independently (Commission Notice on 
the enforcement of state aid law by National Courts 2009/C 85/01) The purchasing cost of CSC was not 
an eligible expenditure in the tender procedure, and therefore the funding from state resources was not 
grounded. With the absence of the above condition, the Court of First Instance found the petition –on 
the basis of Article 107 – to be unsubstantiated. 
The appellant also claimed that there were all the conditions for the state aid that is covered by Article 
107 TFEU. In his appeal, the Plaintiff referred to Case no. C-41/90. 
The Appeal Court, acting due to the Plaintiff’s appeal, upheld the ruling of the Court of First Instance 
with reference to Case no. C-92/11 and C-379/98. The petition for a preliminary ruling procedure was 
denied, as the EU provision was not applicable, and therefore its interpretation was not raised. 
The review request of the Plaintiff was aimed at the repeal of the ruling, and it set forth a claim for 
indemnification. The Plaintiff maintained that it suffered significant damage due to the Defendant’s 
intentional practice, which ultimately led to the Plaintiff being forced out of the market as a database 
creator. 
The Curia was required to take a standpoint regarding whether or not the Defendant granted 
prohibited funding to T-Ltd., and consequently caused damage to the Plaintiff. 
The Curia referred to the principle that, in accordance with Article 107, the state intervention must 
be sufficient to affect trade between Member States. The Plaintiff did not refer to any kind of practice 
that would affect trade between EU Member states, and therefore the petition for a preliminary ruling 
procedure was denied. The Curia found that, for the reason stated above, the prohibited state aid did not 
occur for reasons referred to by the Court of First Instance, and therefore no damage was incurred by 
the Plaintiff in connection therewith. 
The ruling regarding the denial of a preliminary ruling procedure was sustained with reference to the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Case no.C-210/06 (Cartesio). 
According to this ruling, the Appeal Court is not to be deemed a forum that is obligated to refer the 
case to the EU Court; moreover, a higher court forum cannot order a regional court to change its decision 
regarding a case that is at the discretion of the regional court. 
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III. Comment: 
In the light of the above case, it is apparent that the law of a Member State and the EU Court’s case law 
complement one another, even when the actual case does not justify the initiation of a preliminary ruling 
procedure. 
The National Court referred to the previous case law of the CJEU. 
The Member State’s judge interpreted the notion of state aid in accordance with Hungarian law and 
supported its arguments with EU law cases. Due process – the principle of having a lawful judge – is 
not deemed to be impaired only because the Hungarian Court does not refer to the EU Court regarding 
interpretation of the law. At the same time, knowledge of the EU Court’s legal practices is vital when 
making Member State Court rulings, and in the justification of rulings, and appears to be more and more 
important in everyday court rulings.  
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- Monika Dominiak, Regional Court of Warsaw 
- Guido Federico, Italian Supreme Court 
- Fátima Galante, Court of Appeal of Lisbon 
- Davidoiu Georgian, Court of Appeal of Bucharest 
- Maria Gkana, Greece Council of State 
- Marcel Goessen, District Court of Limburg 
- Carlos Manuel Gonçalves de Melo Marinho, Court of Appeal of Lisbon 
- Stefania Grasselli, Court of Cremona 
- Jeannette Hajdinova, Regional Court of Bratislava 
- Merit Helm, Hariju County Court 
- Sarolta Huszárné Czap, Hungarian National Office of the Judiciary 
- Laura Ivanovici, Romania High Court of Cassation and Justice 
- Aleksandra Janas, Court of Appeal of Katowice 
- Polona Kukovec, Slovenia Supreme Court 
- Ana Paula Fonseca Lobo, Portugal Supreme Amministrative Court 
- Colm Mac Eochaidh, Ireland High Court 
- Sofia Maravelaki, Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens 
- Andreea Marchidan, Court of Appeal of Bucharest 
- Seamus Noonan, Ireland High Court  
- Cristian Daniel Oana, Romania High Court of Cassation and Justice 
- Gianmario Palliggiano, Administrative Regional Court of Naples 
- Daniel Panocha, Tarnow District Court  
- Jacinto-José Pérez-Benítez, Court of Appeal of Pontevedra 
- Dimitrina Petrova, Administrative Court of Sofia 
- Mirella Rodin, Municipal Court of Rijeka 
- Aleksandra Rutkowska, Wrloclaw District Court 
- Nienke  Saanen, Amsterdam District Court  
- Consuelo Scerri Herrera, Malta Court of Justice 
- Stefan Schlotter, Germany Ministry of Justice and for Consumer Protection 
- Jelena Šiškina, Vilnius Regional Court 
- Agostinho Soares Torres, Court of Appeal of Lisbon 
- Ewa Stefanska, Court of Appeal of Warsaw 
- Kameliya Stoyanova, Administrative Court of Sofia 
- Natalie Swalens, Commercial Court of Brussels 
- Fernando Tainhas, Commercial Court of Lisbon 
- Luis Manuel Ugarte Oterino, Central Court of Madrid 
- Vanya Valkadinova, Blogoevgrad Administrative Court 
- Rudite Vidusa, Lithuania Supreme Court 
- Josef Franz Weinzierl, Regensburg District Court  
- Gorana Aralica, High Commercial Court of Zagreb 
- Jovita Einekiene, Vilnius City Circuit Court 
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